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ABSTRACT
This dissertation draws on case studies to describe how
top engineers, scientists, and policy makers planned for the
federal management of three kinds of hazards: dam failures,
structural failures from earthquakes, and radioactivity from
nuclear waste. Each case involves artifacts set into an
unstable earth, where disasters can occur from a combination
of a minor organizational mishap, such as a missing part of a
machine, and inadequate knowledge by scientists and engineers.
The planners, working far from the physical and social
reality in which hazards arise, operated with mainstream
conceptual models of organization, engineering, science, and
society as a whole. These general models place technical
rationality at the top to achieve predictability and control,
and discount the knowledge of all below. But these planners
encountered uncertainties in knowledge and surprises in the
institutional setting and responded by imposing more stringent
controls that may actually have exacerbated risks.
On the other hand, the cases revealed other kinds of
knowledge: "intimate knowledge" of particular conditions
acquired over time, skillful workmen's "feel" for phenomena
that cannot be directly observed, "critical knowledge" of
technical matters by those outside specialized fields, and the
"aggregate knowledge" of social groups, more comprehensive
than the analytical knowledge of science. Competent technical
professionals also display such knowledge, which is essential
for planning, design, construction, and monitoring of such
artifacts but which is suppressed under mainstream models of
knowledge and institutional arrangements.
Current remedies do not capture what is needed to cope
with these hazards. The dissertation explores kinds of social
arrangements within bureaucracy and at local levels outside,
which transcend rules and cut across disciplinary and
institutional boundaries. It recommends a kind of planning
that is informal, flexible, and responsive to diversity and to
irreducible uncertainty in the physical and social reality.
Thesis Supervisor: Donald A. Schon
Title: Ford Professor of Urban Studies and Education
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CHAPTER I
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
. . . the problem is not new. The government has been struggling
with the issues for 150 years [since it] asked . . . the American
Philosophical Society to appraise the risks of steam boiler
explosions around 1820 . . . a note of optimism [is] related to the
fact that we collectively decided to restructure our society and
are well along. The 1980's agenda is the rationalization of the
process.'
Philip M. Smith
This dissertation questions the optimism and expectations of
rationalizations in federal efforts to deal with problems of
technological risks, specifically those resulting from dam failures,
earthquakes, and radioactive wastes. During the period 1978-80,
planning for the management of hazards from these sources was carried
out at the apex of what could be called national institutions for
knowledge and collective action, in the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP) within the Executive Office of the President during the
administration of Jimmy Carter.
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We contend that the rationalization touted by Smith is in fact part
of the problem, not the solution. Our thesis is that generalized models
of knowledge and institutionalized actions are inappropriate to deal
with these technological risks because they do not address the nature of
the physical and social reality. As Smith indicated, federal concern
with technological risk was not new. What was new was increasing public
concern about the negative effects of technology, arising out of the
anti-establishment and environmental movements of the 1960s, and the
demands that the federal government do something. The failure of a
federal dam, the threat of a great earthquake in California, and public
agitation about nuclear waste brought these particular issues onto the
federal agenda in 1977.
In each case, the federal government faced a dilemma. For more than
a century, it had created public works to control the flow of water over
the land and had set an example for others at home and abroad in
constructing great dams. It had subsidized public facilities and
fostered urban development in areas prone to seismic activity. It had
sponsored the concentration of radioactive materials for military ends
and promoted their use for civilian needs. It had done these things in
the public interest, and still does.
These federal actions were based on the fact that for years federal
engineers had insisted that their dams were permanent and would not
fail. Earth scientists had promised that they would soon predict great
earthquakes and thus save lives. Nuclear scientists and engineers
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claimed that wastes could be safely disposed of in salt deposits deep in
the earth. And many still do. On the other hand, failures, threats,
and public agitation challenged the promises of the scientists and the
hubris of the engineers and the credibility of a federal government
perceived to be ultimately responsible for protecting public health and
safety. This created a federal dilemma.
In response, OSTP, among its other activities, undertook three
projects to plan for the management of technological risks, on Federal
Dam Safety (FDS), for Earthquake Hazard Reduction (EHR), and on a policy
for Nuclear Waste (NW). All were carried out under Frank Press, the
President's science advisor, and directed by Philip M. Smith, an
associate director of OSTP, with the aid of specialized consultants,
leading scientists and engineers, and top officials, who are considered
the planners in these cases.
To understand why the three projects were grouped together, it is
important to recognize the sense in which the hazards of earthquakes are
primarily technological. These natural events do not harm people in
open areas and seldom damage simple wood frame structures. The dangers
lie in the collapse of more elaborate structures and of such complex
systems as gas lines and bridges.
To give the reader some background: in response to the failure of
Teton dam in Idaho in 1976, OSTP began to prepare federal dam safety
guidelines early in 1977 and in 1979 delegated their implementation to
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an office within the new Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Later in 1977, OSTP began planning for the use of funds to be allocated
by Congress for a new federal role in overseeing programs for earthquake
reduction at all levels of government. The next year, after the
President did not approve grants for the states, funds went mainly to
research in seismology and seismic engineering. In 1980, another new
office in FEMA finally did persuade the President to approve a pilot
program for Los Angeles. In 1978, OSTP began working with others on the
problem of isolating nuclear waste; by the time a policy was announced
during Carter's last year in office, Congress was pre-empting the
administration's initiative and had subverted its intent.
A decade later, the planning seems to have resulted in little of
practical value. Aging dams are seldom inspected and some hazardous
ones remain unrepaired. The threat of a great earthquake grows as
moderate ones shake Southern California, but the only earthquake
predicted so far, in a rural area, will do little to save lives.
Meanwhile people live below dams or in unstable structures in seismic
areas, often unaware of the dangers, while the agencies that could
manage these programs struggle for survival. Old nuclear wastes leach
into the ground and new wastes accumulate, while plans for treatment and
disposal are deferred.
As technological disasters, such as the explosion of the spaceship
Challenger and the fire at Chernobyl, raise public anxieties, they also
increase the importance of understanding what went wrong with these
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federal projects. How can we reduce the likelihood of such disasters,
prepare for them, or mitigate their consequences?
Before searching for answers, we review some of the literature that
informed our work, especially on technological risks and accidents. The
next chapter provides some background on the institutional setting of
OSTP, the methodology, and major themes. The body of this dissertation
consists of three stories about the OSTP projects; the work concludes
with an interpretation of these and a synthesis of lessons learned.
The Literature
Disasters resulting from the use of tools have occurred since the
dawn of civilization. But the literature we are about to review is
narrower, and may be divided into two basic parts. Traditionally,
well-known misfortunes have been treated as matters to be handled in
monetary terms by insurance. But more important is a growing body of
new literature describing an analytical approach to rare or
unprecedented accidents. The question of the acceptability of risks is
set apart and thereby generates an expanding list of problems. At the
core are problems in analyzing hazards and quantifying the probability
of risks accompanied by problems of public perceptions of risks and
leading to dilemmas for public decision makers. In using better
procedures for public participation in decision making to solve these
dilemmas, new global issues arise about threats to the basic
institutions of government and markets. The second section of this
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review covers some fresh perspectives, first on cultural perceptions of
risk, next on organizational strategies for handling uncertainty, then
on how unprecedented accidents arise, and finally on a kind of knowledge
radically different from that of science.
Insurance. An earlier effort to manage risks, in a quantitative and
economic manner, can be traced back at least to the Middle Ages. During
storms at sea, trading vessels were lightened by heaving cargo
overboard, imposing disproportionate losses on some of the merchants.
(One can imagine controversies must have arisen about the placement of
goods in the hold.) When all of the merchants pooled funds in advance
of a voyage to cover the losses expected on the basis of past
experience, and entrepreneurs invested in these pools, marine insurance
was born. Other forms of insurance followed. For instance, after
London's Great Fire of 1666, fire insurance was introduced. In the 20th
century, compulsory "social insurance" has been adopted against the risk
of unemployment and the loss of income in retirement.2
In the insurance industry, the concept of risk was based on several
conditions. Negative events must not be subject to human control but
rather arise by chance. The risk must be unilateral, not arising out of
bilateral marketplace transactions, where one man gains from another's
losses (although the insurance industry has gained). Events producing
losses must be measurable and quantifiable under theories of probability
and chance and the law of large numbers, which states that the greater
the number of instances, the closer the results approach the theoretical
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probability, or a normal frequency distribution. Risk can be calculated
as a ratio between the number of units one expects to be harmed and the
units exposed to the hazard, both assigned monetary values. For
insurance to work, a population at risk must recognize and dread the
hazard, and be willing to take responsibility for the economic
consequences and pay its share. When the costs to a few are then
distributed among all members of a group, insurance is said to
substitute certainty for uncertainty in an economic sense. 3
These conditions, particularly the law of large numbers, do not
apply to many modern technological risks. Negative events, such as the
failure of a large dam, may be so rare or unprecedented that they cannot
be anticipated on the basis of past experience. The boundaries between
who is and is not exposed may not be clear, as in the case of the
expected losses from exposure to radioactivity, for instance, in the
present or in future generations. The value of human life, once a
matter for God, or considered cheap, or left up to individuals seeking
insurance, is particularly contentious. Moreover, an exposed population
may be unwilling to pay insurance costs or to take responsibility for
the consequences of a natural disaster, such as a major quake.
Corporations may treat risks as economic externalities, not their
responsibility, or to be dealt with after the fact by compensating
individuals harmed. For such reasons, government has intervened,
requiring or underwriting insurance or legally regulating private
activities.
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More important, when professionals and managers claim to control
technology, risks no longer appear to arise accidentally, as matters of
chance. Someone is surely to blame. Since the 1960s, a new legal
procedure, liability suits, has gained popularity to compensate people
after the fact of losses. Insurance rates have soared to cover the
prospect of such suits. Moreover, analysts and legislators are
constantly trying to find new ways to reduce risks to economic terms.
An Analytical Approach to Risk
Since World War II, a new and highly technical definition of risk
has emerged, based on the idea that rare or unprecedented events can be
anticipated, their probability calculated, and the level of acceptable
risk decided upon and controlled as a matter of public policy.
Techniques have been designed to anticipate events differing from those
observed or experienced. The Department of Defense and its contractors
developed analytical methods, such as operations research, statistical
decision theory, and systems analysis, for use in the aerospace and
other industries and for planning military strategies.
In the late 1950s the Atomic Energy Commission began to assess risks
from the nuclear generation of electric power. In the early 1970s, it
elaborately analyzed the possibility of a power plant accident, using
decision trees of faults or errors to arrange subsets of events and
sequences of processes in scenarios that could lead to failure. By
multiplying the low probabilities assigned to significant points of
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these scenarios, the Rasmussen Report, as it was called, concluded that
a major disaster was unlikely.4 After the report was criticized for
limiting assumptions and for neglecting combinations of factors, the
techniques were refined.
The difference between old and new ways of knowing about risks,
through observation of past events or through logical mathematical
constructs, is exemplified by national maps of seismic hazards. Earlier
maps were based upon observation, local lore, and history, and presented
the highest magnitude of tremors known since European settlement; they
did not reflect the greater frequencies of earthquake in the west
inactive faults that might soon again trigger quakes. Seismologists
have since designed complex algorithms with parameters reflecting what
is known theoretically about the causes and transmission of ground
motion through crustal materials. Their mathematical models represent
the probabilities that certain levels of intensity of tremors will not
be exceeded during the next fifty years, as a more reliable basis for
seismic standards.5
Now few except experts in seismology and statistics can understand
or criticize the new maps, which rationalize seismic risk into a
hypothetical concept inaccessible to ordinary people. They must accept
on faith the numerical probabilities of unprecedented future events.
Problems from Subdividing Risk and Safety. Characterizing risks has
become the focus of a new professional field, with a growing body of
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literature. The professionalization of risk has been justified by the
growth in the scale of technology and its interdependence with the
environment, which has "dwarfed the ability of individuals to estimate,
appraise, and reduce their own risks." Moreover, the public expects
scientists to solve the problems that the application of science in
technology created in the first place. Thus, we need a rational and
centralized determination of safety.6
Safety, once a quality taken for granted, has been turned on its
head and neatly cleaved into two: "measuring risk, an objective but
probabilistic pursuit, and judging the acceptability of risk (judging
safety), a matter of personal and social value judgment." The technical
definition is further subdivided into a three-part formula: risk equals
the statistical probability of the occurrence of a negative event
multiplied by the magnitude of its effects.1 How to put the parts
together is an implicit issue in the literature.
Many difficulties arise on the technical side: analyzing, modelling,
and quantifying risks. The relationship between cause and effects may
not be clear, as when adverse effects of radiation exposure are
delayed. Cancers, for instance, may have multiple causes, posing
problems of inference. Even after the fact, as we will see in the
failure of the Teton Dam, the cause may be unclear. Scientists face
difficulties in extrapolating, as from mice in the lab to humans or from
given facts to different models, as from the known effects of exposures
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to sudden high dosages of radiation at Hiroshima to low doses over
longer periods of time.
In its present state, the techniques are said to be useful at least
for organizing information, shaping alternatives, and surfacing issues
for discussion and further research. But the "art of risk analysis is
so primitive that in debates, differing analyses can be played off
against each other, supporting opinions arrived at by other means."*
Experts expect the infant field to mature with better science.
However, many problems involving risks have a disturbing uncertainty
about them or pose dilemmas, like Hardin's "tragedy of the commons,"
pitting the individual against social interests. When men are reluctant
to make personal sacrifices for the general good if others do not, all
may ultimately lose the benefits they shared in common. These have
sometimes been called have called "transcientific problems," involving
science but beyond its ability to resolve; these are matters for the
public and its leaders to handle.9
The Problem of Public Perceptions. On the social side of the
dichotomy is the judgment of how safe is safe enough, often considered a
matter of personal or social values, a moral judgment of the sort that
objective scientists should not make. Some experts have tried to
pre-empt the public's role. In the 1960s, Chauncy Starr considered the
risks of nuclear power plants as a kind of transactional matter, using
the method of "revealed preferences," and tried to determine objectively
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and indirectly what risks people would accept in the marketplace in
exchange for the benefits of technology.'" He failed to recognize
that people may voluntarily take higher risks than they will allow
others to impose on them.
But research into public perceptions of risk and safety has
concluded that the public is irrational, even absurd. Tversky and
Kahnemann demonstrated that in matters of chance and probability, most
people have little grasp of the rules of inference and instead use
simplifying rules of thumb, or "heuristics," to make decisions.11
Building on such findings, social psychologists have tried to design a
theory about the public's "expressed preferences." Systematic sources
of error arise from "availability" or "imageability," the ease with
which instances of hazards can be brought to mind. The image of
"mushroom clouds" may haunt the minds of anti-nuclear activists.
Personal experiences play a part; if these are biased, one's perceptions
will be too. The press also distorts perceptions of risks from
disasters that take many lives at one time, such as airplane crashes,
even though aircraft are less hazardous than cars. After a well
publicized disaster, like a major quake, the public will clamor for
something to be done but that demand will rapidly abate. 2
People also seek to reduce uncertainty by denying that it exists.
The seismic planners' version of "human nature" was that most people
live in the "here and how," engrossed in personal day-to-day problems.
They are not concerned about the consequences of low probability future
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disasters. They will tend to ignore or seek disconfirming evidence of
scientific warnings, such as of an impending quake. Even experts may
have untoward confidence in their own judgments, denying the validity of
contrary evidence. "Such over-confidence can keep us from realizing how
little we know," social psychologists warn."3
This "normalcy bias" has posed problems for disaster mitigation
planners, who have concluded that programs "based on individual
motivations for self-protection or the initiative of individuals and
small groups" have failed because they ignored "the universal human
tendency to assume that everything is all right until events clearly
prove otherwise."'" Thus government is justified in preparing
programs to protect the public.
The Problem of Public Decision Making. When experts do not agree on
causes or models or measurements of risks, and when the public appears
irrational, what are public decision makers to do? They are caught in a
dilemma of trying to find a rational solution to a public problem while
maintaining their own credibility before an electorate that does not
know its own mind. The new professionals emphasize that a risk-free
world is impossible. Some would convince decision makers that the risks
are small, urge them to get on with business as usual, and educate the
public to the low probability of "real risks." Most would convince them
to allocate funds to assess the risks.'" But others, in the business
of mitigating risks, including some seismologists and seismic engineers,
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would educate the public about higher levels of risk, to obtain public
support for research and their cooperation with official controls.
Many professionals would transform risk and safety into economic
terms to make a case against government regulations, or simply because
making economic decisions seems easier than making moral ones. "Safety,
like anything else can be bought at a price, but then we have less to
spend on poverty and disease or things to make life worth living."'
Others, in a liberal democratic mode, would devise new or better
procedures for involving the public early on or more intimately in the
decision process. This opens up more global problems.
The Procedural Problem. Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollock have
analyzed types of procedures here and in Europe to handle public
controversies over nuclear power projects, which they consider symbolic
or prototypical of conflicts on other forms of technology. They have
categorized the procedures in a matrix of four different types based on
the general characteristics of being elitist or broadly participatory,
advisory or only informational. No one type seems appropriate to all
nations and situations."
All types of public participation procedures aim to allow dissenting
groups to articulate their views more effectively. This objective is
best achieved by five general conditions: the appropriate involvement
of all affected parties, a fair distribution of expertise, unbiased
management of the procedures, an agenda giving due weight to social and
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political as well as technical concerns, and a real margin of choice for
the participants. However, such debates still do not come to closure
but only abate temporarily as public anxieties shift to other
manifestations of risk. This conclusion supports the conviction of some
that political consensus is impossible. Debates on risk result only in
stalemate or authoritarianism and threaten the basic institutions of
democracy."
The Institutional Problem. Another theme in the literature on
technological risk is the breakdown of an underlying consensus on
societal values, such as the need for economic growth and the authority
of government. Environmentalists had led the way by adopting a new
"paradigm" incommensurable with the old. Those who would protect
"spaceship earth" play by different rules from those who see wealth as
the name of the game. What is reasonable and rational from one
perspective is not so from another." The remedies take two main
forms: institutional reform or radical restructuring of society.
Reformers believe that government, though it must make a "mess" of
managing risk, is all we have. Corporations externalize risks and
ignore side effects while trading short-term rewards for longer term
risks that we cannot begin to understand. Government bureaucracies do
the same when they optimistically develop technologies, such as nuclear
power, in a "hot house," without benefit of common sense or prudent
trial and error.
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Individually the American People are risk takers but collectively
they are risk adverse and woefully ignorant about how technology works.
They bump their concerns up to government, calling for new laws and
regulations, and then confuse symbols with action, failing to notice
that government intervention leads largely to more reams of paperwork.
When a technology actually fails, the public calls upon political
leaders to produce a scapegoat. The expert-bureaucrat search for
acceptable risk becomes a game, as agencies madly search for standards,
disburse money, and give the illusion of doing something. The remedy
would be to create a new institution specifically for dealing with
technological risk.20
Some European social philosophers and political economists take a
more radical view and contend that the very idea that a capitalist
society can manage technological risks is absurd. Most espouse the
"critical theory" associated with Jurgen Habermas: twentieth-century
society has reorganized its view of itself and its institutions on the
model of technical reason. Science and technology have become ideology,
legitimating capitalistic exploitation of individuals and society as a
whole. Emancipation can only come through a neo-Marxian approach, the
application of critical theory, which must unmask the ideology. Society
must be radically transformed through free and open communication among
its members. All must have equal power to start, to influence, and to
criticize the dialogue. Only then will people come to a rational
understanding of both the nature of ecological processes and of social
reality and totally reconstruct society in the interest of survival. 2'
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The radical critique offers insights into the interrelationships
between knowledge, human interests, and institutions. In demanding
dialogue, it calls for more than procedures that only allow dissenting
groups to articulate their views. But it does little to address the
problems of technological risk in an immediate or practical way. For
fresh insights, we turn to anthropology and organizational theory.
Other Views of Risk and Reality
A Cultural Diagnosis. Mary Douglas, a cultural anthropologist, and
Aaron Wildavsky, a political scientist, have devised a theory to explain
why environmentalists differ from others in risk perceptions and see
technology as a threat. The scientific and technological world is too
complex for any of us to know or to cope with all the risks we face now
or in the future. Even primitive societies select particular risks to
attend to and construct ways to deal with hidden dangers within the
cultural framework of how they see the world. In our own society, as
well, different groups share beliefs or "cosmologies" that set
boundaries on what is normal or moral and not, and that also suggest
causal chains from actions to disasters, and establish who is to blame
and what should be done. 22
Science, with its ability through specialized knowledge to measure
ever smaller things, has actually expanded the universe about which we
cannot speak with confidence. Scientists now disagree on whether there
are problems, what solutions to propose, and if interventions will make
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things better or worse. They tend to label whatever is not amenable to
technical solutions as institutional or political problems. Risk
assessment itself is biased, underlain by assumptions about the way the
world is. The scientists' claim of looking at the "is" of a problem
before rationally devising the "ought" ignores the prior editing of
risks and the taken-for-granted moral way people view the world.
Specialized risk assessments impoverish statements of human problems by
removing risks from contexts, objectifying or "desocializing" them.
Our society can be divided into many "political cultures," each with
its own "cosmology" through which individuals and social units identify
particular risks in particular social contexts and have devised social
institutions for managing them. "The social units that do the risk
handling come in a variety of forms -- bounded groups, hierarchical
organizations, competing personal networks..., atomized communities --
and they run the entire gamut from vast federal agencies to tiny
self-help arrangements organized by nothing more formal than a shared
sense of neighborliness."
Five general types of individuals can be characterized on a social
map, at four corners and the center of a matrix of "groups" and "grids"
or hierarchies. These range from tightly bounded groups to loose
networks and from rigid hierarchical to egalitarian social settings;
each has a special sense of time. "Sect members," typified by
environmentalists, form tight groups outside of and attacking
hierarchies. In the short term they only want to survive the pervasive
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hazards created by dominant institutions; in the long term they hope to
find redemption and inherit the earth. "Castists," such as many federal
officials, operate in tightly bounded groups isolated from day-to-day
concerns within rigid bureaucratic hierarchies. These give them
cautious optimism that the stable, complex collectivity will control
risks in the long term.
At the other extreme are "entrepreneurs," working through loose
networks in more egalitarian settings and disdaining hierarchy for the
management of short-term risks, which they welcome as opportunities.
They emphasize personal skills and judgment and tend to be expansive
optimists, expecting "business as usual" in a discounted future, like a
fourth group in the middle, the "hermits," who are independent of both
hierarchies and groups. Some of our outside consultants may exemplify
this type. At the bottom of hierarchies with little group support, the
disadvantaged and powerless live from day to day and accept and
absorbing risks as facts of life.
These authors do not deny that many risks are real, spilling over
from one technology to another and from the physical to the social
world. In their concern with what the lack of consensus on socially
constructed risks may do to basic social institutions, their intent is
to create a theory that policy makers can use in accommodating
differences.
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This diagnosis points up that institutions come in many forms, with
informal norms and taken-for-granted customs as well as formal rules and
roles. It directs attention to outsiders and those at the fringe and
the bottom and tends to equalize their cognitive claims with those of
technical experts, both embedded in moral views of the world but played
out in different social settings. It is good description and diagnosis
but fails to prescribe what can be done outside the domain of formal
decision making. In order to find clues to remedies, we must look more
closely at organizations.
Organizing around Uncertainty. The social psychologist Karl Weick
does not discuss technological risks and accidents directly but writes
of processes of organizing to handle "equivocality," ambiguous signals
and novel situations Uncertainties trigger social interactions within
groups; they organize in order to select interpretations or causal maps
and recipes for handling these. Such maps, much like Wildavsky's
cosmologies, and recipes, like institutionally given ways of handling
risks, are usually drawn from those retained in organizational
memory. 23
People interact to make sense of the plethora of stimuli and the
flow of experience in everyday life. Their experiences are bracketed or
bounded, and parts edited out or rejected, to fit common conceptual
models. When the appropriate behavior or response is not immediately
clear, when conflicts and controversy are rife, people fall back on
diagnoses that worked in the past, selecting models of situations and
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recipes or remedies most readily available in the institutional setting,
as was the remedy of new regulations for dam safety.
Reality is always constructed after the fact, in Weick's view. We
know what we think after we hear or see what we say or do. Thus
retained causal maps, selected interpretations, and organizational
interactions are closely coupled. This view is captured by Clifford
Geertz: "Man is an animal suspended in webs of significance that he
himself has spun," and in the metaphor that organizations paint their
own scenery, observe it through binoculars, and then try to find paths
through it.2 4 But how should we construct the reality of
technological failures?
Normal Accidents. Charles Perrow, an organizational theorist,
offers new maps to explain how accidents occur. He starts with
fine-scale descriptions of accidents in the past and works forward to
describe the characteristics of systems that make accidents so likely
that they must be considered normal. He would classify all human
systems, both social and physical, in a matrix with two dimensions: the
extent to which system components are loosely or tightly coupled and the
extent to which the components interact in simple and linear or more
complex ways. A nuclear power plant, such as Three Mile Island, is a
tightly coupled, complex system, in which components may have multiple
functions or depend closely upon one another and interact often
invisibly in unforeseen ways. The failure of two or more tightly
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coupled components, although infrequent, can proliferate rapidly to a
total system collapse.2
In a loosely coupled complex system, such as a university, a
combination of unexpected, untoward events can usually be contained
without a system failure. In a loosely coupled linear system, like an
assembly process in manufacturing, the worst that may happen is that
parts will back up or form queues. Perrow placed dams in the remaining
category of tightly coupled linear systems, largely based on the
accident at Teton (we will disagree with this classification), in order
to complete his model:
But by and large, dam failures appear to be due to rather prosaic
matters, in particular, ineptitude and deliberate risk taking.
It was important for us to consider dam accidents because we
needed an example of tight coupling without interactive
complexity.z2
Perrow identifies six types of components of systems: design,
equipment, procedures, operators, supplies and materials, and lastly the
environment. Too many accidents are blamed on "operator error,"
overlooking other groups such as management and designers. Frequently,
as in mine accidents, operators as "first party victims" are blamed.
Normal accidents can affect other types of victims; second party
individuals without influence in the system, such as users and
suppliers, innocent third party bystanders, and fourth, future
generations, as in accidents involving radiation or biogenetic research.
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In complex, tightly coupled systems, designers often believe that
they can reduce the likelihood of accidents by incorporating greater
redundancy or more automation. But each additional unit in such a
system may only increase the complexity; the risk may rise exponentially
with the greater number of potential interactions. With automation,
operator confusion may increase in situations not covered by orders from
above or operating manuals, compounding the problem. Even experienced
people tend to make de minimus assumptions and deny that the worst is
happening. They may construct the safest model of reality, one
perfectly reasonable based on past experience. This explains why
seasoned ship captains have misread lights ahead in the dark and steered
into oncoming vessels.
On the other hand, operators can contribute to a recovery from the
errors of others or from unexpected environmental conditions, as the
Apollo space crew did after it directly experienced the jolt of an
explosion and saw a vapor trail. Ground based managers and designers,
confident in safety devices and redundancy, misinterpreted instrument
data and searched for small explanations, determined to maintain
operations. Perrow agonized with others over the dilemma of greater or
lesser operator control.
Perrow concluded that some systems should be simplified by
decoupling components. He feels that others, like dams, are essential,
cannot be simplified, and should be allowed to continue but under
tighter safety regulations. A technology that could fail with
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irreversible long-range consequences but is not yet in use, or for which
substitutes are available, as with nuclear power, should be abandoned or
phased out.
Perrow also contributes an interesting new concept of decision
making, that of "social rationality." This is distinct from two
familiar forms: economic or absolute rationality, which is narrow,
quantitative, and precise, and bounded rationality, which emphasizes
limits in our thinking capacities and in our ability to achieve absolute
rationality. Bounded rationalists despair of the public's ability to
make sound choices on risks. On the other hand, social rationalists
consider that cognitive limits have positive consequences. They
emphasize the diversity in cognitive abilities, such as in counting,
verbalization, or visualization. This diversity brings people with
different types of skills together to address complex problems and leads
to interdependence and social bonding.2"
Moreover, cognitive differences promote new perspectives and
solutions that no one person will have. Indeed, even those who seem
irrational about new technologies may have something to contribute:
their feeling of "dread" about unprecedented disasters, based on a broad
understanding of the context in which lesser accidents arose in the past.
Like Clifford Geertz's "thick description," 2" social rationality
recognizes cultural values and subjective dimensions of reality and
accepts scepticism about man-made systems and institutions. Given the
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tentative, ambiguous nature of experience and the unanticipatable,
unrecognizable interactions from which failures occur, social
rationality may be vital. But what is this subjective dimension of
human understanding? A clue comes from one small source.
Bottom-up knowledge in organizations, as described by Ralph Hummel,
seems linked to the collective feeling of public "dread." Both are ways
of knowing about what is unique or unprecedented in experience and both
differ radically from what is expected of scientific knowledge. Much
like the "feel for the hole" that we discover among grouters at Teton,
Hummel identified a special kind of knowledge of phenomena among
craftsmen in their mundane understanding of their tools and
materials. 29
People who work directly with their hands on materials may acquire a
"feel for" the object of their work, coming to know it "in its own
terms." To a sensitive workman who lacks preconceptions of a priori
notions, the object "shows itself" and imparts an understanding of its
particular nature. The worker comes to know or apprehend its unique
qualities and learns "how it wants to be handled." Workers attuned to
qualitative phenomena that seem to emanate from an object thereby
overcome the object/subject dichotomy typical of the scientific attitude.
Underlying this kind of knowledge is an assumption that reality is
more than what is known through analysis and in relationships based on
intentions to control objects. This richer view of reality opens up
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opportunities for improving the quality of work in organizations. It
involves attention to more than blueprints or plans or numbers. Instead
it requires workmen to understand the context of their work and the
larger purposes of the organization and to synthesize such
understandings with their feel for and receptiveness to the back talk of
objects and the opportunities these present.
Conclusions. This chapter has taken us from an earlier approach to
risk, as a response to past experience, to an analytical approach to
unprecedented future hazards. Technical professionals break complex
matters into simpler parts, after sloughing off what is not amenable to
analysis and quantification and relegating such matters to centralized
political control, leaving the public to accept experts' conclusions on
faith.
On the other hand, if accidents arise from the close coupling of
components in poorly understood complex systems, physical or social,
public feelings of dread may be rational. Something more than the
analytical knowledge of science is needed. This literature also
suggests two very different views of physical and social reality. On
one hand is what can be called "technical rationality," and on the other
hand, one we will call "social rationality." Each is dependent on
different ontological and epistemological assumptions. We may
characterize or caricature the two views as follows:
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Technical rationality assumes a reality apart from people, subject
to eternal, universal physical laws. These are understood by deducing
hypotheses from general theories and testing these with analytical
methods, yielding certain knowledge for prediction and control.
An alternate view is that humans cannot know all of the qualitative
richness of reality, except perhaps provisionally in direct interactions
at the smallest scale. At a larger scale, they perceive phenomena
differently from place to place and over time. The best they may do is
to arrive at tentative understandings negotiated in social groups in
particular social settings. The opposition and tension between these
two views of reality permeate our case studies. But first to more
substantive matters.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
This chapter briefly describes the institutional setting of OSTP
and each of the three projects. It then considers ways that these
could have been interpreted and treated by quantitative analysis or
under various theories of the social sciences. It next describes the
methodology used in preparing this dissertation and concludes by
describing how major themes emerged to shape the thesis and intertwined
in the stories.
Institutional Setting
Although OSTP was only created by Congress in 1976 under P.L.
94-282, the National Science and Technology Policy Act, scientific and
technical advice in the executive office of the President was hardly
new. Scientists had been valued in the White House during and after
World War II when Vannevar Bush declared that science was America's new
frontier.'
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Support for basic or theoretical research in the physical sciences
soon became an accepted federal function, necessary since it was beyond
the capability of private organizations and was good for the nation as
a whole. The mainstream belief is that theoretical knowledge must be
advanced to replenish a pool of knowledge from which general principles
would flow down like water into new technology for the domestic public
welfare and to strengthen the nation's competitive position abroad,
economically and militarily.
The surprise of the Russian spacecraft launching led President
Eisenhower to choose a special science advisor; so did every elected
president thereafter. An Office of Science and Technology was
established by executive order in 1962. President Nixon, however,
transferred its functions to the National Science Foundation (NSF) in
1971, after policy conflicts with his advisors. The technical
community quickly turned to Congress and with support from the office
of President Ford, succeed in obtaining legislation to institutionalize
this function. A skeleton staff from NSF served Ford and included
Smith, who alone would remain under Frank Press, President Carter's
Science Advisor, to work with the new and technically sophisticated
Carter.
Segments of the technical community have argued that the top
government scientist should have cabinet status or a department or at
least an agency of his own with the authority and budget to operate
programs.2 On the other hand, the science advisors have had direct
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access to the President and to the Office of Management and Budget,
where Smith had worked for a time before moving to NSF. The science
advisor's influence inside the White House has depended largely on his
personal relations with the president and his staff and on his powers
of persuasion; OSTP adequately demonstrated such powers and also the
ability to use the clout of the executive office from time to time to
bring the agencies into line. Under Press, OSTP did not lack adequate
power.'
One difficulty in the formal institutional setting, obvious from
our cases, was that divisions among federal branches and state
governments, set up as checks and balances against overcentralization
of power, often meant that responsibility was divided and unclear for
protecting citizens against hazards. Congress has ultimate authority
for making policy on matters of deep national concern, as it would do
on nuclear waste, and intended to do about earthquake hazards until the
president overrode its intent. The states have limited control against
hazards imposed by the government itself, of federal dams or nuclear
waste disposal. Thus in the larger institutional framework, as in the
bureaucratic arrangements for dams, authority is divided and the locus
of responsibility often moot, providing one sense in which
institutional arrangements are inappropriate. To orient the reader, we
now summarize the three cases, each initially treated by OSTP as a
separate and independent problem.
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The Federal Dam Safety Program (FDS) After a dam newly built by
the Bureau of Reclamation collapsed in 1976, Congress urged the
executive branch to improve its decisionmaking procedures on dams.
OSTP was asked to survey the safety practices of more than a dozen
agencies dealing with dams and to direct the preparation of guidelines
for federal dam safety, with advice from a panel of outside experts.
Three major problems were identified: there was no communication among
the agencies, no one knew all about nor was in charge of each large
project, and agency officials were reluctant even to talk about risk
and failure.
OSTP carried out its tasks and saw to it that a new lead agency was
established in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to
coordinate new dam safety offices set up at the top of each agency to
implement administrative guidelines. Almost immediately, difficulties
were reported, such as limited staff, funds, or legislative authority.
Over the years the Bureau of Reclamation did not appreciably change its
practices and other agencies did little but extra paperwork.
The program at least survived a new administration and has
continued to work with top officials at a reduced pace, largely to
define consistent technical standards for dam engineering. It also
tried to build a constituency for dam safety among the states, which
are responsible for about 95% of the nation's large dams, but their
interest waxes and wanes largely in reaction to periodic failures.
Still, this may have been OSTP's most successful planning project.
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The Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (EHR) After years of
conflict, scientists and engineers joined to persuade Congress to
liberally fund a "whole" national program for EHR, both for building
the scientific capability for prediction and for engineering and
planning to reduce hazards said to threaten at least 39 states. Under
Press, a leading seismologist, OSTP was given the task of planning for
the use of the funds.
When planners initially produced only a long list of familiar
issues, calling mainly for adding seismic provisions to existing
programs, OSTP then pushed through a very general plan, centering
around a program of planning grants to states. The Office of
Management and Budget (0MB), fearful of setting a precedent for funding
states to prepare against other natural hazards, persuaded Carter to
veto the program. The funds appropriated by Congress for a whole
program would be used largely for scientific and engineering research.
OSTP eventually set up a lead agency, again in FEMA, mainly to work
on national codes and standards and to urge federal agencies to
retrofit their buildings, but with little success. After Mount St.
Helens erupted in 1980, Press did convince the president to re-examine
the threat, primarily to defense installations. Finally, Carter
reluctantly approved a small federal-state program for EHR in the Los
Angeles region. FEMA has since prepared a logistical plan for "command
and control" of an urban area after a quake, one that many in
California deem inappropriate to unpredictable situations. In the
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Reagan administration, the lead agency operated for many years without
a director and barely survived, with little control over the Los
Angeles program, which has in fact become the center of a successful
movement of preparation in that state.
The seismologists continue with basic research and hope to make
seismology a Big Science. A National Earthquake Prediction Evaluation
Council (NEPEC), set up to certify the validity of prediction research,
has issued only one prediction and for a rural area. Many believe that
the prospects for a socially useful prediction are dimmer now than a
decade ago.
The Nuclear Waste Policy (NW) As public agitation complicated
administrative policy making in other areas, President Carter
established an Interagency Review Group (IRG), chaired by the new
Department of Energy (DOE) as lead agency, to formulate a policy and
program for safely isolating all forms of nuclear waste.
OSTP played a central role, analyzing alternative technical
strategies and problems of knowledge of disposal in mined
repositories. It advocated a cautious "stepwise" process of extensive
scientific research on multiple sites in many geologic media, followed
by public review and licensing before the first repository, primarily
for spent reactor fuel, was constructed. DOE preferred a more rapid
program including a small licensed experiment in burying spent fuel
with military wastes in New Mexico, an ongoing project that OSTP
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generally opposed. As time passed, issues continued to surface and
consensus dwindled within the IRG.
By the time the president was persuaded to support the more
conservative approach, DOE had backed off and obtained help from
Congress to place military waste at the New Mexico project without
licensing, a project that Carter had no power to block. His policy
statement at the end of his term had little public or programmatic
impact. Congress later incorporated the site selection procedures into
legislation but under a rigorous timetable, negating OSTP's intent.
President Reagan and Congress have cut back on the search for sites,
reducing the limited victory for the policy.
In December 1987, as this dissertation was being submitted, water
was flowing into the New Mexico repository, probably making it
useless. Congress had also abandoned its procedures for studying many
sites and had effectively chosen only one at which to bury spent fuel
in Nevada.4 In essence this, the most elaborate of OSTP's three
projects, which might have been judged a limited success, has now been
totally undone. We now address the question of how to treat all three
cases together.
Interpretations
How should these programs be evaluated as a group when each is so
unique and assessment of the outcomes varies with time and with the
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perspective taken and even now is changing? Chapter I mentioned some
reasons why the outcomes seem disappointing. On the positive side, the
planners could be said to have responded adequately to the definitions
of the problems and their mandates as given, but they encountered
surprises and unexpected obstacles, such as presidential disapproval of
state planning grants or DOE's end run to Congress. But there were
some accomplishments. For example, engineers now admit that dams do
fail, some old nuclear waste has been stabilized, and the program in
Los Angeles is successful. But these seem minor or far less than
expected, or were accomplished in spite of federal efforts.
Some might also claim that the risks are quantifiably lower than
they would have been without OSTP's intervention. To argue that case
would entail estimating the levels of risks before 1977, projecting
them, comparing these hypothetical values to present levels, and
attributing some positive difference to OSTP, a highly speculative
venture.
The present approach is that of the more descriptive social
sciences, but what field can supply an adequately comprehensive
framework for analysis? Organizational theory, for example, provides
ample literature on the problems of bureaucracy to account for
difficulties in FDS and particularly for the subsequent inertia in
implementation, but has little bearing on what happened in EHR." The
concept of political games might be used to explain what went on in
making policy for NW, but is less applicable to the other two
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programs. Other concepts from political science might be useful, as in
the literature on problems of implementation. For instance, a
permanent "fixer" in the Executive Office might have made the NW policy
work.' There may be a simpler explanation: a new political party
came to power and the political agenda changed; the planners cannot be
blamed for events beyond their control. But failures, threats of
disasters, and public concerns about risks still haunt elected
officials.
Indeed, using several mainstream views in the social sciences, one
could plausibly and partially explain why these programs were not more
effective, or even argue that they succeeded. The conclusions would
depend largely on the frame of reference and time, on what is chosen as
relevant evidence, and how it is marshalled in argument. But our
intent is more practical than simply to support, refine, or rebut a
particular theory.
Methodology
Our approach does not derive from a single theory but is more
empirical and somewhat interdisciplinary. To a case study approach was
allied a method akin to hermeneutics. This involved close study of
fine details of texts and then shifting attention to larger contexts
and then back to details, repeatedly, in an effort to organize and make
sense of the parts in relation to the whole and to grasp the whole by
apprehending the configuration of parts. Closure comes with the
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convergence of understanding. This method required attention
especially to changes in key documents and omissions in subsequent
versions, as clues to underlying conflicts that were suppressed. The
remarks of the main participants were analyzed closely for an
understanding of their particular perspectives. Making sense of
anomalies necessitated tracing concepts back in time and exploring
tangential areas.
The initial sources of data were public documents produced by these
projects, supplemented by earlier drafts, memos, correspondence, and
other material on file in lead agencies or the National Archives. An
invaluable part of the process was the series of interviews with the
OSTP consultants and other participants, particularly in the first two
cases. The consultant on nuclear waste policy made available his
complete files in nine large cartons. This research was supplemented
by a field trip to California to directly observe the outcome of the
EHR program. A review of materials put out for the general public,
such as Science magazine or conference reports of technical societies,
offered the basis for understanding technical matters, verified through
discussions with specialized professionals.
Every social scientist is obliged to make explicit his personal
views and biases to the extent he is aware of them. I confess to an
initial distaste for the hubris of many scientists and engineers, a
prejudice rapidly dissipated by the honest humility of many of my
informants, who openly shared a critical understanding of their
39
fields. A second bias, if so it be, is distaste for those who belittle
the knowledge of ordinary people, all the more troubling in a
democracy. This research has only reinforced my feelings on that. But
such feelings were not adequate to structure the research.
Common Themes
A persistent question in the early research was what is common to
all three projects? One answer was clear: all are about artifacts in
unique sites in geologic settings and closely interacting over time
with a none-too-stable earth. This distinguished them from
technological artifacts such as nuclear power or chemical plants, where
failures usually arise from events independent of their sites. It also
sets them apart from totally mobile objects, such as space crafts,
where other types of environmental factors contribute to failures.
This fact makes issues of knowledge in the earth sciences, particularly
for engineering, germane to all three cases. But institutional issues
were also a common thread; so obvious as to be easily overlooked is
that all three projects were carried out at the top of the federal
bureaucracy and involved a number of different agencies. For such
reasons, we began to look at models of knowledge and at institutional
actions. The three major themes of the dissertation become the nature
of science and engineering in relation to one another and to the
federal bureaucracy.
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It became apparent that "generalized models of knowledge" lay
behind the work of scientists, engineers, and bureaucrats -- knowledge
derived through the methods of science and refined analytical
techniques, knowledge embedded in abstract theories and general
principles and expected to flow down into engineering and technology to
enable men to overcome uncertainty and to predict and control the
physical and social world.
Also common were institutionalized actions not only in the
structure of the federal system, but even more in rules and procedures
for applying generalized knowledge: in general guidelines and
technical standards, as formal criteria for decision making, in the
processes of policy analysis and planning. These institutionalized
aspects were all formulated at the top and imposed down through the
hierarchical organizations of government and for science and
engineering.
In contrast to these common general aspects, two rather anomalous
points stood out, not common to all three programs but unique, one
emphasized in OSTP's program on FDS and the other by planners for EHR,
and both largely overlooked, ignored, or suppressed in the other
federal programs. Neither was clearly recognized by the planners in
NW. The first applies to the nature of engineering knowledge, the
second to the role of individuals and groups in decisions or actions
necessary to deal with technological risks.
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In FDS, the outside consultant and panel of experts repeatedly
stated that in practice dam engineering is not simply the application
of scientific principles. Practitioners must contend with irreducible
uncertainty in understanding sites and material conditions and must
recognize their limited control over construction processes and the
destructive forces of man and nature. Designers must accommodate and
synthesize many non-technical considerations into their designs. For
such reasons, dam engineering is more like an art.
In EHR, the planners emphasized that at virtually every level of
society, individuals and groups make decisions that affect
environmental safety. Therefore responsibility for mitigating
earthquake hazards must be shared throughout the public and private
sectors.
These principles, that engineering relies on more than science and
in practice is like an art and that responsibility for safety must be
shared, seem to come from a model of the physical and social reality
other than the model of technical rationality described in Chapter I.
In that mainstream view, engineering is simply the application of
scientific principles and those at the top assume full responsibility
and are ultimately held accountable.
But the outside dam engineers failed to completely understand
artistry; they attributed it almost exclusively to themselves,
inadequately recognizing the knowledge and skills that we will discover
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in construction, such as the grouter's mysterious "feel" for
unobservable conditions below the surface into which he injects
material. The EHR planners largely ignored the artistry, for instance,
of local building officials coping with seismic risk in difficult
social settings and the ability of ordinary people to understand
earthquake hazards and be willing to take precautionary actions.
Instead, particularly in EHR, the federal government fell back on a
bureaucratic model of command and control to protect the public from
harm.
In NW, the policy called for the federal government to assume full
responsibility for isolating nuclear waste, ignoring the shared
responsibility for its generation. The public would be allowed to
express its views primarily through licensing procedures. These
planners also sought better scientific knowledge and elaborate
procedures to inform site selection and unprecedented engineering,
under the model of technical rationality.
In contrast, what is happening about nuclear waste illustrates our
thesis. The unexpected water at the New Mexico site reflects the
inadequate knowledge of scientists and engineers and may well combine
with DOE's poor management, particularly in its relations with New
Mexicans, to halt that project. On the other hand, although
Congressional representatives are accused of politics, they seem to
have exercised sound judgment in choosing a site for spent fuel in
Nevada. As with engineering artistry in design, this choice reflects
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an understanding of the social and physical reality and a synthesis of
technical and non-technical factors which make this site preferrable to
contending ones in Texas and at Hanford, Washington. Like Hanford, it
offers the political advantage of state tolerant of nuclear activities,
the demographic and physical advantages of being in an unpopulated area
already contaminated by nearby nuclear testing, and the legal one of
federal ownership of the land. Economically, it is the cheapest of the
three to mine. Technically, the site is in a dry area above the water
table and unlikely to contaminate the water supply, as feared on the
basis of extensive studies of geohydrology at the other two. Although
not a perfect choice, it reflects a kind of shared responsibility and
"social rationality" or artistry in decision making.
Why did the planners ignore the principles of artistry in
engineering and shared responsibility for safety? The answer seems to
lie in part in the institutional setting. The planners took for
granted mainstream views of knowledge and of appropriate forms of
action embedded in the dominant institutions of science, engineering,
and the federal bureaucracy. In interacting at the apex of these, the
planners simply did not see what goes on far below or far away from the
center at the periphery or outside of institutional boundaries, in
diverse and ever changing local realities. The thesis arising from
these observations is that generalized models of knowledge and
institutionalized actions are inappropriate to deal with technological
risks because they inadequately reflect the social and physical reality.
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To give a solid foundation for this generalization, we first
describe the cases narratively, as stories. These ostensibly describe
interactions among top officials and leading scientists and engineers
and interweave the themes of bureaucracy, science, and engineering.
Engineers dominate the first story with outsiders pitted against
bureaucrats. In the story on EHR, outside engineers are pitted against
scientists, who are insiders in the sense that they depend on federal
support. In the final case, bureaucratic officials and engineers are
pitted against scientists as policy makers.
Minor stories are linked to the major ones. One strong central in
FDS is about the evolution of Teton dam. Others tell about inspection
and construction, revealing alternative kinds of knowledge. EHR takes
us back in time to the evolution of knowledge and institutional
arrangements of seismic engineering and seismology. It also describes
seismic code enforcement in a local social reality similar to the
physical one at Teton. The tale of the subsequent program in FEMA
reveals effective planning in bureaucracy. Several minor stories
complete this one, about recent earthquake preparation and programs to
enable predictions in California. Finally there is a story from China,
where the preparation and prediction were successfully combined. The
story on NW is supplemented by a sketch of earlier federal efforts and
ends with a description of a local movement, again revealing kinds of
knowledge and actions that helped upset the federal policy.
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A final comment: these stories are not "whodonits" revealing a
villain at the end to be blamed for the crimes; little is achieved by
placing blame. These are more like classic tragedies in which the
heroes themselves become victims, not of blind chance, but of their own
blindness. Indeed our lack of awareness of institutional arrangements
and of limited knowledge make us all potential victims of technological
risks.
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CHAPTER III
FEDERAL DAM SAFETY
What follows is a story in several parts. It begins with a history
of Teton, the dam that failed, followed by investigations into that
failure. The central part is the response in the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP), followed by a description of a continuing
program in the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA). It
then describes the National Dam Inspection Program, revealing a useful
but untapped kind of knowledge. A close look at construction of Teton
reveals three more useful kinds of knowledge.
The Story of Teton Dam
At 11:57 on the morning of June 5, 1975 an earthfilled dam over 300
feet high, nearly completed by the Bureau of Reclamation on the Teton
River above Idaho Falls in southeast Idaho, abruptly collapsed. The
water in an almost filled reservoir spewed fourth, killing 11 people,
damaging over 3,000 homes, destroying 16,000 head of cattle, inundating
100,000 acres of farmland, and causing property damage estimated at more
than one billion dollars.'
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This event marked the first time that a large dam constructed by a
major federal agency had totally failed. It shook the Federal
establishment and the nation. It also abruptly ended a project that had
been evolving for over seventy years.
Although Teton is a "worst case," the process by which it evolved
may be typical of many public works or even large private projects. The
first part of the story has been pieced together from statements
scattered through sections of reports on subsequent investigations that
seem to have been of minor interest to engineers. The latter part is
much as the Bureau might have told it, had everything worked out as
planned.2
The idea of a dam on the Teton River was first considered in 1904,
only two years after Congress had created the Bureau. No doubt the
local Bureau people were attracted by the sheer volume of water that
poured down through the steep-walled canyon of the Teton River, draining
an area of over 1000 square miles, capped by the Grand Teton Mountain
rising 23,766 feet above sea level to the east. The precipitation in
that watershed, which falls mostly as snow, is 12 to 15 inches a year.
These waters then flow into the Snake River, which has laid a rich
alluvial plain across southern Idaho. There, in contrast, the average
rainfall is only about 8 inches per year, making it a naturally
semi-arid region. [Panel 10-11
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After the turn of the century, settlers in the Snake River Valley
began building a private, cooperative system of canals, which
dramatically expanded irrigation projects and agricultural production.
Both the Bureau and the Army Corps of Engineers constructed public works
to aid the farmers. By mid-century, 90% of Idaho's economy depended
upon agriculture, primarily from the southern part of the State.3
In these first five decades, the United States Geological Survey
assisted the two agencies with geologic and hydrologic studies of the
Teton and its tributaries. A 1934 USGS report described the first
specific site investigated, for a limited water storage project.
But selecting a suitable site remained difficult. In 1946 the
Bureau rejected two sites on a tributary of the Teton, largely because
too much reservoir water could seep into the highly fractured volcanic
rocks of the canyon walls through which the river cut. [IRG 3,6]
Gradually the concept of a multipurpose project evolved, no doubt to
offset the costs of construction under the difficult site conditions.
The project would control all drainage from the watershed and achieve
the maximum benefits of water storage, flood control, irrigation, and
hydroelectric power. [DOI 3]
From 1955 to 1960, the Corps and Bureau jointly conducted a survey
of developmental opportunities in the Upper Snake River Basin [GAO-ll].
In 1957, the Corps bored 285 feet through alluvium to fairly impermeable
rock and decided that this would be acceptable; it would eventually
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become the site of Teton dam. [Panel 4-3] That same year, the Bureau
drilled to solid bedrock at a site downstream but rejected it because
the low banks there could contain only a small reservoir. It sought
instead a site upstream with higher banks but still far enough
downstream to capture the maximum runoff.
About the same time, the Bureau and Corps formed a joint committee
to subdivide the territory in which both agencies had an interest. The
Bureau was awarded jurisdiction over the Upper Snake River. [IRG 6] The
Corps went on to build Ririe Dam on a tributary of the Snake, some 30
miles below the Teton site. [GAO 20) In 1959, the Bureau began a
reconnaissance survey for a site on the Teton.
Public pressure for a project began to increase in the irrigation
district around the junction of Snake and Teton Rivers, an area of
110,000 acres. Bureau staff met repeatedly with representatives of
agricultural groups and encouraged them to urge their Congressmen to
support a Teton project The water-users also mobilized Chambers of
Commerce and other community groups in the area. At a public hearing in
Idaho Falls in December, 1960, a resolution was unanimously adopted in
favor of the project. In January, 1961, the Idaho State Legislature
passed a "Memorial" petitioning Congress and the President to give early
consideration to construction of the Lower Teton Reservoir. [CGO 53
Over the next year, natural events seemed to conspire with user
needs. That summer a drought emergency was declared along the Upper
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Snake River. In February of 1962, cropland along the Snake River
tributaries and on its plain were declared a disaster area from severe
flooding. [CGO 4] In March, at the request of the Bureau's Commissioner
in Washington, both its Engineering and Research Center (E&R) and the
Idaho District Office approved a special report based only on
preliminary reconnaissance data, urging early Congressional
authorization for a multipurpose project estimated to cost $52 million
but yielding benefits worth $93 million. Customarily, such a proposal
should have awaited completion of a more detailed feasibility study.
Meanwhile, a Bureau geologist visually inspected four new sites but
supported the particular site that the Corps had earlier found
acceptable. [GAO 11]
The project was to be built in two stages: first a dam, a
hydroelectric plant, and a canal to a nearby irrigation district; the
second stage would extend irrigation into new areas. The only
objections to that site came from a local wheatgrowers' association,
which argued that the first phase of the project would only stabilize
and expand the yield of existing acreage; it wanted a site farther
upstream to irrigate additional land in its area. [Panel 4-3]
Without debate and with little discussion, Congress's project was
approved on September 7, 1964. It now seemed essential to control
chronic natural disasters as well as to meet expanding agricultural
needs. ECGO 5]
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The Bureau then closely followed its formal sequence of routine
procedures.4 It made an intensive geologic study of the site,
drilling over 100 deep holes to explore the foundation and to assess
local sources of sand, gravel, and silt to be used for construction.
The many holes were necessary because alluvial material had been
deposited rather randomly in the riverbed, often in the form of lenses
(thick in the center, tapering out at the edges), posing difficulties in
extrapolating the nature of subsurface conditions from one core to
another. The local materials were not considered ideal but were no
worse than materials used successfully at other dam sites. [GAO 29)
The Bureau used sophisticated equipment to determine the extent of
fracturing. It also conducted one of the most thorough pilot grouting
programs in its history, inserting water and concrete into the rocks to
determine how best to seal the extensive cracks. By the end of 1969, it
was confident that it had sufficient data on the geologic problems at
this particular site and that these were no greater a challenge than at
sites of successful Bureau dams. [GAO 31)
The E&R designed a five-zoned earthen structure more than 1600 feet
deep from its upstream to downstream "toes" (the base of the structure
in the stream-bed) and extending 3100 feet in width across its crest.
Ninety-percent of its bulk was an "impervious" clay core of silt
compacted to retard the seepage that would inevitably occur. On the
downstream side a drainage layer of coarse sand and gravel would carry
the seepage that did occur harmlessly down the face of the structure to
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the riverbed below. Other zones or layers supported and protected the
structure. Such a zoned design was common practice.
The core was to be set on a wide-angled "cutoff trench" dug about
150 feet below and across the riverbed between the banks. To prevent
water tunneling under this would be a "grout curtain," a row of closely
spaced holes drilled as deep as 300 feet below the trench, each filled
with a cement mixture under pressure to seal all subsurface cracks and
create a kind of subsurface wall. Such a curtain was frequently
installed when foundation rock was not ideal.
To compensate for the special problems of the site, the Bureau
devised several somewhat innovative techniques. Since a single grout
curtain might not adequately seal the fractures in the rocks, the
designers added two parallel rows of holes to contain and reinforce the
central curtain. It had learned the necessity of this a decade earlier
at a similar site of the Fontenelle dam, when water began to tunnel
under the dam through the single curtain.5
Since the canyon walls were also cracked and covered deeply with
loose material, the designers added "key trenches," steep walled
excavations up both banks of the canyon, also to be underlain by a
triple grout curtain and filled with compacted silt like the cutoff
trench. Thirdly, to control the spread of the fluid cement mix through
the crevices around the grout hole and to hasten its setting closely
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into a compact curtain, the designers called for calcium chloride, or
salt, as needed, to be added to the grout mixture.
These technical modifications gave the Bureau confidence in its
design. The drawings and specifications were put out for bid in July of
1971. The contract was let in December, and work began at the site in
February, 1972.
Construction went smoothly. The only major change in the original
plans was the use of about three times the amount of grout originally
anticipated. Congress granted additional funds for this without
question in one of its annual appropriations. Before the dam failed,
these totalled more than $70,000,000. [CGO 6-8)
The only major hitch in scheduling was a delay in the delivery of a
piece of equipment for the main river outlet, so that only the auxiliary
outlet was operating when the reservoir began to be filled in October of
1975. The filling was slightly ahead of the original schedule but was
necessary so that the contractor could test the turbines in the power
plant the following spring. The reservoir began to rise by one foot per
day, the rate the designers had specified. EGAO-58]
Then an unexpected natural event occurred. The snowpack in the
mountains above the dam was almost twice as heavy as the average over
the past 20 years, and was melting rapidly. [Panel 10-11) The runoff
began to exceed the capacity of the auxiliary outlet to release excess
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water. In March of 1976, the Project Construction Engineer requested
permission to fill the reservoir more rapidly. He cited the advantages
of water for that summer irrigation and for recreational use of the
reservoir. Permission was granted. The rate of filling increased and
on several days was more than four times the originally specified rate.
But the Project Engineer and Bureau officials obviously had no choice.
[Panel 10-12)
When the reservoir was almost full, the crew noticed fresh springs
and seepage below and at the base of the dam. But the water ran clear
and the volume was small; such incidents are not considered unusual nor
a cause for alarm.
Then at 9 a.m. on the morning of June 6 leaks appeared high on the
dam. Within an hour, a tunnel opened up, spewing out over 6,000 gallons
of water per minute. The Project Engineer notified sheriffs of the two
counties below but conveyed little sense of urgency to at least one of
them. That sheriff requested the local radio station to broadcast a
warning, but the station allowed its taped program to conclude before
making an announcement.
By 11 a.m., a whirlpool had developed in the reservoir. At 11:20,
two bulldozers, which had been used to try to fill the hole on the face
of the dam, fell into it. Erosion progressed up the face until at 11:57
the dam collapsed.
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It was said that many people who had lived through natural floods
failed to understand the seriousness of the situation. Indeed, no one
had ever thought that the dam would fail. [GAO 67]
This story offers few clues that the project would end in a
catastrophe. The idea of the project evolved slowly, until the agency
responded in a timely way to public needs and natural disasters. It
took exceptional care in studying the site. It built upon experiences
elsewhere and modified the design with defensive measures in a
conservative manner to accommodate specific site conditions.
Construction followed specifications, except in increasing the grout to
create a more solid foundation and in filling the reservoir more rapidly
in response to an unexpected combination of man-made and natural events.
Background on Building Dams. Before considering how the federal
government responded to the failure, a bit of background is in order.
Structures to stem the flow of water over the land are almost
taken-for-granted around the world. This country contains more than
67,000 large dams, 25 feet or more in height or impounding 50 or more
acre-feet of water, in addition to several million smaller ones.6
Such water impoundments are no modern phenomena; men have piled
earth across stream beds for over 4,000 years.7 Structures of hewn
stone, "gravity dams," date back to early Mesopotamian and ancient
Greece. Early settlers in New England even built dams of wood. Within
this century engineers have created arch dams of reinforced concrete,
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sometimes exceeding 700 feet in height, but these constitute only a
small percentage of all dams. The majority of large dams are still
earthen structures, the highest, designed by the Russians, to rise over
1000 feet.
In 1842 the first engineered dam in this country was built for
public water storage at Old Croton, N.Y.8 During this century the
rate of dam construction accelerated from an average of 205 large
structures completed each year from 1900 to 1930, to 570 in the period
1930 to 1950, to approximately 1610 a year, or an average of four of
five per day, during the 1960s. EFCCSET11] Since then the rate of
construction of large dams has dropped due to rising costs and a
shortage of suitable sites. Like Teton, large modern dams usually serve
many functions. In the 1970s, most new ones were of moderate size and
largely for recreational or aesthetic purposes."
Dam failure is such a rare event that the average annual death rate
attributed to the failure of dams, large and small, is insignificant;
more people drown each year in reservoirs and impoundments.'" The
most memorable disasters, as that which caused 2,200 deaths in the
Johnstown flood in 1898, were of structures built without the benefit of
modern engineering and then poorly maintained. In fact, by the middle
of this century, well-engineered dams were considered "permanent
structures."''
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The federal government has pioneered in dam engineering, shaping
waterways since the early 19th century. By 1976, 18 federal agencies
were authorized to carry out responsibilities related to dams, notably
the Corps of Army Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the
Tennessee Valley Authority. The government owned and operated almost
five per cent of the larger dams in this country; the remainder fell
under the jurisdiction of the States. The major federal agencies12
occupy a position of leadership in dam construction far greater than
these numbers imply, and were particularly proud of their record of no
major failures, until the collapse of Teton.
Investigations
Immediately after the failure -- pictured on the cover of Time -- a
slew of special investigations began. Both houses of Congress, the
General Accounting Office (GAO), the Department of the Interior, the
Idaho Governor's Office, and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS),
among others, set up groups to study and report on the incident.
Like Monday morning quarterbacks, each group tried to reconstruct
what had happened and to identify the causes of failure, each in light
of its particular interests and the facts it attended to. Presented
here are highlights of four investigations that influenced the OSTP
agenda. Of interest is how two groups with different diagnoses
converged on a similar set of remedies while two others starting from
identical facts diverged in their conclusions.
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The House Subcommittee Investigation. Two weeks after the disaster,
Congressman Leo 3. Ryan, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Conservation,
Energy, and Natural Resources of the House Committee on Government
Operations (henceforth referred to as the Subcommittee) inspected the
ruins and talked with officials and victims in Idaho. His subcommittee
then began a series of hearings that continued for almost a year.
Ryan recognized that the site was a poor one but considered this a
"man-made disaster." [CGO 8) Early in the investigations, a Bureau
official was overheard to say that the agency had nothing to learn from
the failure. To this, Ryan commented, "... bureaucratic infallibility
is an idea whose time has long since passed." [3) At the opening
session of the hearings on August 4, he articulated a "theory of
momentum" under which he diagnosed the problem. [14-16] The Bureau and
other federal agencies were wont to continue projects, once begun, in
spite of hazards detected and warnings given.
Ryan focused his attack on the bureaucratic "momentum to construct,"
fueled by engineering hubris. This was evident in the belief within the
agencies that they could engineer a solution to any problem, based on "a
general principle of modern engineering" enunciated by a top officer in
the Corps that "almost any site can be used for construction if the
owner can stand the price.""
Initially the Bureau's official position was that what had happened
at Teton was "impossible." Its officials were so confident in their
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engineering ability that they maintained that the site was adequate and
that nothing was wrong with the design, engineering, or construction.
[24) And yet it had happened.
The Subcommittee supported its theory by citing four instances in
which significant warnings went unheeded. One occurred before
excavation began when a team of USGS field geologists, mapping the Snake
River Basin, concluded that the area was seismically active. Yet the
Bureau's geologic reports had acknowledged neither seismic hazards nor
the recent discovery that newly filled reservoirs can trigger quakes and
cause dam failures. Thus, "in the spirit of cooperation," the
geologists sent a lengthy and urgent handwritten memorandum to their
home office to be typed and relayed promptly to the Bureau's Site
Engineer.
But over the next six months their superiors in Washington revised
the material, deleting all sense of urgency and transforming the memo
into a more "objective" scientific paper. The Bureau never formally
acknowledged receiving it. [16-22) One of the team later said, "... the
emotional -- the feelings we had about the thing really could not be
documented scientifically." [19)
Another warning cited was when the Bureau's Regional geologist first
met with the Project Construction Engineer at the site and told him that
this was not a good place on which to build a dam. His professional
opinion was never relayed, orally or in writing, to Bureau officials in
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Denver. The Subcommittee concluded that both men were "intimidated" and
"silenced" by "the force of the momentum." [22)
More evidence of warnings unheeded emerged during excavation and
grouting. The crew uncovered cracks in the highly fractured rock far in
excess of the maximum size of 1.7 inches anticipated. Instead they
found caves large enough for a man to walk in. One hundred feet down
one narrow passage was a cavity containing a rock the size of a pick-up
truck. [14) At another point, grouters, filling a hole in the side of
the canyon, were forced to flee from an emerging swarm of bats. [23]
But the Project Engineer had been confident that grouting could
adequately seal these holes. The Subcommittee concluded that the
Engineer's exaggerated overconfidence was typical of Bureau officials,
"bordering on arrogance." The Bureau's own grouting expert later
testified that "certainty is never possible"; grouting is not an exact
science but more like an art, necessitating a certain "feel" for the
work. [24]
Finally, the Subcommittee decided that the Bureau took an
unwarranted risk in filling the reservoir so rapidly. This is the time
when a dam is put to the "acid test". Bureau officials had granted
permission for rapid filling contingent on findings from a "superior"
program of instruments in 19 wells to monitor changes in groundwater
around the site. But three of the instruments malfunctioned; data from
a fourth, when later analyzed under a "steady state" model, indicated
62
that groundwater had travelled under pressure at the alarming rate of
1,000 times what was anticipated. But the Engineer had relayed such
data routinely in his monthly report, which the Bureau's Denver office
received only after the dam had failed. The ERC later used a different,
"transient," model to analyze the data and found that it did not
indicate a "pressure response" and was thus presumably less alarming.
The Project Engineer would not comment on this to the Subcommittee,
disclaiming expertise as a groundwater geologist. [24-27] Nor did he
mention that the Bureau had no choice in the rate of filling.
However, in its eagerness to justify its theory, the House
Subcommittee neglected to distinguish the different positions and roles
of its informants in the bureaucracy. The USGS was a separate agency
from the Bureau. Contractors came from the private sector, outside the
bureaucracy. The Bureau officials in Denver, who approved the rapid
filling, ranked high above those at the site. Yet under the theory all
were treated simply as parts of a monolithic body equally subject to the
abstract force of "momentum."
Nor did the Subcommittee reflect on the role that Congress itself
had played to initiate and maintain that momentum by appropriating funds
until the dam failed, ignoring public protests. Voices were raised not
in the executive branch nor directly to Congress, but in the courts;
they were not about safety and thus apparently not germane to the
Subcommittee's argument.
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For instance, in 1971, environmentalists, concerned that the 17-mile
long reservoir would destroy scenic areas and wildlife habitat upstream
(but apparently unconcerned about the hazard to human habitat
downstream), sought to stop the project through an injunction requested
from a Federal District Court. Their grounds were technical and
procedural: the Bureau had overstated the economic justification for
the project and had filed an inadequate environmental impact statement.
A higher court halted this legal action in 1974. [9)
In 1971, the Idaho Water Resources Board also protested to the
federal Council on Environmental Quality that the benefit-cost ratio was
been incorrectly calculated and that the project was not economically
justified, to no avail. By 1969 the Bureau had lowered the preliminary
1961 ratio of 1.79:1 on which the project had been authorized, to 1.55:1
and reduced the estimated cost from $52 million to $48.5 million. No
procedures required revision of that estimate again, once Congress had
begun to appropriate funds routinely.
Instead, the Subcommittee focussed on matters within its scope of
authority, to oversee operations of the Executive branch. Its
prescription followed from its theory and was consistent with its
metaphor of bureaucratic momentum. The Secretary of the Interior should
apply "appropriate brakes on the momentum to build," or else legislation
might be passed to reorganize federal dam operations. The Bureau and
others should establish new administrative procedures to improve their
decision-making, instituting procedures for setting a mid-point for
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reappraising projects under construction and for halting construction,
should any significant safety hazards appear. [33) In essence rules
were needed to slow momentum and, if necessary, to stop a project.
Technical Investigations. Shortly after the disaster, the Governor
of Idaho and the Secretary of the Interior, Cecil B. Andrus, convened a
group of international technical experts from outside the federal
government as an Independent Panel to review the cause of the Teton Dam
failure. [Panel] Its aim was to reconstruct the sequence of physical
events within the structure leading up to the breaching. But it faced a
problem common after engineering failures, that much of the evidence has
been destroyed, in this case, literally washed downstream.
The Department of the Interior also created an Interagency Review
Group (IRG) with a similar mission and made up of representatives from
five agencies: USGS, the Soil Conservation Service (SCS), TVA, the
Corps, and the Bureau. The two groups shared the results of field
investigations and laboratory tests, but independently analyzed the data
and the design,specifications, and testimony from many involved. (The
term "experts" will distinguish the Panel from the officials of the IRG.)
Neither group could reconstruct with any precision or certainty what
had happened. Both rejected the hypotheses that seismicity was involved
or that differential settlement had cracked the structure, and neither
considered the rapid rate of filling significant. Both agreed on a very
general explanation, that the dam had failed due to internal erosion
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(piping) through the core. Water had entered openings in inadequately
sealed rock joints and tunneled through the core before it burst through
other zones high on the right abutment.
The experts proferred several tentative explanations for parts of
some complex sequence of events. A theory of "hydraulic fracturing" was
one: the geometry of the steep-walled key trench had forced the fill,
expanded with water, to arch, causing cracks in the core above. In
1976, this theory was relatively new, more like an hypothesis, still to
be tested, and unknown at the time the Bureau designed the dam. [Panel
App. I]
Neither group found anything amiss in the site selection procedures
and geologic studies. Documents indicated that the site was "the best
of the available sites for the purposes of the project." [IRG III]
Like the Bureau, investigators did not question those purposes nor
whether men should have tried to stem the flow of that river; all
seemed to take for granted the basic principle that a permanent dam
could be build on almost any site. They accepted their immediate
problem as given, to identify the physical causes of failure, how the
dam should have been designed.
The geologic studies had been "appropriate and extensive."
[Panel v] The pilot grouting program was exceptionally thorough and
forecast many of the difficulties. The design followed Bureau practices
developed through years of experience. Construction conformed to the
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actual design, to the plans and specifications, in all significant
respects except scheduling. [Panel vii]
The Bureau had been aware that the silt in the core and trenches was
brittle and erodible, and also that the downstream drainage layer was
rather impervious, but it had used such materials on earlier dams, but
apparently not both together. In combination, the drainage layer had
prevented the exceptional seepage from flowing harmlessly down the face
of the dam. [Panel 7-11] If that layer had functioned as intended, the
weakness in the structure might have been evident earlier and allowed
the population downstream to flee before the dam was breached. The
experts suggested that adequate instrumentation in the structure (not
just in the banks) might also have provided early warnings, but the
Bureau was so confident that it could predict problems in its earthen
dams that it did not install this expensive equipment. [IRG D-4]
The experts casually mentioned one decision that seems to have
contributed significantly to the failure. Late in 1970, when
environmentalists were challenging the project, the designers decided
not to take sand and gravel from the riverbed downstream "apparently to
avoid damaging the downstream environment," but to use as much material
as possible from upstream, although it contained more silt. They
correspondingly reduced the sand and gravel requirements in the
specifications for the core. [8-1]
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One can imagine that economic reasons bolstered this decision made
in a political context. The reservoir would eventually conceal the
upstream "borrow pits," as these excavations were called, but the Bureau
would have had to grade over unsightly holes downstream, at some
expense. The experts did not explore reasons for this decision, perhaps
because both political and economic matters were outside their mandate
and expertise.
Instead, they found the cause of failure in the design and faulted
designers, but primarily for omissions. More defensive measures should
have been used against the possibility of piping, such as filters over
the core, transition zones under it, grouting on the sides of the
trenches and a drainage system in the abutments. [8-1]
The officials also recognized these omissions but defended them with
a kind of psychological explanation: "the designers' reliance on the
grout curtain 'inhibited' their adopting other measures..." [103]
Apparently design engineers were so satisfied with their innovative
solutions that they forgot to attend to other potential problems. A
main criticism was that they did not document how they "logically" had
arrived at their decisions. [87]
More important, even though "windows" were found in the grout
curtain and fill was often insufficiently packed under overhanging
rocks, both groups absolved construction personnel from responsibility
or blame, and instead commended the workers at the site. The project
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engineer "did a good job." [Panel 11-18]. Supervisory personnel were
"knowledgable" and "interested" and "faithfully carried out all aspects
of quality control." [9-6) The contractors were "competent" and
"administered their formal contracts in accordance with well-accepted
practices." [IRG v] The field staff seemed interested in the quality of
their work and "determined to achieve, or exceed, the desired results."
[IRG C-5]
Field workers obviously took initiatives. For instance, "to allay
their concern for compaction of Zone 1 (core) material over large
voids," they developed "surface treatment procedures," filling cracks
and laying slurry grout in the bottom of the trenches. They only ceased
this practice high up in the key trenches, where piping later occurred,
"on orders from above." [IRG D-6]
The experts said that questions about the quality of construction
should not deal with its execution as much as with the "exercise of
judgment in matters more related to fundamentals of conceptual design."
[9-66) The Bureau had not considered sufficiently the unique and
unusually difficult geologic conditions at the site nor recognized that
every embankment has "its own personality." It concluded that building
a dam at that site called for "the best judgment and experience of the
engineering profession." [ix]
We may never know the final answer to the specific cause of failure,
the Panel concluded. It may have been from some combination of geologic
69
details, the geometry of the key trench, variations in compaction or
stress conditions, but which precise combination of factors initiated
the failure "is of course unknown and, moreover, not relevant." [12-18)
"The failure was caused not because of some unforeseeable fatal
combination, but because (1) the many combinations of unfavorable
circumstances inherent in the situation were not visualized, and
because (2) adequate defenses against these circumstances were not
included in the design." [12-18, italics added]
In diagnosing the cause of failure as a lack of professional imagination
and redundancy in the desig, the Panel did not consider that additional
defenses would have clearly made the project economically unfeasible.
The officials generally agreed with the experts' conclusions, but
took their diagnosis a step back into the organizational context.
During their study, they had identified "areas where it appears that
procedures and documentation, or lack of them, may have played a part in
decisions that ultimately led to the failure of Teton Dam." [101] This
led to four recommendations for new procedures requiring:
(1) independent boards to review the design and construction of each
major project, (2) design decisions to be formally documented in
writing; (3) design personnel should remain active and visit a project
frequently during construction, and (4) instruments should be installed
and data from them and promptly interpreted at all major dams. [107)
Although starting with identical data, investigators diverged,
consistent with their institutional positions. Outsiders, independent
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consultants, called for more of what they themselves possessed, the best
professional engineering judgment and imagination. Like the House
subcommittee, the bureaucratic officials stressed impersonal remedies,
new administrative procedures, particularly to govern engineers.
The GAO Investigation. At Ryan's request, the General Accounting
Office (GAO) investigated the procedures and practices of the Bureau and
also of the Corps and several non-federal groups. Assured of no major
problems in construction, it focussed on site investigation and design.
In general, it supported the recommendations of the House subcommittee
and the officials for consistent controls over design and administration
processes.
The GAO seemed leary about the use of professional imagination and
judgment. Although acknowledging that each site is unique, it descried
the agencies' lack of explicit criteria for choosing "acceptable sites"
and of specifications for "adequate" site investigation. Like the
officials, it called for independent reviews of agency judgments on
these, especially "due to the relative complexity of the remaining
sites." [22]
The GAO urged designers to make their "intent" explicit and agencies
to adopt procedures ensuring that the "design intent" is carried out.
In the case of Teton, the intent has been so unclear that the staff had
"misinterpreted" general instructions and allowed the crew to apply
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slurry grout at its own discretion. [42) The GAO obviously frowned upon
imagination and discretion at all levels.
Moreover, noting that the theory of hydraulic fracturing had not
been adequately tested, the GAO concluded that dam building "has not
reached a point where designers can predict all problems." [36)
Implicitly until that science advanced, multiple defenses were
justifiable.
The GAO also chided the Bureau for not learning a lesson from a near
failure during the filling of its Fontenelle dam, a failure averted by
lowering the reservoir through oversized outlets; the Bureau should have
made sure both outlets were usable before filling Teton. [65) The GAO
seemed unaware that the Bureau had taken a different lesson from
Fontenelle, addressing what it saw as the cause of near failure by
adding two rows to the grout curtain at Teton.
The GAO also pointed out inconsistencies among agencies, for
instance that none had formal criteria for rates of filling or lowering
reservoirs. The Corps built its dams to withstand any rate of filling
and the Bureau used one foot per day as an "unwritten rule of thumb."
The Corps and Bureau could empty one in 90 to 120 days; the State of
California expected to empty half a reservoir in 14 days. Agencies also
differed on means to handle heavy flows the Corps and TVA depended
mainly on spillways; California and other agencies used outlets.
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[63-64] Each seemed to have its own "style" of engineering; the GAO
apparently expected there to be one best way.
Both Corps and Bureau also had "procedural gaps" in programs for
inspecting existing dams and in monitoring them with instruments. The
use of instruments raised other problems. The anomalous data from Teton
had "different meaning and significance" to different people, including
designers. [51] Project staff were not qualified to recognize abnormal
readings, and even ground water specialists had not known what ranges to
expect. On the other hand, the GAO reported, park rangers and
maintenance workers in California, "with little dam design and con-
struction experience," read instruments on existing dams and transmitted
data to the Corps district office, apparently quite satisfactorily.
[55] The GAO did not realize that instrument data at a new site can be
meaningless even to experts until patterns are recognized specific to
that particular site.
The GAO discovered that the field staff at Teton had devised a
"Self-Protection Plan" of instructions for internally reporting serious
or unusual conditions, perhaps reflecting unspoken concerns of the
construction crew. [71] In fact, none of the federal agencies had plans
or procedures for emergencies, which obviously would not occur if dams
were permanent, failsafe structures.
In a postscript to the formal investigations, the Bureau later
claimed that contractor negligence was responsible for the failure.
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Investigators had uncovered an "anomalous layer of cold, moist fill"
horizontally across the core where the water had probably tunneled. The
Bureau then suggested that late in the Fall, when contractors added
water to the final layer of silt, it froze into a thin layer of ice
which was sealed in with new fill in the Spring. The ice eventually
melted into a plane pervious to seepage across the core. This discovery
enabled the Bureau to deflect blame from itself and open legal actions
against the contractor, and made designers aware of inhomogeneities in
all earthen dam construction.".
Planning for Federal Dam Safety
In December of 1976, as investigations continued, top officials from
about 14 federal agencies dams, met and decided to establish an
Interagency Committee on Dam Safety (ICODS). Early in 1977 they adopted
a formal charter with the purpose of preparing a set of guidelines
outlining procedures to assure attention to dam safety in each of the
constituent agencies.
To draft the guidelines, ICODS organized a small hierarchy; under a
5-member steering committee were three subcommittees, one on each step
of the formal sequence of site investigation and design (SID),
construction (CON), and operation and maintenance (OPM). Each was
further subdivided into special task groups to prepare specific parts of
the guidelines, with membership distributed among the agencies. [FCCSET
Appendix B]
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In March, after more House Subcommittee hearings, Congressman Ryan
wrote to the President urging the administration to take action on dam
safety. On April 23, 1976, Jimmy Carter issued a memorandum [FCCSET 1)
to the Directors of OSTP and 0MB and to the Secretaries of Interior,
Agriculture, and the Army, the Commissioner of the U.S. Section of the
International Boundary and Watery Commission (IBWC), and Chairmen of the
Federal Power Commission (FPC), and TVA. They were directed to
cooperate with OSTP in a three part program. Each agency should first
survey practices affecting the integrity of dams under its authority.
Second, OSTP should convene an interagency committee to propose
guidelines for management procedures to ensure dam safety. Third, a
panel of recognized outside experts should review agency regulations,
procedures, practices, and the proposed guidelines.
Carter urged special attention to several aspects of dam safety.
These included the effects of "cost-saving incentives" and also of
earthquakes or earth movements (Frank Press's primary interest), the
extent of in-house and outside interpretations of data in site selection
and design, the use of "new technological methods," and the involvement
of local communities in "identifying, analyzing, and solving dam safety
questions." One item, "the degree to which probabilistic or risk-based
analysis is incorporated into the process of site selection, design,
construction, and operation" put the new technique of risk analysis,
then poorly understood in OSTP, on its agenda.15
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Philip Smith, one of three associate directors of OSTP, was put in
charge. As technical consultant and staff, he brought in Bruce
Tschantz, an engineer from the University of Tennessee. His recent
testimony on State dam safety programs before the House Subcommittee had
impressed the Congressmen,16
Smith converted the Steering Committe of ICODS into an ad hoc
committee of the Federal Coordinating Committee on Science, Engineering
and Technology (FCCSET) and in May convened it in an impressive
conference room in the White House. A cadre of Army top-brass attended
to represent the Corps. In heated discussions that ensued, one Corps
engineer emphatically repeated the statement that with enough money the
Corps could build a safe dam on any site. This arrogance irritated
Smith. 7
He also had strong reservations about the federal government even
being in the business of building and operating dams, but admitted
privately that as an avid whitewater canoeist he was probably "biased."
Lacking expertise in dam engineering and pre-occupied with other duties,
he left technical matters and much of the day-to-day work to Tschantz,
whose first assignment was to "interpret the President's memo" and would
then work closely with the 5-member steering committee."
Tschantz modified the wording of the President's list to conform to
the lexicon of dam engineering, adding items to cover all essential
aspects of the conventional process from site investigation onward.
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Initially he hoped that the agencies would evaluate their own procedures
and insert their scores on a matrix of sixteen specific items. But the
agencies objected that if the public learned that safety procedures were
less than adequate, it might become unduly alarmed. Undoubtedly, low
scoring agencies also feared losing face and funds at budget time in
Congress.
So Tschantz asked them only to report on relevant procedures and
practices in the sixteen areas and describe any other problems. At
first, some did not seem to take the assignment seriously or protested
that the checklist was not relevant to their operations. For instance,
neither the TVA nor IBWC were constructing new dams. The Soil
Conservation Service (SCS), and other agricultural agencies were
concerned primarily with small structures. FPC was primarily interested
in regulation of hydroelectric power projects. Most eager to cooperate
was the representative of the Bureau, which had been humbled by the
failure and forced by many inquiries to reflect on its practices.
Tschantz also added William Bivens, a former classmate, to the Steering
Committee to represent the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which
regulates impoundments of water from nuclear power plants and had
pioneered in the use of risk analysis.
At the end of June, when Tschantz and Smith met with staff of OMB,
he established his credentials in OSTP. The consultant so persuasively
presented a paper on dam safety issues, especially on the deplorable
status of State programs, that OMB agreed to seek funds for the Corps to
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inspect non-federal dams, a long neglected law, under P.L. 92-367,
passed in 1972.'' His success gained him "clout" among the agencies.
Over the summer, the Corps solicited comments on items in the survey
district offices. DOI hired a consultant, Woodward-Clyde, to assess the
procedures of the Bureau and its five other agencies. A committee of
top officials representing six agencies compiled Agriculture's report.
[27-28] In September, they submitted more than 2000 pages of material
to OSTP. Most had catalogued copies of formal documents, lists of
administrative and technical procedures and statements of policy intent
under the survey headings to attest to safe practices. The USDA
justifiably complained that time did not permit a field study but the
others seemed to assume that these documents represented their actual
field practices. Tschantz laboriously summarized this material for the
FCCSET Report. [27-68)
Survey Findings
The most general item, the use of "Cost-Saving Incentives" seemed
unproblematic, and all agencies claimed to achieve some balance in
phrases such as TVA's: "Dams are designed and constructed with regard
for economy. However, saving of cost is not permitted to compromise dam
safety." [67]
Personnel qualifications seemed adequate. All cited criteria for
formal education and experience in hiring and staffing. For instance,
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15% of the Corps' professional employees held advanced degrees and two
thirds of its engineers and scientists were registered. All listed
programs for professional development, for "technology transfer", and
for improving technical skills, such as in-house lectures and seminars
or the availability of new publications, participation in professional
societies, or on-the-job contacts with superiors.
But more was needed, the Corps volunteered, such as programs for
training sub-professional operators and maintenance crews, who lacked
the engineering background to recognize dam safety problems, and for
rotating field and office engineers. Engineers were later said to
resist field assignments, perhaps because these symbolized loss of
status or forced them to live far from urban areas. [OSTP-24]
The Bureau brought out how bureaucratic matters impeded professional
development and performance: "...engineers have little time to
participate in activities which lead to technical growth and sometimes
may not be able to give full technical attention to project
requirements." It explained that "recent reductions in ceilings on
employee levels" and increased workloads had diverted "substantial
numbers of 'personnel slots'" from design and construction supervision
to work required to conform with "social and environmental regulations,"
citing the Occupational Safety and Health Act, Privacy Act, Freedom of
Information Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). [42]
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Most agencies called upon the professional judgment of others within
their agencies for "Internal Reviews" of projects, but brought in
outside consultants where unusual problems were anticipated. Only TVA
had regularly used independent boards for external reviews. Its
internal reviews often took the form of informal consultations between
persons involved earlier and later in projects, no doubt because TVA did
not use contractors but hired and trained local people, maintaining a
cadre of experienced personnel within the Tennessee valley. [GS-67]
Such informal consulting might be more difficult when agency operations
are geographically diffuse.
The Corps raised an issue that the survey had not addressed.
Because each site is unique, with diverse conditions, initial geologic
data is often inadequate. Designers often have difficulty interpreting
data and appreciating foundation conditions before the site is fully
excavated. The Corps seemed to fault USGS and State geologists for
supplying inadequate information; it had to exercise "continuing
vigilance" to assure that scientists under contract supplied information
consistent with designers' needs. Since problems frequently develop at
the dam/foundation interface, as they did at Teton, the Corps
recommended that preconstruction assumptions be re-assessed during
construction so that foundation treatment could be modified. [33-34]
The survey implicitly recognized such problems under "Assimilation
of New Field Information" into the- design. On the other hand,
"Orientation of Construction Representatives" to the design intent
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seemed make construction supervisors responsible for identifying new
information to be incorporated into the design. One message was clear:
before construction practices could vary from the specifications, those
at the site must send information up to the designers so that they could
modify the design documents. These seemed to be assigned an almost
sacred status.
The Corps also admitted difficulties with its "Construction Quality
Control" (CQC) procedures under Army regulations; most other agencies
used less elaborate procedures for materials testing under Federal
Procurement Regulations. The Corps hired independent subcontractors
specialized in CQC to monitor the prime contractor and had cut back on
its own inspection staff, which now only checked that the subcontractor
complied with his contractual obligations. But working through a
"middleman," as it also did on site investigation, the Corps had
encountered difficulties getting the prime contractor to meet the
specifications and felt that the new arrangements had weakened its
quality assurance program. [30]
The engineers' mistrust of those responsible for completed dams was
obvious in another item, "Control against Improper Operation and
Maintenance." Although some agencies had manuals for operating larger
dams, most conveyed instructions informally and, by implication, failed
to exercise sufficient control.
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Most agencies also cited procedures for "Periodic Inspections" of
existing dams, but few were probably better than the Corps: "Excellent
in concept" but in practice district offices lacked "diligence" in
carrying them out. [29] Part of the problem lay in obtaining funds for
maintenance and non-emergency repairs. The Soil Conservation Service
had no program to follow up on small dams prolifically constructed on
its advice.
The Department of Agriculture did work with private individuals and
groups on small projects. But in contrast to the broad role envisioned
for citizens in the Carter memo, most agencies became involved with the
"Non-Technical Community" only through NEPA procedures, which required
public hearings on environmental impact statements. or through the
licensing procedures of the NRC and FERC, both completed long before
construction began. TVA with its system of dams completed continued to
work with community groups in their operation.
The regulatory agencies alone required emergency plans, to be made
by others, to evacuate people downstream from the threat of a dam
failure. Conversely, under "Security Against Sabotage," the Corps, the
NRC, and IBWC had procedures for protecting dams from the threat of
people.
"Risk-Based Analysis" One surprise from the survey was the unity of
the agencies, except the NRC, in opposition to what was called
"risk-based analysis."2 Most of these engineers were not opposed to
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probabilistic methods per se, which were commonly used on aspects of
design, as in calculating the maximum probable flood or the strength and
tolerance of materials. Their conventional method for handling
uncertainty was the "factor of safety approach," or allowing a "margin
of safety" under a policy of "conservatism" in design and construction
to give them assurance that their structures would not fail.
The arguments against risk-based analysis were diverse and often
contradictory. The Corps, usually at the forefront in technical
innovations,2 ' had studied the new technique and concluded that it had
"little to offer in its present state of development." The Bureau
listed specific problems: its use would require assessing the
probabilities of all factors in each phase of the process of building
and operating dams, taking care that these factors were "all inclusive
and mutually exclusive." Even if all factors could be classified to
make them causally independent, the mathematical probabilities of
failure of many factors could not be determined. Thus the Bureau
concluded that risk analysis required "judgmental assessment," here
presumably unreliable. [45) Conversely, USDA argued that these
procedures, not yet proven to be valid, might lead to "the substitution
of numerical values for professional judgment," [37] here presumably
more reliable than a technique.
The NRC admitted that risk analysis applied to dams, in contrast to
nuclear power plants, had "technical limitations" but alone continued to
endorse its development and use. [59] The value of property and number
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of people at risk downstream (the magnitude of the consequence) could at
least be used to set priorities for attention among high hazard dams.
The technique could provide a "more explicit approach to the
understanding of risk" and give theoretical guidance to engineers in
allocating resources among safety measures. But even when theories of
risk were fully developed, the techniques could augment but never
substitute for the competence of professionals and constructors, and in
spite of the intention to reduce the risk of failure to zero, some risk
would remain and failures would occur. [OSTP 23]
Privately, the agencies argued vehemently and ad absurdum against
the use of risk assessment. To discuss risk openly would undermine both
public confidence in dams and Congressional support for the agencies.
It could bring an end to new water resource projects so desperately
needed to increase agricultural production and feed the world's
burgeoning population. Use of the technique would result in mass
starvation.
OSTP admitted that assigning a mathematical probability to the
failure of an individual dam was not yet technically possible and that
any number would be "very arbitrary." On the other hand, the "social
cost of a low probability disaster (residual risk)" should be factored
into benefit-cost analyses used by Congress in authorizing new dam
construction and to alert the public of the potential hazard of new
projects in order to prevent an "upward bias" for dams that are not
"economically justified or socially acceptable." EFCCSET 75) This idea
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of modifying benefit-cost analyses was consistent with Smith's desire to
get the federal government out of the business of dam building and
apparently one of his major contributions to the FDS program.
In the results of the survey released in November, Smith wrote an
executive summary directed mainly at the Corps. It should complete
inspection of all high hazard non-federal dams. With other agencies, it
should involve the non-technical community more than "passively" and
beyond the initial stage of dam development. [8] A research program
should also be funded to meet such common needs as objective criteria on
filling rates, and improved techniques for calculating seismic forces
and especially for analyzing risk.
Tschantz himself evaluated agency procedures on a matrix, adding
items raised during the survey, a complex analytical task. Only the NRC
and the Federal Energy Resources Commission (FERC and formerly FPC) had
perfect scores. Two giants, the Corps and TVA, were inadequate on many
counts. Agencies in Interior, except for the Bureau, which had embarked
on reforms, lagged behind those of Agriculture. Of course, agency
spokesmen still objected that simple symbols could not and should not be
used to rate and compare diverse agencies.
Tschantz also summarized major points for the guidelines from rough
drafts and outlines submitted by ICODS subcommittees and appended to the
report. More important, he concluded that the review process itself had
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been valuable and extensive discussions had resulted in safer dams
because hundreds of agency people were now aware of "management lessons"
to be learned from Teton's failure. [79]
The OSTP project had also set in motion a framework for treating dam
safety as an "identifiable component" in all phases of a project.
Moreover, he expected the federal program to stimulate, by example and
standards, programs in the States. [80] In essence, the project had
transformed dam safety into a separate matter and created a new program
expected to serve as a model down through the federal system and out to
every State.
New Uncertainties. However, both Tschantz and later the Independent
Panel emphasized the uncertainties in dam engineering. In an
introduction to the FCCSET report, the consultant recalled major
failures of the past. Moreover, because of "uncertainties and lack of
understanding" of material behavior and of man-made and natural
destructive forces, and because of "imperfect control of construction
processes," no dam will ever be "failsafe." [9] Imperfect knowledge and
control were basic issues.
His argument went further. Dam engineering may draw heavily on
mathematical principles and physical laws but is not an exact science;
it is "more like an art." In practice, engineers must exercise
judgment, grounded in experience, especially in the face of limited
knowledge of foundation conditions prior to excavation. Therefore,
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throughout and after construction, dams must constantly be
"re-engineered." [10] This solution would put the professional
continuously in charge.
Meanwhile all existing dams are "aging" and, reflecting the
accelerating rate of dam construction since the beginning of the
century, an ever greater proportion are becoming fifty years old or
older. (12] Moreover, maintenance is costly but yields no quantifiable
economic benefits beyond those originally calculated. (Implicitly, such
costs could only be justified as a way of avoiding the cost of
failure.) At the same time, the number of feasible sites for new
projects is decreasing and, as construction costs rise, engineers are
under pressure to construct new dams with more limited resources at ever
poorer sites. These were the key issues.
About a year later, the Independent Review Panel published its
report, [OSTP] supporting and expanding on these views. It too
emphasized that dam building is an art. Practitioners may draw on basic
principles of sciences, such as geology, hydrology and seismology, and
on bodies of knowledge in civil and construction engineering and in
project management. These principles have emerged over time, in part
through the work of several federal agencies and as professionals have
learned from failures. But experience and judgment are essential in
applying these principles for the development of water resources
projects in the context of economic, environmental, social, and
political factors. [8-9]
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An issue of "overriding importance" was dealing with uncertainty
arising from geologic conditions at a site, variable material conditions
that escaped detection even with CQC, and "extreme meterological events
and operating conditions which can be forecast only in a statistical
sense." Human behavior was particularly unpredictable, making it
"difficult and perhaps even impossible to quantify" such sources of risk
as "errors of judgment" and "the inevitable human shortcomings" of
designers, contractors, and owners. [27] Formal risk analysis offered
little solution to these uncertainties.
The Panel elaborated on factors in the physical context that
jeopardize dams. Hydrological and other conditions upstream can change
over time, subjecting them to increasing pressure and greater
possibility of failure. For instance, developers may clear land,
increasing runoff, or a municipality may import water from another
watershed increasing the river's flow. Nature or men may alter a
river's channel increasing the speed of that flow; it may carry more
sediment to settle behind the dam and reduce the reservoir's capacity,
contributing to overtopping. A series of dams on a watercourse, like
steps on a stair, often built and operated by independent agencies, with
different standards, also create a potential "domino effect" of
simultaneous failures. [12-16]
Internally a structure and/or its foundation may weaken or age in
undetectable ways. For instance, certain kinds of foundation material
deteriorate rapidly. Clay shales may lose "shear strength" and permit a
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structure to slide; limestone may dissolve into a pattern of voids like
a honeycomb, allowing water to tunnel beneath a structure. Water seeps
not only through earthen structures but even through concrete, which can
also deteriorate from physical weathering or chemical action.2 2
Instruments may not detect the gradual process of internal aging in
the early stages. The most common instruments are piezometers, deep set
pipes, to measure underground water pressure, but, like those in the
banks at Teton, are not extremely reliable. They were installed on less
than 10% of existing dams and are especially expensive to emplace after
a dam is complete. Meanwhile, people settling on low-lying plains
downstream increase the possible consequences of failure.
The panel also contributed insights into the organizational and
institutional context of dam engineering, particularly in the federal
government. The "size and complexity of dam projects and of the
agencies engaged in their administration" and "the natural tendency of
large organizations toward compartmentalization and specialization"
could stifle communication and the necessary coordination. Other
considerations -- environmental, political, etc. -- may also divert
management attention from "the overall objectives of risk reduction and
cost-effective operations." (26]
A key problem arising from the institutional context was "fixed
appropriations." On both public and private projects, major funding is
committed before construction begins, and contingency funds often
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underestimate the "real degree of uncertainty or the costs which may
result." Moreover, the "differences in spending rates," slow during
design and more rapid during construction, aggravates the situation.
"Designers are not accustomed to working in an environment where time is
crucial" and redesign may create "havoc with the logistics of
construction, carefully scheduled for cost-effectiveness." [27J
Other formal arrangements impede communication and complicate the
situation. A contractor may not understand the implications of
construction problems and so not report them to the engineer. Under
formal contractual arrangements, he and the engineer may attend less to
'project requirements" than to meeting their "individual obligations,"
which in turn can force all parties into "adversarial roles." [28]
Also, although quality control programs offer the benefits of expertise
and efficient testing, inspectors tend to develop "a testing
psychology," rigidly following contract specifications rather than
adjusting their procedures to actual "test results" or to obvious site
conditions that indicate the need for more frequent tests or even
different ones, so that actual deficiencies go unidentified and
uncorrected. [29]
The Panel also suspected that some agencies viewed procedures on
inspecting and re-evaluating existing projects as "bureaucratic
requirements to be met 'on paper,' rather than ... achieved in fact."
[19] Some lacked legislative authority or policies or simply failed to
request budgets to take corrective actions. [20) But panel members
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could not agree on whether procedures should explicitly require
inspections at specific intervals or should allow the agencies the
flexibility to determine their timing, based on specific factors at
specific dams. [21] Here as on other matters, the panel showed itself
to be divided on whether to treat bureaucratic problems with more formal
requirements or less.
The Panel did recommend extensive peer review, by outside engineers,
even of each agency's organizational structure and operating
conditions. Plans should also be made at the start of each project to
"forecast potential problems and create a rationale for dealing with
them ... in a timely, efficient manner to minimize construction delays,
added costs, or distress to the completed dam." But this would require
"an organization that assures communication and continuity of thought
process with feedback . . . throughout the life of the project." [27]
The implicit remedy here was for an organization rather than
professionals to be continuously in charge. But the Panel gave little
specific advice on financing, contracts, and other institutional
arrangements, matters that would carry it far beyond its mandate and
expertise.
A major concern of the Panel, comprised of engineers largely from
academia, was that agencies had not attracted top quality professionals,
an impression based on informal sources. Many had attended second rate
colleges or had not achieved high standing in their classes. Therefore,
professionalism should be strengthened by using outside consultants on
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difficult projects and internally through professional development
programs following the guidelines of the American Society of Civil
Engineers (ASCE). [23-25]
But the greatest threat to dam safety lay within the culture of the
agencies: the slow insidious development of attitudes that trivialized
safety issues in small agencies, and in large ones reduced dam building
to routines and allowed personnel to "become complacent, over-confident,
and perhaps, even arrogant in the belief that they know with certainty
how to build a dam that will not fail." The Panel emphasized that "the
most fundamental principle of dam safety is the recognition that every
dam runs some risk of failure." [8, italics in the original]. Thus
changing personnel attitudes was a basic problem to be solved, but the
question was how?
The Panel and Tschantz had become aware of an unwritten rule within
the agencies forbidding even talk of risk and failure. The subject was
taboo. The agencies had argued that should personnel even mention that
a dam might fail and it later did, they might be legally liable for a
structure they had "known all along" was unsafe. If anyone knew that a
dam would be unsafe, he should speak up so problems could be corrected.
This argument suggests that a fundamental objection to risk analysis
lay in the fear of liability, which could destroy the credibility of a
professional or the reputation of an agency. This reasoning and
references to knowing are revealing. Obviously no one can know with
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certainty during design and construction that a dam will fail; one can
only speculate, raise questions, or express intuitive feelings. The
story of Teton refutes the assumption that an agency would accept that
kind of knowledge, unsupported by scientific arguments or technical
data, especially from mid-level or lowly people or outsiders. There is
evidence that early concerns expressed by the chief designer of Teton
were even ignored. 2 3 In practice, speculation, imagination and
criticism were taboo.
The Panel's main response to the lack of professional competence and
taboo on talk of risk was to recommend a dam safety office be
established at the top of each agency implicitly to make risk and
failure discussable. Although it recognized that "in some sense safety
is everyone's responsibility, [11) these academicians thought that some
one person, like a teacher, must lead the discussion and show by example
that such talk was permissible. This permission was expected to filter
down through all levels of the bureaucracy enabling everyone to voice
concerns and attend to safety issues.
Such offices at the top would also be free of competing pressures
and act as independent "champions" of dam safety. [10] They would
provide peer review on major projects, to counteract the impression that
heretofore no one knew all about nor was accountable for large
projects. To overcome a lack of communication among the agencies, the
dam safety officers should report to, advise, and work together with a
lead agency, possibly in the President's Office.
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The guidelines should be completed as soon as possible, but again
Panel members could not agree, this time on whether the guidelines
should cover technical as well as administrative matters and in how much
detail. Detailed technical guidelines could convey current practice and
provide minimum standards for smaller agencies to compensate for the
poor quality of professionalism. They would also stimulate improvements
in non-federal practice. The very process of "personal interactions" to
reach agreements (echoing Tschantz in his conclusions to the survey
report) on technical standards might generate improvements in federal
practice.
On the other hand, technical guidelines would be burdensome to keep
current and might lag behind the best practices or even "freeze" them in
the inertia of institutional processes. Moreover, they would "tend to
become cookbooks that are followed uncritically and without real
thought," making practices that follow the book "appear safe, whether
they are or not." [31-33] This was their dilemma.
Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety (ICODS)issued in June of 1979
dealt only with administrative matters and left technical matters to the
discretion of professionals. Even then the authors tried to strike a
balance between proscribing detailed procedures that could be
burdensome, expensive, and unnecessary for smaller agencies, while
avoiding "saying nothing." If the guidelines were too general, agencies
could interpret them to mean that they did not have to change their
ways. 2 4
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The guidelines contained few surprises. They called for dam safety
offices directly under the direction of each agency. These officers
should use reasonable judgment in obtaining compliance with the intent
of the guidelines throughout their organizations. The general
responsibilities of other roles and offices were listed. Written
documentation often in "standardized format" was prescribed in
considerable detail on every stage of a project, from the interpretation
of even "suspected" site conditions in geotechnical records to the
reasons for rejecting alternatives in design decisions. [14]
On the other hand, they emphasized teamwork and informal
communication. For instance, management should encourage
interdisciplinary teams of geologists, geophysicists, and engineers to
use "intellectual curiosity and an inquisitive approach" in geotechnical
investigations. [21) Designers should seek the advice of construction
engineers on the "constructibility" of a project and the "ease of
contract administration" prior to advertising for bids on construction.
[13) The agencies should coordinate budget requests and give dam safety
matters "visibility" throughout the federal government. [18)
A few analytical techniques were mentioned, such as for determining
"maximum credible earthquakes," without specifying details. Designers
were warned that "judgment and analytical expertise" were just as
important as the mechanics of analysis in selecting data to represent
the range and variation of foundation and material properties. [25]
Analysis, too, appeared to be something of an art.
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Detailed procedures were specified for operating and maintaining
existing dams and new forms of analyses for emergency action planning.
The agencies should evaluate "the possible modes of failure" and the
"many degrees of failure" up to a final catastrophic stage, and identify
precursory signs and a range of emergency actions to be taken for each
of these. They should prepare "indundation maps" for all high hazard
dams. [36]
The reluctant agencies were again instructed to develop and use
"risk-based analytical techniques and methodologies" with their "high
potential" as an aid to decision making. The authors acknowledged "the
dual problems of uncertainty in analysis and the possibility of
misinterpretation by the public," and also that "loss of lives can only
be quantified, but not evaluated." [11) In other words, one can count
dead bodies but not put a pricetag on lives.
institutional problems were glossed over, except that "Safety
related functions and features must not be sacrificed to reduce costs,
improve project justification, or expedite time schedules," [9] and
design and contractor "organizations should maintain the flexibility
necessary to modify the design ... and construction specifications as
conditions dictate ... " [30] Here "saying nothing" disposed of
problems too intractable to deal with.
On construction, the guidelines were brief and general. For
instance, construction supervisors must be aware of the assumptions and
96
intent in "design philosophy" and have the authority to suspend work
when conditions differed from those anticipated until design engineers
could evaluate these and determine if design modifications were
required. [28]
The role of the public was less than Carter envisioned or Smith had
urged. Outside interest groups "should have the opportunity to voice
their concerns" on public works projects at any time. However, their
concerns "often represent constraints on technical decisions in the
form of local or regional political interests, legislation, perceptions
of risk and hazard, environmental factors, social conflicts, etc."
Agencies should develop procedures to assimilate such views and resolve
problems before beginning construction. [18]
With publication of the guidelines, OSTP's planning was complete.
Smith's final act was to obtain a second Presidential memo calling for
adoption of the guidelines, a new lead office in the Federal Emergency
Management Administration (FEMA) and another process similar to the
first: another survey, this time on implementation, and reviewed by an
independent panel. [FEMA]
Smith's intent was to help Tschantz, as director of the FEMA office,
and with a part time secretary and little budget, to establish clout and
control over the agencies, who did not welcome another survey so soon
after completing the guidelines. Four months later they did report that
all agencies had added dam safety offices to their organizational
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charts, all except the Bureau adding these duties to individuals with
other responsibilities. [7] On other points, as a new independent panel
observed, the agency reports contained more promises than evidence of
accomplishments. [Appendix A-19]
Tschantz re-organized ICODS to advise his office; its first task was
to review the agency surveys. It found evidence of chronic bureaucratic
complaints, of insufficient funds, staff, and of time, of course, to
implement the guidelines. Implicitly shifting responsibility to
Congress, it called for legislation to deal with gaps or overlaps in the
authority among different agencies.
ICODS recognized that some agencies were making costly efforts,
beyond what good sense would dictate, to comply with literal
interpretations of the document. For example, some were carrying out
costly seismic analyses in zones of minimal seismicity. It recommended
that conditions be specified for granting exceptions to the guidelines,
in essence, rules for interpreting the rules. [18)
The new panel also recommended that the lead office refine the
guidelines. It suggested a long list of tasks that would obviously
require a sizable staff or pre-occupy the overburdened dam safety
officers from their agency work. The guidelines seemed to be taking on
a life of their own, demanding special attention and effort.
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Obviously not understanding the reasoning or intent of the earlier
panel, the new one also questioned whether dam safety officers were
pre-empting responsibilities for dam safety more appropriately
distributed among designers and contractors. Nor did the guidelines
provide practical advice on raising consciousness of safety among
personnel in all phases of a project. [Appendix A, 32J
During the final six months of the Carter Administration, Tschantz
convened ICODS monthly. The dozen members faithfully attended, partly
because, it was said, each feared that in his absence other agencies
would interpret the guidelines in a manner detrimental to his own
agency's interests. Mistrust apparently still plagued interagency
relations. At the end of the Carter Administration, Tschantz resigned,
"burned out," and returned to the University of Tennessee. His duties
went to William Bivens, who was still promoting risk analysis.
The FDS office had been put within FEMA's Office of Hazard
Mitigation and Research, directed by Charles Thiel, an effective
advocate for both federal dam safety and earthquake hazard reduction.
When he resigned late in 1981, FEMA support for both programs waned.
Bivens eventually found a superior without specialized knowledge of dam
engineering and with many other duties but willing to help the program
survive.2
He began to build a constituency for dam safety outside of FEMA,
particularly among the States, by sponsoring conferences, publishing
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reports, and adopting a "logo" to give the program identity. He
continued to convene ICODS but now only quarterly. The National Academy
of Science created a Committee of the National Research Council (NRC) on
the Safety of Non-Federal Dams, to study the proper role of the Federal
government vis-a-vis the States. 26 In a second phase, it planned to
address technical issues, beginning with standard definitions of
heretofore inconsistent terms. For instance, "dam failure" could mean
anything from excessive seepage, to overtopping, to total collapse.
FEMA's promotion of risk assessment as part of benefit-cost analysis
was without success. Even the NRC realized that opposing parties,
affected differently by any assessment, would use different criteria to
determine costs and risk. But it hoped the technique would provide a
framework for organizing information and communication among opposing
parties and structuring technical decisions.27
By 1982, only two of FEMA's six subcommittees were still active.
One on communication had lapsed when funds were unavailable for two or
more personnel slots recommended by the Corps in each agency to carry
out formal "communicator roles." Instead FEMA should be used as a
"forum." A subcommittee on research disbanded after publishing a report
already becoming obsolete on projects completed and underway. Another
on training issued a catalogue of agency programs open to outsiders, but
bogged down on the issue of liability. It feared that if it even issued
videotapes for training operators and inspectors of a dam that later
failed, it might be caught in a chain of liability. Because of this
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issue, some agencies also resisted installing instruments, fearing that
they might be misread.
One active subcommittee on emergency preparations pointed out
proudly that TVA was enlarging spillways on several 50 year-old dams to
meet modern standards. That agency was also in the forefront in
preparing emergency evacuation plans. A simple formula had been
discovered for estimating downstream "inundation areas" with a hand-held
calculator as an alternative to more complex, debatable, and
time-consuming methods. TVA reasoned that it was better to get on with
planning and evacuate a few people unnecessarily than have no plans at
all.
The most active subcommittee had become one on technical guidelines,
after it had decided to work only on items on which its members could
agree. It had, for instance, tabled work on standards for spillway
design after the Corps refused to accept turbines and pinstocks to
handle excessive flow, as other agencies did, claiming that these sucked
in debris and soon became damaged and ineffective. After hearing
arguments among peers, it was trying to build national standards "by
consensus." "Maybe that's not the right way," Bivens said, "but it's
the best we can do."
The technical group was seeking a single method for interpreting
watershed data to define a standard "project flood" for design, since
heretofore the Corps, TVA, the Bureau, and the SCS had used different
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methods to arrive at different designs for any given site. It had also
finally convinced the Bureau to use National Weather Service data for
calculating the "maximum probable flood" rather than its own data, as it
had done for years. To Bivens this was a sign that the Bureau was
"opening up" again after it had "closed up" at the end of the OSTP
program.
Bivens had his own diagnosis for Teton's failure: in an agency
where people talk only to each other, they become convinced that they
are the only ones who know anything about a subject. The lesson he drew
was "Don't become drinking buddies with your crew." His message were
ambiguous. A small elite group could set national standards by talking
among themselves; an agency should be open to criticism from outside;
but within it, engineers should not fraternize with lowly construction
workers. Horizontal boundaries and top-down control must be maintained.
ICODS was beginning to relax some technical standards in the
realization that achieving these would cost as much as the Gross
National Product. Meanwhile, Bivens was learning to do without money as
he tried to keep the Federal Dam Safety Program alive.
Evaluation. Was the program a success? Tschantz, reflecting on it
later, from the distance of Tennessee and time, thought so. Top
officials in the federal agencies were still talking with each other and
working together on issues. He was less certain that the momentum would
continue after the most active individual members of ICODS retired.
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But, for the moment, he was optimistic in part because the States were
slowly moving forward on their own programs, prodded by private
consulting engineers interested in designing improvements for older
dams. He also saw a new attitude, a kind of revolution in the thinking
of many members of the engineering community, who were now talking about
dam safety, where a decade before only a handful would admit that dams
do fail.
Outside observers were less sanguine. The Bureau has not
significantly changed its ways. All agencies seemed to be preoccupied
only with more paperwork, seldom read or analyzed. The old
overconfidence remained in offices and at projects far below the
agencies' dam safety offices.28 Whether the new attitude and a sense
of responsibility would filter down, as Tschantz and the first panel
hoped, remained to be seen. The guidelines seem to have only added more
bureaucratic requirements to an already overburdened technical staff.
One thing is certain. Should a federal dam fail now, the cause
would be easy to identify. One person alone could be blamed. As one
OSTP staffer sarcastically remarked, the new guidelines were
"Draconian," like a Hammurabi Code under which, should a federal dam
fail, the dam safety officer and a dozen others in the agency should
publicly be put to death.2" Even a lesser punishment would provide a
symbolic sacrifice to appease the public but contribute little to
learning and leave intact the institutional arrangements that seem at
the heart of the problem.
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The National Dam Inspection Program
Before concluding this story, one should consider the other 65,000
large dams in this country, outside of the federal government but of
major concern in OSTP. A series of events in the early 1970's focussed
public attention on the hazard of these. In February, 1971, an
earthquake damaged the lower Van Norman Dam in California and put at
risk some 80,000 people in the valley below. In February of the next
year, a poorly engineered mining dam on Buffalo Creek, West Virginia,
collapsed, killing 125 people and causing $50 million in damages. Then
a freakish, highly localized rainstorm caused a Rapid City, South
Dakota, dam to rupture. In June of 1972, Hurricane Agnes brought floods
that threatened a number of dams in the Northeast.
Congress responded promptly to the latter events and introduced a
bill; two weeks later without public hearings, it passed the National
Dam Inspection Act. This directed the Corps of Engineers to make an
inventory of all sizable dams under the jurisdiction of the States and
to inspect the most hazardous ones. It excluded those built by TVA, the
Bureau, the IBWC, under FERC, and most of those of the Corps.
President Nixon reluctantly signed the bill into law on August 9,
1972 but wrote; "I think the particulars of this bill are most
unfortunate, for they depart from the sound principle that the safety of
non-federal dams should primarily rest with the States,3 "
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Under the Constitution, state governments are responsible for
protecting the health and safety of their citizens, and most had passed
legislation regulating dams built and owned by all non-federal
entities. But the legislation was often inadequate, or the States
lacked funds or technical staff to enforce these laws.
OMB subsequently denied the Army's request for funds for inspection,
apparently fearing this would open a Pandora's box of State requests for
repairs. The Corps then asked the States and some federal agencies to
list and submit basic facts on larger dams within their jurisdictions,
compiling the data into a National Dam Inventory. The initial tally of
less than 50,000 dams nationwide, of which approximately 2,000 were
federally owned, over 3,000 more were on federal lands, and over 1,500
subject to federal licenses, has continued to increase, not only as dams
have been completed, but also as the inventory became more accurate,
since both States and some agencies' records had been incomplete."
Although the Corps had initiated the legislation -- some say in the
hope that the program would compensate for its decreasing opportunities
to build new dams31 -- through 1976 it did little more in a practical
sense than prepare the four volume inventory and some recommendations to
Congress. It was also said that the Corps backed off out of fear of
liabi lity.32
Meanwhile, many professional dam engineers thought that the cluster
of incidents in 1971 and 1972 had been unusual. The U.S. Committee on
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Large Dams (USCOLD) marshalled data to show that through 1972, of 4,918
dams in this country over 45 feet in height, only 74 failures had been
recorded. Of another 274 near accidents, only 104 would have affected
public safety; remedial action was taken before the structures
collapsed.3" Moreover, the average annual failure rate was
declining: from 1900 to 1939, the rate averaged .0027 failures per dam
per year; from 1940 to 1972, it had dropped to one fourth or .0007.
[FCCSET, 12] At this rate of decline, dam failures would soon become a
thing of the past.
In 1973, in anticipation of the inspection program, a small group of
engineers began to meet annually under the auspices of the American
Society of Civil Engineering (ASCE) and its Engineering Foundation, to
discuss aspects of dam safety. Bruce Tschantz emerged as a national
expert on State programs.34 In 1976 the Corps finally proposed a
general set of inspection guidelines that generated considerable
discussion and raised concerns about the liability of private
consultants. P.L. 92-367 stated that no action or failure to act under
it should be construed as creating any liability for recovery of damages
from the federal government or its employees, but court decisions had
made the law somewhat ambiguous particularly on the liability of
consulting engineers. Many felt that Congress should adopt special
legislation to protect them.
One man, who had had an unfortunate experience in this matter,
described how excessive liability could put a professional in a
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difficult position."' For instance, if he used his best judgment on
an old dam, which had successfully weathered time and seismic tremors
and served a valuable function, such as for municipal water supply, he
might be loathe to condemn it, especially if it might remain sound with
some remedial work. If he ran scared and condemned the structure, his
decision could be disruptive and costly for the local community.
Ultra-conservative inspections across the country could be disastrous.
On the other hand, the public, unaware of how much judgment was
required, expected a dam to be perfectly safe, especially after it had
passed inspection. If it later failed and they suffered damages, their
lawyers would seek maximum compensation for them in the courts. Under
common law, the owner is usually liable for a failure but seldom carries
enough insurance to pay more than minimum damages. After that,
operators, constructor and original designer are seen as links in a
"chain of responsibility" going back over time. But many may be long
gone or unable to pay for the damages. The lawyers may view the
inspector as the most recent link in a new "chain of liability" and turn
on a responsible professional, who had tried to perform a public service
but made a minor error in judgment or overlooked a detail, and accuse
him of being negligent, fraudulent, or worse. Not only would his
professional reputation suffer, but his firm's or personal assets would
be in jeopardy.
Under the law an engineered structure need only meet the standards
in the state-of-the-art at the time that it was built. But the courts
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might interpret inspection guidelines very differently from what the
framers intended and expect an inspected dam to meet current technical
standards, or view standards in guidelines not as maximum but as minimum
ones, expecting the professional to have used even higher professional
standards.
For such reasons, many competent engineers were reluctant to
participate in dam safety programs and were tempted to leave inspections
to the incompetent, who lacked experience and judgment, or to the
foolhardy or the happy-go-lucky, who did not even care about the quality
of their work.
Another concern was how a single set of guidelines could be
uniformly and fairly applied to tens of thousands of dams built at
different times under varying states-of-the-art, and with different
histories of maintenance and stresses, and existing under different
climatic, hydrological, geologic, seismic, and other conditions.
Leaving inspections to the most competent professionals presented
other difficulties. The number of trained professionals was limited and
determining who among them was competent seemed an "insurmountable"
problem. Contracting with private consulting engineers would also be
time-consuming and costly.
An alternative might be specific guidelines for each high hazard
dam, such as the Bureau was preparing, for use by less advanced
108
professionals. But these could be a "dangerous tool" if treated as
"cookbooks" or applied "by rote," leading to overlooking significant
clues and complacency. Moreover, if individual guidelines had to be
prepared for thousands of dams, the program could not be carried out in
a timely way.
A third alternative, barely discussed, was a program in California
with no guidelines at all. Forestry department field workers kept close
watch over dams in their regions and developed an "intimate knowledge"
of each. They and their supervisors would "talk with each other"
frequently and discuss any changes that might warrant closer, more
professional attention.
After Teton's failure, the pressure for national inspection
increased; Tschantz had helped the cause in Congress and OMB. When a
private dam collapsed on the Toccoa River on November 6, 1977, killing
35 Bible students and their families in Carter's home State of Georgia,
the President demanded immediate action. In less than a month, by
December 5, one dam in each of the 50 states had been inspected. During
the next four years, the Corps provided technical assistance and funds
to States to inspect almost 9000 "high hazard" dams, defined as those
whose failure would result in "more than a few" lives lost and
"excessive" economic losses.a3
The guidelines finally devised by the Corps were an ingenuous
compromise among the alternatives. They offered a checklist of general
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items, which were then to be refined into specific lists for particular
dams. Inspection was also to be done in stages, first by a thorough
review of existing engineering data and a visual inspection, and then if
conditions warranted, a second phase involving more sophisticated
technical analyses. Two types of personnel were also involved: less
professional people in the first stage but under a registered engineer
who would be in charge of phase II, if required. Most of the subsequent
9,000 inspections involved only Phase I: a review of the records that
could be found on design, "as-built" construction, and the operational
history of the dam, and then a visual inspection.
The general checklist for inspecting embankment or earthen dams is
not esoteric, especially when translated into simple English, but
understandable even by a layman. For instance, one should look in the
streambed below the structure and on its lower face for "sinkholes" or
depressions; these may indicate settlement. Also look for "boils" or
springs, which indicate excessive seepage. Look up over the slopes and
along the crest for surface cracks or irregularities in alignment, which
may indicate that the structure is sliding on its foundation and
potentially instable. Check the upstream slope for gullies and
wave-formed "benches" or notches, signs that waves in the reservoir have
worn away the outer protective layer; excessive water could be seeping
in at these points. Around the banks of the reservoir, masses of wet,
highly saturated soil indicate incipient landslides, which could reduce
the capacity of the reservoir or even cause overtopping.
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Intimate Knowledge. What is remarkable about this list is how
readily ordinary people might be able to notice these phenomena. Anyone
could observe a spring or avoid a soggy mass of earth about to slip into
a reservoir, but might take these for granted as normal. On the other
hand, people who have regularly walked around an earthen structure or
fished in the reservoir may one day sense something new and different, a
change. They may notice with mild surprise a crack, a surface
depression, or a notch on the reservoir side, which they never saw
before. They can check that this is new by reflection, comparing what
they see with images from the past.
Like the intimate knowledge of dams by California foresters, those
who frequently visit a dam repeatedly observe, however idly, many
details, and develop a kind of knowledge of that particular artifact
through deep familiarity over time. They know in a sense analogous to
the way we say we know a spouse or a special friend. They may wonder
about a change but be unaware of its significance. Yet it could be an
early warning of impending weakness in the structure.
Even if they knew their observations to be significant, ordinary
people are unlikely to report them to the dam's owner or local
officials. They are more likely to feel that this is not their
responsibility but that of others more knowledgable than they. Even if
they did report, they would probably be rebuffed as ignorant laymen."
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Those who have this kind of intimate knowledge are outsiders to the
formal institutions that claim to bear exclusive responsibility for dam
safety. But people who live below a dam have more at stake than
engineers, who might lose money and reputations in the event of a
failure; local residents could lose their property or even their lives.
People willing to speak up about their intimate knowledge take the
risk of being humiliated, but there is also much to be gained, if
officials are willing to listen, investigate, and confirm their
findings. If a layman's concerns prove groundless, he should at least
be commended for a sense of responsibility and informed why his
observations merit no concern. In this way responsible citizens could
learn to refine their judgments. But if something is found to require
remedial work, our observer should be treated as a local hero of sorts.
He could become an example for others to emulate at that site and across
the country. One can imagine other local people forming small
quasi-official cadres to monitor particular dams, learning among
themselves what signs to look for and to report. Undoubtedly they would
come to advocate good maintenance and form a constituency for timely
repairs.
In this way, dam safety inspections could be transformed from a
costly, one-shot, top down government program, the result of a
time-consuming formal process of devising and managing elaborate
procedures, into a continuous operation, at little cost to the
taxpayer. Local volunteers, working in small groups with owners,
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officials, and engineers could provide a new model for the management of
this technological risk.
The Corps completed its inspection program by October, 1981. It
reported that over 2,900 or 1/3 of the high hazard dams inspected did
not meet federal standards; repairs had been completed on less than 5%
of these. 4 0  The fifty States are now responsible for monitoring
impoundments within their jurisdiction, but with the end of federal
assistance, most had cut back on their dam safety programs. 4 ' While
the NAS committee was seeking to define a more positive federal role on
non-federal dams and the small FEMA office simply trying to survive, the
resources of intimate knowledge were going unrecognized and untapped.
Other Kinds of Knowledge
Awareness of intimate knowledge at existing dams leads one to wonder
about other kinds of knowledge available at dams under construction.
That such existed at Teton was apparent in testimony before the House
Subcommittee. Further evidence was buried in Appendices of reports on
the technical investigation. Before considering this, one needs to
understand the physical and sound context in which construction took
place.
The foundation at the Teton site was vast, extending over more than
60 acres. Some was flat riverbed, but most of this surface was steeply
sloped, at 30 degree angles up each side of the cutoff trench across the
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riverbed, at approximately 45 degrees up the two banks, where the bases
of the key trenches were terraced to facilitate work, and about 60
degrees up the sides of these trenches. These surfaces were primarily
of irregularly fractured rock.
The Bureau supervisor's officer was high on one bank, with a
panoramic view of more than 3000 feet across the canyon and over 400
feet down to the deepest part of the foundation. It was connected to
specific work centers by telephones, with lights to signal incoming
calls. [IRG G-19] The site must have been extremely noisy, during
excavation from initial blasting, later from drilling deep grout holes,
and throughout from heavy machinery, and echoing off the steep canyon
walls, must have made ordinary conversation impossible.
The construction season was only about six months, from May to
November, when the necessary water was not frozen. Three shifts worked
around the clock, except that core material was not laid during the
graveyard shift, allowing time to maintain the heavy equipment.
Continuously during the other two shifts, trucks brought in and dumped
construction material or fill, which was spread, watered, and compacted
by "twelve passes of standard tamping rollers" into 6 inch layers.
Quality control personnel then tested these for density and moisture.
Thus, half a foot at a time, the structure gradually rose from late in
1972 to early 1976 to a crest more than 450 feet from the bottom of the
key trench.
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Grouting at Teton. As soon as the site was excavated, the grouting
subcontractors began their work. To create the curtain, they drilled
holes as deep as 310 feet and generally twenty feet apart, in three
parallel rows, in conformance with the designer's detailed
specifications on depths and angles. When a set of holes was drilled,
the grouting crew pumped into them a basic mixture of about eight parts
water to one of concrete, filling these holes incrementally in 20 foot
stages. Pressure was required to force the grout past loose rubble that
might block subsurface openings and to spread it through fractures over
a radius of at least 10 feet so that it would intersect with grout from
adjacent holes and form an impervious curtain.
The grouting program was carried out through a five-tiered hierarchy
under the Project Engineer. Reporting to him was a special civil
engineer from the Bureau, who supervised those third in command, three
field inspectors, one for each shift. These in turn monitored the
subcontractor, a firm owned by the three brothers, who served as foremen
on each of the shifts. They oversaw the fifth and bottom level, a crew
of 18 to 27 men. [IRG G-13]
Both the bureau and the subcontractor maintained extensive and
duplicate records, describing the complex history of each hole in minute
detail on individual sheets. Logbooks recorded the grout takes, water
test information, surface leaks, etc., at each 20 foot stage. Drill
sheets noted time of drilling, rock hardness, color of water returns
(from water tests), and even the serial number of the drill bit used.
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Pump operators kept running records of the batches and mixes of grout.
[G-15]
Each morning the field inspector presented these documents and his
own summary of the work on the three previous shifts to the Bureau
supervisor. He in turn would plot the data on a plan and composite
profile drawings for each row of holes, then overlay these and compare
the data from hole to hole and row to row, in an effort to check that no
gaps had been left. He could specify, and often did, that the men
should drill and grout additional holes. [G-17]
The specifications required adding calcium chloride or salt to the
grout to force it to set quickly before travelling too far and also to
keep it from freezing at the beginning and end of each season. This
procedure had been devised after an extensive pilot grouting program.
During testing at Teton, workers encountered rock so highly fractured
that water and grout, used to test the extent of sub-surface voids,
would sink into holes without pressure, as into a bottomless pit. On
numerous occasions, under pressure, grout would resurface as far as 300
feet from a hole. [IRG 62, 69]
To prevent excessive travel, the Bureau experimented by adding up to
10% CaCl2 by weight of concrete. The use of up to 3% salt was
standard practice. Shortly after construction began, the grouting
subcontractors, apparently with some authority in this matter, voiced
concerns and the maximum was limited to 8%.42
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The Bureau tried to devise precise standards for the proportions of
salt under various conditions. The workers analysed the effects of such
factors as the temperature of water, sand, cement, and air and the
distance from the mixing plant to the hole and the rate of "take" or
flow of material into the hole. But they could find "no precise
criteria to predetermine accurately" how rapidly the grout would set
with a given amount of salt under the variable conditions. They finally
decided to correlate the amount of salt initially to the temperature of
the mix on a thermometer at the pump as the most "feasible" criteria.
This was certainly the most readily observable and quantifiable
criteria. [G 125-127]
But still grout would sometimes harden before it reached the bottom
of a hole and have to be drilled open. At other times it would set in
the mixing bins before it reached the pump and have to be softened with
water. The Bureau had specified that grout should travel no more than
100 feet from a hole (how compliance could be confirmed is unclear) and
had printed on the forms for each grout hole that "reasons for 'Waste'
must be explained in detail." [C-18] The grouters tried to strike a
balance between "slugging the hole" and wasting grout. [G-1263
Procedures were specified for filling each hole. First the crew
would pump in water for five minutes, measuring the volume. If the hole
took water at the maximum pressure of the pump, 250 cubic feet per hour,
the basic mix would be thickened with either sand or salt. Sand would
be added if grouters suspected an open cavity lay below, but salt would
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be added if they sensed that water was flowing into narrow fissures.
Grouting would then begin. When the pump began to operate under
pressure, the grouters would decrease the amount of sand or salt.
After filling 20 feet of a hole, the Bureau required the crew to
wait for a specified time and then pump in water again as a check that
all voids had been closed. Investigators later feared that this
procedure may have washed out some of the grout. [C-6] Then raising the
pipe through which the grout was inserted, the crew continued on other
stages until that hole was filled.
The Bureau supervisor checked the work, but it was said that the
field inspectors made the critical decisions. The behavior of each hole
and even of different stages of a single hole, could vary widely. The
grouters determined what mix to use and when to change it based, it was
said, on the rate of take, drilling characteristics, pumping pressure,
but most important on "intuition" or the so-called "feel of the hole".
[G-18)
The Grouter's Feel. What is this "feel of the hole"? Obviously no
one can directly observe the conditions of rocks 300 feet beneath the
surface. Neither the grouter nor anyone else can know with certainty
where the grout is travelling and settling or where voids remain. Nor
can anyone evaluate the grouter's work except rarely, when, as in the
case of Teton, a dam fails and part of the work is uncovered or exposed
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in sample cores. Thus everyone must have faith in the grouters'
mysterious "feel." The integrity of a dam may depend upon it.
Obviously the grouter is a skilled craftsman. But a craftsman's
work can usually be seen and judged by others. The grouter's "feel"
entitles him to be called an expert of sorts or an independent
professional in that he alone can claim to know how to diagnose and
treat a particular situation and is solely responsible for the results.
Not even his peers can challenge his specific knowledge, unless they
participate in his direct experience. What sort of knowledge does the
grouter possess and how does he acquire it?
This "feel" seems difficult for even a grouter to articulate in
words. What he knows better than anyone else is not amenable to verbal
abstraction or open to inspection or testing. It certainly cannot be
measured or represented by rules and formula. He does not learn this
feel in a classroom; it certainly is not taught there. He learns it
only by direct "hands-on" experience in specific situations in the
field, probably under the guidance of a master craftsman. Procedures
may be applied around its application but apparently do little to
validate the quality of the work; they may even jeopardize it, as water
testing possibly did.
The art of grouting seems to require continuous attention to a
myriad of subtle qualities, such as the "hardness" of the rock or the
"color" of the water flowing back. But the meaning of this data, of
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these clues, cannot be abstracted from their object nor do they seem
independent of one another or of the larger context of the particular
site and situation. Just as objective criteria could not represent the
time that grout will set with added salt, the grouter's knowledge cannot
be based on analysis. His feel combines visual perceptions with
kinesthetic sensations and data from other senses. These senses may be
sharpened with time much as blinded people learn to hear sounds which
sighted people miss.
We posit that the grouter builds up a repertoire of strategies for
different kinds of holes in different situations. In that sense he
acquires a kind of general knowledge. But since every site, each hole,
and even different stages of a single hole, are unique, he cannot depend
upon formal models, general rules or recipes. If he settles into a
mindless routine, the quality of his work may suffer. He must
constantly be alert to the "back-talk" of the specific and immediate
situation.
Analogies to the grouter's kind of knowledge are found in many forms
of art. The sculptor in stone, for instance, combines data from many
senses in his skill in working with his hands and through his tools. In
trying to shape a particular piece of rock into the form he has "in
mind," he continuously studies its specific texture, grain, and
potential lines of fracture, from various angles, near and far. Keeping
in mind what he has learned, he must also imagine what lies ahead,
unseen, within the material. That particular object speaks to him,
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tells him what he can and cannot do, constrains and offers opportunities
for his actions.
The sculptor builds up expectations, to be tested, of how the
material will react to each tap or blow, a kind of theory or predictive
knowledge, much as when scientists say they know a particular thing. In
this way incremental actions and hypothetical knowledge, images and
substance, are synthesized and continuously adjusted to one another.
But at any moment the material may surprise him and force him to modify
his formal idea or abandon it entirely. He lives with that
uncertainty.
The grouters, working under contract at Teton, had no options to
talk back to the designers or abandon their work. If their knowledge
and skill failed them, more could be lost than a creative idea for a
work of art. Studies have shown that foundation failure has been the
most frequent single cause of dam collapse.41
Surface Treatment at Teton. The grouters' "feel of the hole" is not
the only kind of knowledge essential in securing a foundation. The
surface of the foundation, especially under the core, must be adequately
sealed to prevent hard-packed silt from eroding into large fissures,
leaving weak spots or voids through which water can later tunnel. The
surface is usually treated by removing loose material, cleaning out
crevices in the rock with jets of air or water, and filling voids with
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silt, sand, or grout. Incidentally, the grouting subcontractor did not
participate in the surface treatment at Teton.
Surface grouting is generally done with "slurry grout," a very thin
mix of cement, water, and often sand. But the work is specialized, as
various terms attest, such as in "gravity," "broom," or "bucket"
grouting, or with special forms of material such as "slush,"
"shotcrete," or "dental concrete." At Teton, the specifications called
only for generalized slurry grouting as necessary.
As was said, the Bureau was subsequently criticized for not
prescribing more detailed procedures. It justified itself on grounds
that only field personnel can directly observe the variability of
fractures and patterns of joints. They can decide what openings to
treat and how to treat them better than if they simply follow "an
arbitrary set of rules devised in the Denver Office." [IRG G-100] But
the expert investigators argued that the field crew could not make valid
decisions without understanding the theoretical principles on which such
treatment must be based. [C-6]
As we know, the surface at Teton was extensive and extremely
variable. The crews worked night and day on all three shifts first on
the flat base of the central trench and then on the terraced levels of
the key trenches. They generally worked about five feet above the level
at which the fill was being laid and compacted. The Office was said to
set policy; for instance, after clean-up, an inspector would look over
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an area and spray red paint around the crevices to be treated. The crew
would take it from there, developing their own procedures with plenty of
room for individual judgment. [C-15]
At times, a crew treated up to ten voids per shift but at other
times worked on a single void for more than eight hours, as the level of
fresh fill rose around them. On a few occasions they poured grout
through pipes into voids remaining under overhanging rock after the fill
was compacted. Obviously they were always under pressure not to hold up
the work on the core, a factor that must have influenced their judgment
on how much and what kind of treatment to perform.
The Bureau was criticized for not setting criteria at least on the
minimum width of crevices to be treated, such as 1/4 or 1/2 inch. But
the men used more than spatial measurements. For instance, if a large
void appeared to be tightly packed with natural silt, it needed little
treatment. A sense of touch was also critical as when, frequently, "one
could hold one's hand over a hole and feel cold air." [C-15]
Disaggregated Knowledge. The Bureau's justification seems
appropriate: the workers had to use more knowledge than could be put
into specifications. The designers, with data abstracted from sample
cores had only indirect, partial, general knowledge of what that crew
would encounter and grossly underestimated the difficulties of site
conditions. The Project Engineer from his high vantage point depended
largely on the observations of others. The designers who had come
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periodically for a day or two to inspect the construction site could
know even less than the Project Engineer. Only those who actually did
the work could know the kinds of treatment required for specific
conditions.
As these workmen interacted with unique and seemingly trivial
details, they directly observed and sensed each specific hole, sometimes
for eight hours or more, and acquired more complete understanding of the
heterogeneous conditions than anyone before or after construction. They
knew foundation conditions in the only sense in which they really were
known, the only way that real knowledge is possible.
Unlike that of the grouters, their kind of knowledge was spacially
limited to superficial characteristics of each crack; they had less
sense of what lay beneath. Moreover, since conditions would change
under pressure from the fill and with seepage, their knowledge was also
temporally limited and would soon be obsolete.
Moreover, no single workman knew all about all of the surface
conditions. Each man on each shift -- no count was given of how many
worked on tens of acres on three shifts over several seasons --
possessed only a small fraction of the total knowledge that they
collectively possessed. Given the noise, the pressure of time, and the
organization of separate shifts, it is doubtful that the men
communicated much or shared, compared, or combined their individual
impressions, except perhaps in a local bar on weekends. From a larger
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perspective, this kind of knowledge could be called a disaggregated
"feel for the whole." But even after the failure, the investigators
never tapped nor tried to aggregate these diverse impressions, which
remained fragmented and dispersed.
Passive and Critical Knowledge. Still another kind of knowledge
emerges from the description of events at the site. At an elevation of
5200 feet, where the water later tunneled, the crew received orders
"from above" to stop surface treatment. Those interviewed later did not
agree on whether the rocks at higher elevations were less or just as
fractured as those below. Some members of the surface treatment crew
were apparently bewildered by this order and tried to construct an
explanation. One reason "floating around" was that the stresses high in
the dam "would be low enough to allow quitting," indicating that these
workers understood technical matters in at least a general way.[IRG-C-15]
Of course, they had no formal training in the theory and techniques
of dam engineering. But they understood the physical principles well
enough to appreciate that the weight and horizontal force of water in
the reservoir would be less at the top than at the base of the
structure. They accepted this as a sound hypothesis or reason behind
their orders.
In so doing, they demonstrated a kind of passive knowledge, as when
people understand a language or appreciate good music, but do not have
the skill or expertise to read or write it. Such passive knowledge
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often carries with it critical ability. An amateur may be able to
differentiate between a masterful and sloppy bit of work and support his
judgment with reasonable arguments and plausible explanations almost as
well as a professional. But those who lack formal academic credentials
or status in special institutions are seldom credited with such
knowledge, or heeded.
We do not know if these workmen had a passive understanding of other
matters or made other critical judgments about the work of their
superiors, but we do know that if they had continued grouting, this dam
would probably not have failed in the way or as soon as it did.
Moreover, since the special investigators talked only to those at the
top of the hierarchy of construction workers, these various kinds of
knowledge became buried in the structure and lost in individual memories.
Summary and Conclusions
This has been a story about one type of engineered technology, dams,
intended to control the range of natural atmospheric events, of droughts
and floods, and manage water resources for social benefits. It
described the long social evolution of a large public works project,
from a gleam in the eyes of new agency engineers to an idea shared by
local people, who pushed it up through levels of government, until
Congress transformed it into a technical project for agency engineers.
For a decade, the design was pieced together with sample data from the
site, rules of thumb, and examples and lessons learned from other
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sites. About five years later, when the idea was almost a reality, the
structure collapsed.
Investigators from different institutional settings sought the cause
of the failure, but all ignored the slow social evolution in the distant
past and the social aspects of construction in a complex physical
reality. Diagnoses of the problem and prescriptions to prevent further
disasters diverged sharply, particularly between technical experts and
bureaucratic managers. A remedy was chosen that fit the setting, more
administrative rules to control technical decisions throughout
bureaucracy. OSTP pre-empted a group of top level bureaucrats to make
the rules, but it saw the development and use of the new technique of
risk analysis as a remedy, especially to the momentum of Congress to
construct.
The agencies feared that risk analyses would unduly alarm the
public. They were reluctant to admit problems except those that could
be blamed on others: inadequate data from scientists for design, laws
and regulations overburdening engineers, and quality control weakened by
specialized middlemen. Admittedly, inspections were better in concept
than practice, funds limited for maintenance and repairs, and emergency
plans were rare, but none of these were necessary when engineers knew
how to build permanent dams.
Outsiders to bureaucracy criticized this arrogance and offered
another view of engineering, in a different physical and social
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reality. Each dam is built at a unique site, acquires its own
personality, and ages in a dynamic environment. Irreducible uncertainty
persists about geologic and material conditions, even with
instrumentation and quality control procedures. Over time engineering
principles have been devised, often by learning from failures, but
engineers' knowledge and control is limited, particularly in the complex
context in which they must work. Therefore, like artists, they must use
skill, imagination, and judgment, gained through experience, to
synthesize combinations of physical factors with non-technical
considerations in their designs and specifications. In essence dam
engineering is a form of art.
The tension between this and the mainstream view of engineering
echoed throughout this story. It was seen in GAO's opposition to the
use of discretion and judgment at any level, the demand for objective
criteria, and implicit expectation that engineering would become a
predictive science. It appeared in the agencies' contradictory
arguments against risk analysis: both disdaining them because they
required judgment, fearing that they would replace professional judgment
and artistry.
When engineering was linked to bureaucracy, this conflict divided
the Panel, for instance, on whether to leave inspections to managerial
discretion or to add more bureaucratic rules. The conflict emerged in
Biven's embarrassment at setting technical standards by consensus when
he expected some "right" or more scientific way. It emerged in the
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debate over whether to use competent engineers or consistent rules for
national inspection guidelines. The guidelines sought to balance both
views, in encouraging critical judgment in assessing data,
interdisciplinary teams in site investigation, and informal
communication between design and construction. But they also spelled
out general roles and rules.
Parallels and linkages in institutional arrangements exacerbated
problems beween bureaucracy and engineering. Both bureaucratic
compartmentalization and engineering specialization impeded
communication and led to discontinuity in design decisions. Contractual
arrangements distracted attention from the unexpected in the physical
reality and diverted energy into legalistic disputes. Inflexible
budgets and fixed front-end financing spurred the momentum to construct,
inhibiting new information from the site flowing up the bureaucracy and
back into the design. Bureaucrats use rules and engineers use formulas
like recipes, displacing judgment and creating false impressions of
safety.
The outsiders realized that both management and technical lessons
were best learned in free and open discussion, such as occurs in an
academic organization. Inadequately understanding the nature of
bureaucracy, they expected new attitudes to "flow down" from competent
engineers at the top. Instead, their remedy only elaborated bureaucracy
and compartmentalized dam safety into an identifiable component. a
separate responsibility of only a few at the top.
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FEMA saw no need to protect artistry as it expanded technical
standards and sought consistent definitions, as if to transform a once
taken for granted quality of dam safety into a new and specialized
field. Meanwhile, management rules took on a life of their own,
demanding more staff to interpret them and to spell out exceptions and
more paperwork to demonstrate conformance, while the lead agency fought
a bureaucratic battle for survival.
Finally, the threat of liability from outside of both bureaucracy
and engineering was paralyzing the sense of professional
responsibility. This fear justified suppression of talk of risk and
failure, inhibited competent engineers from inspecting old dams, and
stopped FEMA from issuing training guides. Ironically, legal experts in
another institutional setting promote this threat on behalf of lowly
outsiders who have accepted the engineers' claims of certain knowledge
and control and who, after an accident, will throw these claims back at
them, holding them accountable. Yet the guidelines had dismissed
citizen concerns as "constraints" to be removed before beginning design
and construction.
These men at the top treated engineering as if it were performed by
heads decapitated from bodies. Their model of engineering artistry
ignored the skill and artistry of others below and outside and failed to
address how institutional arrangements of both bureaucracy and
engineering suppress other kinds of knowledge of the local physical
reality.
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Ironically, potential victims and lowly workmen possess the
knowledge and ability to act in ways that seem to offer opportunities to
compensate for the limited number of competent professionals and cost
constraints on elaborate programs, for instance, in inspecting older
dams and even constructing new ones. But such opportunities would only
become reality if old institutional arrangements were modified and new
social ones formed to foster continuous attention to local details and
aspects affecting safety at all levels.
Finally, we offer our diagnosis of Teton's failure. With Perrow, we
see dams as made up of tightly coupled component parts. But they also
appear to have interactive complexity, internally and with their
environments; only in the analytical minds of designers are interactions
simple and linear. Indeed earthen dams appear to be less like
mechanical systems and more like living organisms.
Moreover, in contrast to the divergent diagnoses of experts and
officials, the "cause" of Teton's failure seems traceable to a
combination of both physical and organizational events, to the
unexpectedly heavy snow melt and the failure to deliver one outlet part
that preceded that failure. The first is traceable to inadequate
knowledge in the domain of science of normal variations in snow
precipitation. The second factor lies in the domain of bureaucracy and
could be considered a small but normal "administrative glitch."
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If the outlet had been open, it would have released the flow
downstream; if the runoff had been as expected, the lack of the outlet
would not have mattered. But the coupling of these two conditions made
the reservoir rise, forcing the engineer to request a change in
specifications to allow it. This was a mere bureaucratic formality; had
it been denied, the engineer would have had no choice but to break the
rules. Nor did the workers, who felt surface treatment should continue,
have much choice under the organizational arrangements; they had to
leave the upper portion of the embankment vulnerable to excessive
seepage and piping.
Perrow simplified the nature of earthen dams to complete a formal
matrix. Much as Congress used its theory of momentum to selectively
attend to evidence and ignore fine bureaucratic distinctions, so Perrow
accepted a simplified engineering model of dams to complete his
theoretical model. For such reasons, both erred in prescribing a remedy
of more rules and safety regulations.
The question now is whether these findings about particular dams
have more general applications and broader implication, when we look at
a program to protect against, prepare for, and predict a natural hazard.
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CHAPTER IV
EARTHQUAKE HAZARD REDUCTION
This story is more complex than the last for it takes a critical
look at seismic engineering and seismology as background for the OSTP
program.' It then describes later events in California and earlier in
China. The reader should remember that earthquakes are no more a
natural hazard than flowing water; the harm arises from structural
failures, just as it does from dams.
This chapter continues the discussion of engineering knowledge in
the previous one, describing briefly the nature of seismic engineering
knowledge, how it was acquired, and its use. It then addresses these
characteristics of knowledge in the nearest field of science,
seismology, which began to pre-empt the claims of seismic engineers.
The central part of this chapter is a three part story about how these
fields joined to gain more federal funds for a whole earthquake hazard
reduction program, the seismic engineers lost out in the process of
planning in OSTP, and the program became focussed on research needs and
reducing hazards to national defense. Here the term seismic engineering
is used in a broad sense to cover an array of programs, such as land use
planning and building code enforcement, which seismic engineers have
long supported.
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This chapter goes on to assess earthquake preparedness and
prediction programs at a state and local level in California and
concludes with a story about successfully combining both prediction and
preparedness programs under very different concepts of science and
institutional conditions in Revolutionary China. As the theme of the
previous chapter was kinds of knowledge, the theme of this becomes
different kinds of planning.
Seismic Engineering
In contrast to federal dam engineering, seismic engineers carry out
many small projects in the private sector. This field began after the
1906 San Francisco quake, with the question of why some buildings stood
while adjacent ones collapsed. Research was done on structural models
on shaking tables; students later formulated huge sets of mathematical
equations to represent differential stresses in tall buildings. 2 At
first these engineers encouraged development of seismology through the
installation of seismographs in California, but soon realized that the
data on acceleration from these was of little value in their work. More
important in structure failure was the duration of vibrating motion.
Then they made the vital discovery, that not one factor but a
combination of factors in an overlapping pattern caused most of the
damage. Each structural member naturally vibrates with a characteristic
range of frequencies; if these are amplified by a corresponding range in
ground motion, that member may fail.' Engineers could estimate the
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normal vibrations of members but they still did not know the range of
vibrations so expect at a particular site from a future earthquake.
Seismic engineers wanted detailed information along a chain with
many links, from some unknown source, over a particular path to the soil
under the foundation, to each structural member and the configuration of
members as a whole. Seismologists studied earthquakes after the fact in
particular locations in order to understand general causes not effects;
they offered little help. Finally research engineers turned to tables
of random numbers for approximate quantities to use in some formulas for
design.4
Aware than earthquakes could affect much of the nation, these
engineers, mainly Californians, promoted the threat.5 They also
sought to embed their knowledge in national or regional model building
codes and seismic standards, to be applied by engineers and building
officials. Local communities often adopted these codes by reference.
Thus seismic engineering knowledge became institutionalized and flowed
down and out in uniform rules to govern construction practices
throughout the nation.
But local building officials with small staffs and limited power,
especially in rapidly growing areas of California, were often forced to
loosely interpret or laxly enforce the codes. Violations slipped
through, morale would drop, and staff would burn out. Neither stronger
regulations nor more formal training made sense to these harried
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officials. The best work was often done by experienced officials who
liked their work and could sense violations before they saw them.6
As moderate earthquakes continued in California, other protective
measures were explored. An earthquake in 1971 gave impetus to formation
of a state level Seismic Safety Council.7 New legislation also
required controls on development in seismic zones throughout the state
and a "seismic safety element" in every local land use plan.
But inadequate knowledge of active faults limited the number of
seismic zones and data for planning. Most of the seismic safety
elements were prepared by consultants and seldom read or understood by
local officials. Only a few communities went through a time-consuming,
contentious, "messy process" of widespread citizen participation in
preparing plans. These were well understood and accepted as legitimate
by local developers and officials.'
The greatest hazards were older unreinforced masonry buildings. In
municipal centers, these structures were sometimes rehabilitated for
commercial use under local historic building codes. Such actions might
be economically feasible but often displaced low income families and did
not make these buildings safe.' In the political context, local
building officials had little choice but to go along, recognizing that
they could be liable should these buildings fail.'"
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One respected senior engineer, Henry Degenkolb, expressed critical
insight into what he called the "pretense of knowledge," embedded in
local codes and engineering formulas.'' Like some dam engineers, many
building officials and civil engineers treated these without thought as
recipes, going by the book or simply not caring or even trying to beat
the codes. On the other hand, conscientious engineers, who followed the
codes but also used judgment to consider factors outside the codes and
safety features, were often penalized for imposing higher costs.
Moreover, engineers who depended on tidy formulas derived from
analytical research seemed to forget that if a theory was wrong or
neglected one factor, as it did for the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, a
disastrous failure could result. Many engineers lacked a sense of
history and like the public believed that structures build under earlier
codes were safe. They forgot that new understanding often made past
knowledge obsolete. New knowledge after a surprising failure might do
the same to present knowledge. One could not know what it is that one
does not know.
On the other hand, the leading engineers in OSTP would be concerned
primarily that codes and standards did not fit the extent of hazards in
many parts of the country or were not up-to-date, due to a lengthy
process for revising them. Developers particularly in eastern cities
protested against overconservative codes based on national maps
indicating the strength of tremors in the past but ignoring the
infrequency of earthquakes outside of California.12 The engineers
needed better information from seismologists, not only for designing
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individual buildings but for codes to govern construction. But
seismologists faced difficulties of their own.
Seismology
This field began to emerge as a modern science in the
mid-nineteenth century out of two traditions, an older more speculative
one of natural philosophy that led to geophysics, and the more empirical
natural history resulting in geology; both are now encompassed by the
earth sciences. 1 3
Empirical work began in Italy when a Britisher, Robert Mallet,
scaled and mapped structural damage and "felt reports" of a strong
earthquake, using isometric lines to reveal the focus or epicenter of
the tremors. In 1889 such reports from around the world were mapped in
an atlas showing seismic regions or belts much as they are known
today. 1 4 The observed effects of earthquakes are now ranked on a
modified Mercalli scale of intensity.
Geophysicists disdained felt reports and sought to create a more
objective quantitative discipline. They developed accoustical
instruments to be their eyes and ears, record and measure tremors, which
they treated as waves of energy. They analyzed four types of
seismographic signals and calculated the magnitude of energy released
from a distant source on what is called the Richter scale. 15
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In practice, however, they can only estimate the amount of energy
released in a quake. Much is lost initially in overcoming friction; the
rest radiates in all directions. With a few miles of a source (damage
seldom occurs beyond ten or twenty miles) different types of waves,
released in a minute or less, are indistinguishable on a seismograph.
Afar they may fade out or be cluttered with "noise," as from distant
tides or nearby traffic. In between, various materials deep in the
earth or at the surface may deflect or refract waves or cancel them out
or amplify them. Distinguishing specific types of waves requires
training and experience. Interpreting the wiggly lines of seismographic
instruments has been likened to trying to understand the construction of
a violin from the sounds of it heard over a telephone.1
Moreover, each seismograph at a particular location receives a
unique set of signals. To select a definitive number to represent the
magnitude of a distant quake requires scientists to work together to
combine data from several instruments, synthesized with specific
knowledge of that instrument and materials at the site and an
understanding of particular paths from the source, based on many earlier
geologic studies. 7
Scientific understanding of the nature of the earth that produces
these signals has changed. Originally the two traditions disagreed:
geologists, following Darwin, saw the planet as an aging organism;
geophysicists chose the metaphor of a heat engine, subject to entropy.
Both wanted to find uniform principles or laws that determine specific
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phenomena and rejected the idea of sudden processes or unique events,
such as proposed by catastrophy theory, as much too random. They also
rejected the concept of continental drift proposed by Alfred Wegener
early in this century.'8
A theoretical breakthrough came after the great earthquake in San
Francisco in 1906. H.F. Reid compared 50 years of field surveys nearby
and suggested that earthquakes occur when stress increases along a fault
until it overcomes friction; rocks snap into new alignments like elastic
bands. Thereafter American faults were closely studied and classified
and characterized by geometric models for laboratory research.
But angular blocks oversimplified the irregular edges of real
fissures, which merge at depths or horizontally or end in
discontinuities of rock material invisible beneath the surface. New
questions ensued over what causes the build up of stress, what limits
the length of a fault slip, and what finally triggers a quake. Some
scientists attribute "the straw to break the camel's back," to something
deep in the earth, others to factors in the surface or to the pull of
the moon and the stars above. What a scientist considered a plausible
answer often depended upon the scientific specialty in which he sat.' 9
In 1958, during disarmament talks in Geneva, seismologists sat with
international experts and urged that seismographs be placed around the
world to detect violations of limits on underground nuclear testing.
U.S. opponents of disarmament argued that the plans were based on
144
monitoring only one underground test; a second test revealed the limits
of these instruments. The SALT talks floundered but the scientists,
hoping to prove that science could help solve political problems,
obtained liberal federal funds for improving seismology. 20
At this time, anomalous findings deep in the ocean inspired a
scientist to write an "Essay in Geopoetry" which revitalized Wegener's
ideas. Seismologists, self-consciously reflecting on Kuhn's theory of
scientific revolutions, adopted a new theory of plate tectonics, which
seemed to explain the cause of faulting. They also adopted a new
metaphor: the earth was like an atemporal cybernetic system, recycling
matter and energy in feedback loops in an effort to achieve
equilibrium. Other new ideas followed: earthquakes recur in regular
cycles with a gap after each; if no quake had occurred for some time, a
new one would soon occur. By the mid 1960's geophysical concepts
dominated the field. 21
But tectonic theory could not account for many earthquakes, such as
those in the middle of plates. Various hypotheses now view in
explanation.2 2 Recurrence times may vary from tens to thousands of
years; seismologists seldom know particular cycles, or what part of a
cycle a fault is in. Nor could elasticity account for faults slipping
gradually without tremors. "Aseismic creep" was finally explained after
seismologists discovered that fluids lubricate fine rocks or "gauge" in
fissures and "ripen" faults for premature quakes. They learned about
floods after several earthquakes occured in several new dams and after
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citizens linked tremors in Denver to the Army's injection of fluids into
deep wells nearby.23 A proposal to insert water into the San Andreas
Fault, forcing it to release stress gradually, was abandoned lest it
trigger a major quake. 2 4 But the hope of control lingers on.
In 1965 a Presidentially appointed Panel chaired by Frank Press,
encouraged by the progress in theory and research, made the surprising
announcement that with enough money, within a decade, seismologists
would be able to predict earthquakes and thus save lives.2 s This
promise brought new saliency, especially in Congress, to seismological
research. But it also deeply divided the community of scientists, many
of whom felt that the promise was premature. The promise annoyed
seismic engineers especially; they had long claimed saving lives as
their exclusive raison d'etre in their unsuccessful competition with the
scientists for research funds.
In the early 1970s laboratory scientists discovered a "dilatency
effect" in acorn-sized pieces of rocks under pressure. These expanded
with many small cracks before they split. Linking this phenomenon with
field observations measured before quakes in Russia and Japan,
seismologists devised a theory about a uniform set and sequence of
precursors.2" Even though seismologists did not fully understand the
causal mechanisms, they were euphoric about short term forecasting of
quakes with the accuracy of weather predictions on the basis of readily
observable field phenomena. They sought funds for arrays of new field
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instruments.2 7 They also became even more involved in political
action, as the following story attests.
The Story of the EHR Act
What follows is a three-part story of the passage and aftermath of
the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Act of 1977.28 The first
chapter began after the San Fernando quake, when Senator Alan Cranston
introduced the first of a series of bills, with little hope of more than
public education. His legislation urged funds primarily for earthquake
prediction research. Staff in the National Science Foundation (NSF) and
USGS, asked to comment, pointed out the need for more practical
measures; to their surprise, their suggestions were accepted.
Thus began what staff called a "conspiracy." 2 " Administrative
and legislative people began to work together for a "whole" national
earthquake hazard reduction program encompassing seismology, seismic
engineering, and more diffuse programs for seismic safety. In the face
of competition over limited funds among agencies and outsiders, NSF and
USGS staff also made a "gentlemen's agreement" to share funds and
cooperate on programs.
Over the next five years, these self-proclaimed conspirators at
mid-levels of separate institutions learned some valuable lessons. Most
important was to treat neither victories nor defeats as final, but to
closely guard the turf that had been gained and to take advantage of
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every opportunity to advance the cause. They slowly assembled a diverse
constituency in support of legislation.
Seismologists might not have joined had not social scientists
shocked them by suggesting that earthquake prediction could have
negative effects. Local officials might ignore a prediction or question
its validity; local residents might flee the area.3 0  Experts later
concluded that dire economic, social, and political consequences were
possible but without experience to draw on the precise response was
extremely uncertain. A combination of a negative public response and a
devastating quake could be worse than no predication at all. 3 ' The
seismologists' promise of social benefits had now become a threat.
The seismologists' solution was to make a simple distinction; they
would issue only objective, politically neutral scientific statements.
Public officials must take responsibility for interpreting these,
issuing "warnings," and managing public responses. 3 2 The federal
government now was expected not only to supply research funds but to
control the public reaction. Some saw little benefit in making a
prediction until government was ready to implement plans.
Seismologists also sought to institutionalize control over the
quality of research. Both California and the USGS set up Earthquake
Prediction Evaluation Counsels, CEPEC, and a national NEPEC. A top
group of scientists would validate methods used to arrive at any
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predictive statement. Research results must meet criteria on the
expected time, place, magnitude, and probability of occurrence."
Even then, seismologists felt vulnerable. Predictions were
recognized as different from weather forecasts. Outsiders could have no
evidence to confirm that an earthquake might occur or if it did not,
that it would be more likely in the future; they would have to take the
scientists' statements on faith.3 " If no quake occurred as expected,
seismologists worried that their competency would be questioned,
research funds cut off, or even that they would be held liable for
economic damages such as the decline of local property values.3 ' More
than a negative social response to a prediction followed by a disastrous
quake, scientists seemed to fear a negative response followed by no
earthquake at all, even though the public would be spared.
Other problems arose from the nature of their work and their
research institutions. Short term precursory phenomena would allow no
time for publication and peer review as in other areas of science, nor
perhaps for top scientists to examine evidence in the field. They would
have to trust the judgement of distant field workers, subject to error
or lapses in objectivity. Long term predictions, which could depress a
region's economy, could not be confirmed for years. Probabilities
assigned to such predictions would be little more than guesses until a
sufficient number had been successfully made.3 7
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On the other hand, research institutions or individuals competing
for funds and the prestige of being first might either make premature
predictions or withhold proprietary information until they were more
confident. In a democracy the freedom of speech of scientists could not
be suppressed, but in a free market system, scientists with inside
knowledge might also withhold it for private advantage.38
The press and public tended to misunderstand or misinterpret the
statements of scientists or else they accepted the word of seers as
scientific; if these were discredited by scientists, the public might
disbelieve scientific statements as well. With such logic, NEPEC and
CEPEC must "filter" all statements about seismic events and certify
predictions. 3 9  A few scientists who later made public statements were
humiliated; thereafter other were afraid to try."*
As a general policy, seismologists retreated from research in
densely populated areas to focus instead on rural areas, where they said
that earthquakes were the most likely to occur .4 They also came to
support legislation appropriating funds not only for basic research but
for federal planning.
In 1976, natural and human events seemed to conspire to foster
passage of the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Act. Although
quakes in this country were less than normal, the death toll worldwide
was the highest since the great earthquake in Lisbon, Spain in
1556.42 Evidence of an uplift of land in Southern California
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later acknowledged to have been the result of surveying methods4 3 was
reported by Frank Press to Nelson Rockefeller, gaining the Vice
President's support for legislation. Then President Ford commissioned a
study of funding requirements, to attract California voters. By
1976 all important constituencies, Congress, the President's Office,
major agencies and scientists and engineers were united in favor of a
large appropriation for research and hazard mitigation measures.
Chapter Two of the story began long before the Earthquake Hazard
Reduction Act, P.L. 94-282, was passed in October 1977. Frank Press
persuaded Congress to let OSTP plan for use of the funds. In the late
Spring of 1977, with OMB's approval, Philip Smith organized a staff and
hired Karl Steinbrugge, a seismic engineer to prepare the plan. Two
major impediments soon arose. There was no budget data on the cost of
earthquake related federal programs; agencies had not recognized these
as separate items.45 Second, OMB was determined to include this new
program in its proposed reorganization of emergency services and asked
the planners to defer discussion of organizational matters. 4*
Instead, the staff borrowed from various agencies focussed on
accumulating a comprehensive set of more than fifty "issue statements,"
in part by consulting with leaders of national interest or "umbrella"
groups in Washington. Since everyone interested in reducing seismic
hazards already knew what the issues were, the staff carried out the
process of "going public," largely to show that plans were not made in
an ivory tower.
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Assembling these separate statements into a cohesive document
proved difficult; a comprehensive plan was never completed. The draft
called largely for additions to existing federal programs, such as HUD,
for land use planning and for structural rehabilitation of older
buildings. The USGS was to set criteria for State and local mapping of
seismic hazards for local planners, who should be trained to use the
data.47
New uncertainities emerged, such as about the effects of
earthquakes on "critical facilities" -- nuclear power plants, liquified
natural gas tanks, toxic waste facilities. A major concern was that
public protests impeded timely decisions and drove up construction
costs. 4 8 A secondary issue was that risk analysis was inadequate to
calculate the chain of events from the failure of these to
unprecedented tertiary disasters.4 * On the other hand, risk
assessment techniques were lauded for new national seismic maps and as a
way to avoid over conservative design in particular structures such as
hospitals, and for the new national seismic maps, which gave local
officials a choice in the acceptable level of seismic risk.5"
"Shared Responsibilities" was emphasized in the draft in an
introductory paragraph: "... virtually every level of society -- the
individual, family, firm and community" make decisions affecting seismic
safety. "The achievement of a safe environment is basically a shared
responsibility of all levels of government and the private sector."51
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This statement was retained in the final version, but given less
emphasis.
The draft also contained contradictions. On the one hand, it
described the huge aggregate national consequences of future
earthquakes, requiring strong federal leadership and planning. On the
other hand, it mentioned that only a few small areas would experience a
major earthquake by the year 2000. Individuals correctly perceived that
the probability of personal harm is exceedingly small.s"
These widely divergent representations of the hazard -- in the
aggregate and to individuals -- was reconciled as follows: The failure
of past programs for disaster mitigation had taught disaster planners
that persuasion and shared responsibility would not work, because of
"human nature." People live in the present, assume that everything is
all right until events prove otherwise, avoid even thinking about future
disasters, and are not motivated to act even in their own
self-interest.5 3  Moreover, they expect the government to protect
them. Federal planners must therefore package earthquake hazard
reduction with other emergencies, including nuclear war, and prepare
general plans for damage control. Such plans were especially necessary
after a quake when looting and other forms of social disorder would be
rife. However, this expectation of social disorder contradicted
evidence that local people organize themselves and help one another
after disasters.
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One general principle in planning was to avoid arousing the public
about hazards until there is something for them to do.S 4 Protective
control should be build into the myriad of social institutions that give
order to society and could assure compliance. Incidentally, this
concept of command and control allied the disaster planners with the
scientists, who expected knowledge from basic research to flow down like
water to inform the actions of key professionals and public
decision-makers.I
Time began running out for OSTP to prepare a plan to present to
Congress. Smith took control and, using the appearance of the power of
the President's office, exacted commitments of general programatic
support from a dozen agencies. He quickly obtained their "sign-offs" on
further discussion.5" He also insisted over staff objections that a
lead agency for EHR be placed in the proposed Federal Emergancy
Management Agency. The staff argued that FEMA's leadership, drawn from
the military, with little experience in preventing disasters but only in
cleaning up afterwards, would not understand the slow pace of scientific
research and incremental planning required for any successful
program. 5 The staff lost that battle.
The "whole" national program suffered a major defeat a few weeks
later. Central to OSTPs plan was a program granting funds to states for
planning. In a routine "decision memo", the President was asked to
approve these funds.58 Much to OSTP's surprise, he vetoed it
instead. The reasons were obvious: Carter was reluctant to benefit a
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political rival, California Governor Jerry Brown, who would get the
largest grant; OMB also feared setting a precedent for federal funds to
states for planning protection from other natural hazards. When the OMB
threatened to cut off funds for scientific research unless OSTP
acquiesced, it did.5" Congressional intent was thwarted; the funds
went primarily to research.
After the plan went to Congress,'" Charles Thiel was put in
charge of the new program, still in OSTP. With a skeleton staff, he
used "mirrors" to enlist support from state officials, to create
committees to clarify model codes and standards, and to try to persuade
federal agencies to retrofit their own unsafe structures.61
Meanwhile, seismologists struggled to extricate NEPEC from provisions of
the Freedom of Information Act requiring several weeks notice of
meetings and precluding timely decisions for a short-term prediction.
They also tried to protect themselves legally from liability for damage
from a prediction or a quake.6 2
Finally established in FEMA, Thiel puzzled over how to use the
policy making process not only to advance theoretical knowledge but to
save lives. He kept "striking out." Then an Asian friend pointed out
that Thiel had been using the approach of Western science, analyzing the
problem into parts in order to find solutions one at a time, and hoping
that these would add up to a total solution. He advised Thiel to work
with others equally concerned, gain agreement on the essence of the
problem, and then build a constituency for a solution.
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Meanwhile, USGS seismologists were planning the next phase of
research. Reflecting on the status of their knowledge, they admitted
that the pieces of their theories did not fit well together nor account
for empirical evidence, especially of precursory phenomena. They pinned
their hopes on improving theory through vast experiments around the
globe using expensive space age technology. But they also emphasized
that highly organized research should not neglect support for innovative
individual research."
This respect for individual research no doubt arose in response to
the work of Terry Sieh. As a graduate student in 1978, using only a
pick and shovel and an understanding of local geology and geologic
history, he had uncovered evidence of a series of major earthquakes on
the San Andreas fault. Dating the recurrence intervals with a Geiger
counter, he suggested that another rupture would occur late in this
century.6 4 The fruitfulness of this simple research amazed
seismologists.
The third chapter of the federal story began unexpectedly with the
volcanic eruption of Mount St. Helens. Frank Press and others, planning
to fly with the President to view the devastation, rehearsed their
comments: the damage was minor compared to the impact of a major
earthquake, especially on military installations in California. After
the trip, Carter convened a committee of the National Security Council
to plan protection for national defenses."
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Meanwhile, a second conspiracy had begun, this time also involving
administrative and legislative officials in California. People from
FEMA, Congress, the California legislature, and its Seismic Safety
Council agreed that the problem was to fund a small prototype program.
Early in 1980, seismological data indicated that a prediction might be
forthcoming for Southern California,'' threatening chaos in Los
Angeles. This threat was seen as an opportunity since the city had the
first plan in the nation for preparing for a prediction.67  That
metropolitan area became the focus of the prototype program.
A Machiavellian scheme evolved: the California legislature,
convinced that Carter would give no money to that state, would be
persuaded to appropriate funds for the prototype program, contingent on
federal matching funds. While support for legislation increased, the
planners accumulated commitments of unexpended funds from FEMA and
future money from Congress for a joint three-year planning program in
the Los Angeles area. Governor Brown, who had previously disdained
seismic safety, then claimed credit for the new program, while Carter
reluctantly approved FEMA's participation at the end of his
admi ni stration.e6
In the second year of the Reagan administration, Thiel resigned,
leaving a small staff without a director. But FEMA was preparing
elaborate plans for the Army to control an area immediately after a
quake and for coordinated federal relief efforts.6 ' Thus the final
157
chapter about this federal effort ended. We now turn to planning and
research at the local level.
The Aftermath
In California both seismologists and seismic engineers have
recently had successes, but again on different tracks. We deal with
each in turn. Those concerned with hazard mitigation achieved success
more in spite of and not because of the federal program. Early in 1981,
the Los Angeles program, known by the acronym of SCEPP, began
unpropitiously with a conflict over its name and purpose, whether it was
the Southern California Earthquake Prediction -- or Earthquake
Preparation -- Project. Its objectives and a dictatorial director
delighted FEMA but alienated State and local officials. After only a
few months, the Seismic Safety Council fired the director and turned
this fiasco to advantage by limiting FEMA's control of the pgram and
assembling a dedicated professional staff.7"
To spite FEMA, Governor Brown initiated his own program in 1981.
Its charismatic director scorned FEMA's attitude of "Big Government
versus the Great Earthquake," which encouraged people to feel more
helpless. Instead, he dreamed of organizing and training teams of
people in business and industry to demonstrate their resourcefulnesss as
paramedics and firefighters immediately after a disaster, when citizens
would be "protected from big government."" He failed to organize
permanent committees, but did inspire leading citizens to prepare their
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corporations and communities, thereby strengthening the program in Los
Angeles and throughout the State.
At SCEPP, the professional staff soon learned to live with
uncertainty and to operate like a multidisciplinary team. They made
flexible agreements with the many jurisdictions in the metropolitan
area. They collected and nurtured support and offered technical
assistance to specialized groups, such as shop keepers and gasoline
station managers. They shared ideas for educational and practical
actions. For instance, school children observed doll houses on shaking
tables to overcome their fears. Residents were encouraged to bolt
structures to foundations, secure ceiling fixtures and heavy furniture
to the walls, and to learn where to shut off gas intakes to prevent
fires in the event of a major quake.
SCEPP was said to be getting into the "doingness" of earthquake
protection, helping others to prepare for a major disaster. Its aim was
not to create paper plans, such as FEMA's, nor establish a centralized
bureaucracy but to work from the bottom up to enable individuals and
groups to be self-sufficient during and after a quake. 2
In 1985, California generated national interest in its first
Earthquake Hazard Preparation Week. The Governor entered a shaking van
with Yogi the Bear, a mountain rescue team removed people by helicopter
from tall buildings, and public officials handled simulated emergencies
or observed the collapse of structures on Hollywood sets. Ham radio
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operators practiced communicating messages and first aid teams dealt
with mock disasters. Private firms distributed booklets on household
self-protection and signs for elderly to put in their windows asking for
help.
FEMA showed off its new plane equipped as a portable press room,
apparently to keep newsmen from interfering with the Army's management
of a disaster. With its fire-fighting mentality -- wait til the crisis
occurs and then send in masses of men and equipment -- it was bewildered
by SCEPP's success and frightened by what had become a kind of popular
movement, that seemed out of control. 74
Prediction research was also progressing on a federal model with a
costly program near Parkfield, an almost unpopulated area in the center
of the State. The USGS blanketed the area with sophisticated equipment
to monitor signals from a remarkably well-behaved fault. Since 1856 it
had erupted every 22 years, with one premature exception, enabling
scientists to predict another quake in 1988, plus or minus four years.
Finally, after two decades, seismologists had made good on their promise
and issued a prediction."
But that program has limited applicability to less well-behaved
sites; it serves mainly to improve general understanding and test
equipment. Some scientists suspect that the first socially useful
prediction will come from a consensus among a handful of field
geologists monitoring data in the hills above Los Angeles, adjusting
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data from modest equipment for atmospheric changes and other "noise,"
and seeking convergent patterns.76  But would anyone take their
consensual judgment seriously?
Once before when seismologists had warned of a local quake a few
days in advance, State officials ignored them leaving residents confused
and inactive; fortunately no one was harmed. The State Geologist was
concerned about the four-way fragmentation of the prediction system,
dividing scientists and public officials at both federal and state
levels, and questioned whether FEMA, especially, would respond in a
timely and appropriate manner.
Others criticized the prediction system as too passive, simply
waiting to validate research. Instead, NEPEC should be aggregating data
from every possible source and searching for patterns that might warn of
coming quakes. The prediction system was the product of old-time
seismologists, uncomfortable working under public scrutiny and, like
prophets without honor, burned out from bearing bad news. These
scientists also did not seem to appreciate the qualitative difference
between the effects of earthquakes in the past and what could occur in
the future.78
On the other hand, seismologists had led the public to believe that
they could put a stethoscope to the earth and diagnose a coming quake.
The best they could do was reach a consensus to bracket a time and
place, but would know only after the fact if their collective judgment
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had been sound. The public must learn that there are no
guarantees.7" However, even a failed prediction would be valuable to
provide data on public reaction to replace costly speculation in
federally funded social studies." Meanwhile, there was a shortage of
funds and staff for state programs to explore faults suspected to be
active near urban areas and to replicate Sieh's site specific studies,
to enable better local planning and warnings of potential local
quakes.'
The field of seismology has also been criticized as overly
dependent upon geophysical theory, which is unable to account for the
variety of natural phenomena observed in the field"z or explain the
different processes that seem to generate earthquakes around the world.
Indeed, as in other fields of science, research is seldom convergent;
for each problem solved a dozen more questions arise, proliferating like
rabbits. Seismologists' latest problems arise from new instruments and
more data than can be processed, and have been characterized as problems
of too many rabbits and too much noise out there. Some observers agree
that prediction seems less likely than a decade ago and was badly
oversold for political reasons."8
Another Perspective
An American account of a successful earthquake prediction sparing
thousands of lives in the mid-1970s in China, one in an uneven sequence
of successes and failures, gives a fresh perspective on Western
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science. 4 Admittedly, the Chinese have records dating back 3000
years, from which they have organized, mapped, and statistically tested
data on earthquakes, searching for patterns. They have also operated
under a very different cultural, social and institutional system,
especially during the Cultural Revolution, favoring massive empiricism.
They disdained building theories, preferring to let theory "grow from
the roots up, like a tree," or "be honed on the fine edge of practice."
Under Mao-Tse-Tung, China adopted an "open door policy" toward
science, welcoming in the masses. It sought to combine knowledge old
and new, indegenous and foreign, from folk lore and from science. The
revolutionary government put highest priority on a precautionary program
against earthquakes, common throughout the nation. When a six-year
pattern of quakes pointed to one in Haicheng, a few scientists set up
instruments there to monitor changes, and recruited or accepted services
volunteered by groups of untrained citizens who began to gather data
with simple and often homemade equipment. The scientists incrementally
checked teams reporting significant findings, instructing those whose
methods were poor, sending the best to enlist and instruct others, but
encouraging all, until a network of 5000 observation points blanketed
the area.
Meanwhile, local people received literature explaining what was
known about earthquakes and how they could take precautionary actions,
such as building temporary shelters and first aid stations, and leaving
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their homes if a warning were issued. When the prediction came, 600,000
people had moved outdoors and were spared from harm.
A U.S. team visiting China later acknowledged that the Chinese
generally practiced good seismology, using many fine instruments, some
unknown in the Nest. But they disdained the lack of parsimony as
inefficient; they also suspected that they were shown only the best of
the data. They considered reports on strange atmospheric phenomena and
animal behavior, with no basis in Western theory, as the product of a
kind of group madness. They dismissed reports of earlier successful
predictions, especially by village groups, suspecting that local people
might have been punished by Communist leaders for unauthorized actions.
The Chinese could not even cite statistics on their success to failure
rates. The Americans concluded that this prediction was not the result
of science, since it did not use hypothetico-deductive methods, but was
the result of good luck in response to a crescendo of small tremors.
The Americans were especially bewildered by how the Chinese
assessed data, arrived at a decision to predict , transformed the
prediction into a warning, and obtained citizen compliance. Why would
people abandon normal activities and suffer winter discomforts outside?
In response to these questions, the Chinese considered the decision
process and mass response unproblematic and did not distinguish between
a scientific prediction and an official warning.
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Decisions were obviously made incrementally by groups combining a
variety of perspectives at different levels, as data was gathered and
flowed up for repeated evaluation in exhaustive discussions. After
using "intuitive judgments," these groups as a whole, not one leader,
issued increasingly specific statements up to the warning a few hours
before the quake. The visitors thought that such a process in the U.S.
would impede effective decision making and be viewed as a delaying
tactic, exacerbating conflict. But they envied one attribute of the
Chinese program, that citizen participation relieved the scientists of
full responsibility if a prediction failed.
An American sociologist, John Turner, explained how these groups
bridged the dual institution of science and civilian authority like
rungs on a ladder. At the lowest level, volunteers served as staff to
scientists but gained status as scientists in their villages, while
scientists served as advisors to government officials at various
levels. Compliance was explained by the cultural emphasis on social
over individual welfare, reinforced by viewing participation as
indicating commitment to the revolutionary ideology. In this way, the
Chinese had solved the tripart problem of "incentives, control and
communication," plaguing voluntary programs in the United States, where
individuals receive little credit in their neighborhood or vocational
life for voluntary work. These lessons were barely apparent in the OSTP
program but were partially applied by SCEPP.
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Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has shown how seismic engineers have been socially
motivated to acquire and institutionalize their knowledge for widespread
use and have encouraged others to participate in improving public
safety. Still their knowledge appears to be little different from that
of dam engineering, not based on science and in practice more like an
art. Moreover, in a social reality as messy as the physical one of dam
construction, these professionals long had difficulty in obtaining
adequate use of their knowledge. The seismologists, with even more
difficulties making predictions about an equally complex physical
reality, have focussed on building better theory, while protecting
themselves against potential threats in a poorly understood social
environment.
On the other hand, planners, first at mid-levels of government and
then from the bottom up in California, were able to bring together
broad-based support for national legislation and then for a successful
prototype program that has become something of public movement for
earthquake preparedness in California. A similar kind of movement took
place in Haicheng, where the Chinese disdained building theory but set
out to save lives. Although never referred to as "planning," their
precautionary program could be seen as planned actions that involved a
messy incremental bottom-up process and elaborate social arrangements
for doing science, resulting in saving lives. Both the California and
Chinese cases seem to validate the prescription of some of the planners,
166
that decisions about seismic safety must be made by all kinds of
individuals and groups at all levels of society and that responsibility
for a safe environment must be shared. That is the moral of this story.
We now move to planning a policy for protecting the public against
the hazards of nuclear waste. Our focus will be on the extent to which
these planners understood the lesson from the dam safety program about
the nature of knowledge for engineering and the prescription of the
planners in the story just told.
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CHAPTER V
NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT
The story of planning a policy for the management of nuclear waste
will be told only briefly, with emphasis on institutional issues and
problems of knowledge. The reader is urged to consult more complete and
detailed accounts.' In contrast to the previous stories, this topic
became high on the federal agenca due to broad and continuing public
concerns about past failures of government to deal with a long-term
threat to health and life. To isolate man-made radionuclides from the
biosphere for millenia could require engineered systems with permanence
beyond the wildest dreams of dam engineers and predictive knowledge from
the earth science beyond the highest hopes of seismologists. Moreover
knowledge must be combined about phenomena at the atomic scale with
geologic knowledge up to the broad scale of regional water systems.
This story begins with background on the history, institutional
context, and technical terms. It then describes policy planning during
the Carter administration. A third section describes how the planners
tried to overcome gaps in knowledge. This is followed by a synopsis of
recent problems in dealing with various kinds of waste and concludes
with a local perspective on policy implementation.
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The Institutional Context
Historically Congress empowered the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
in 1954 to promote and regulate nuclear materials developed for the
atomic bomb for peaceful use. For two decades the AEC was part of a
"cozy subgovernment" linking the Commission and the Joint Atomic Energy
in Congress.2 The AEC was eventually attacked for mismanagement and
suppressing safety problems and for a conflict of interest between
promotion and regulation, a conflict not so apparent when the peaceful
use of the atom was considered overwhelmingly beneficial. Its functions
were split between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), to control
commercial activity, and the Energy Research and Development Agency
(ERDA), which would become the Department of Energy (DOE) promoting
civilian use of nuclear energy and managing both nuclear waste from
commercial and military activity. Physicists seemed to have assumed
that radioactive material could be handled safely under federal
regulations and by competent engineers, placing faith in institutions
outside their realms of knowledge and control.
In spite of these accusations, a chronology of events suggests that
the AEC at least planned to take timely actions to manage wastes. For
instance, it promptly requested advice from the National Academy of
Science; in 1957 the NAS announced that a solution was to bury the waste
in salt.3  In 1963, when the AEC awarded the first contract for
building a commercial reactor, it issued a permit for a plant to
reprocess spent fuel that was to cool in storage at reactors for five
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years. It also began a timely experiment for the disposal of the
residual waste in salt in Kansas. By 1971, the AEC spent some $100
million studying bedded salt.4
A combination of unexpected events and limited understanding of
local geology upset its plans; local knowledge also played a role. For
instance, waste from a plutonium production plant in Rocky Flats,
Colorado, was injected into deep drilled holes and caused seismic
tremors until local citizens recognized this cause and stopped it. 5
Then in 1969, a fire badly damaged that plant and set in motion a series
of disastrous events. The AEC hastily relocated waste to its
reservation at Idaho Falls. A trout farmer realized that radionuclides
could seep into groundwater through the highly fractured rock and
migrate to the surface; he notified the Governor. Idaho's Senator Frank
Church then demanded that all this waste be removed by 1980.6
The AEC logically turned to its Kansas experiment for a solution,
only to be confronted by state geologists. Inadequate knowledge of that
particular site ended this idea in 1972.7 The AEC then turned to the
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and found a site in New Mexico, a state
long supporting nuclear activities, where a Waste Isolation Pilot
Project (WIPP) was begun and is still underway.
Meanwhile, the first plant designed to actually reprocess spent
fuel, in West Valley, New York, was plagued with unexpected problems.
One was a lack of suitable fuel that forced it to operate below capacity
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and to treat material from experimental reactors, which damaged the
chemical process.' Again the AEC's timely plans had gone awry. The
plant closed in 1972 for repairs; it never reopened but left a legacy of
legal problems and intractable waste, while spent fuel overcrowded
cooling pools at commercial reactors.
The AEC then proposed temporary storage of waste in special mausolea
above ground until it cooted. Environmentalists feared that these would
become permanent and rejected the proposal. When ERDA proposed placing
waste in deep holes drilled in various types of rocks in any of 36
states, it aroused wide-scale resistance, leading many states to ban
waste-related activities within their boundaries. Public protests grew
against all types of nuclear activity, as did a demand to halt licensing
new nuclear power plants until the waste disposal issue was settled.
New institutional and technical difficulties arose. Reprocessing
came under Presidential scrutiny and was halted indefinitely by
President Jimmy Carter early in 1977. USGS scientists began raising
questions about actual salt deposits, such as unexpected heterogeneities
and brine inclusions, which could migrate to and rapidly corrode waste
containers. In this context, the President asked DOE to assess the
problem as a first step in devising a sound administrative policy and
program to deal with all types of nuclear waste.
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The Institutional Problem
Nuclear waste is frequently said to be no technical problem but an
institutional one. Many interest groups within diverse perspectives
focus on particular facets of the aggregate problem of nuclear waste,
engaging in what seem like irresolvable conflicts -- deemed the
"institutional problem." This way of looking at the institutional
problem seems too fragmented and narrow, ignoring how closely technical
and institutional matters interact.'" It also ignores the larger
institutional framework in which nuclear wastes are generated. Finally,
it overlooks the routine ways in which people in fine-scale social
institutions in all sectors and at all levels of society, make decisions
that foster waste production. The following paragraphs describe the
most important aspects of and distinctions made within this complex
institutional framework.
For instance, the technical community justified delays by claiming
that wastes were at the "back end" of the fuel cycle and lacked the
urgency of producing weapons or power plants. With characteristic
optimism, it expected a "technological fix" eventually. This phrase,
back end, is misleading; radioactive residues are produced throughout a
lengthy process, from dusty mill tailings at uranium mines, as gases and
liquids released in refining or processing fuels, as heterogeneous solid
"low level waste" (LLW) from research, medical practice, and reactor
operation, as "high level waste" (HLW) directly from the fuel in
reactors, or as transuranic elements (TRU) from reprocessing that fuel,
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and finally as massive refuse from unusable reactors, most aptly at the
tail end of a technical process.''
This list of types of wastes must be further subdivided between
commercial wastes, generated by the private sector, and military waste
created largely in the production of weapons for national defense, in
which the Armed Services Committees in Congress and the Department of
Defense have major interests. High level defense wastes have been
temporarily and inadequately stored mainly at three federal
reservations.12 No formal procedures exist for public review of
military waste management in order to avoid a "threat to national
security," or more properly to avoid public interference and delays in
defense activity.'" Thus public understanding and discussion of this
part of the larger institutional framework has been limited.
The most hazardous commercial waste is the spent fuel from plants
generating electric power, a function long supported by federal energy
policy to protect the nation against the uncertainties of imported oil.
Here disaggregated consumer decisions about the use of electricity
directly and indirectly foster continuing production of waste. The well
organized nuclear industry, made up of utilities in more than 30 states
and their suppliers, had long treated the residual spent fuel as a
resource to be reprocessed to extract valuable uranium and plutonium for
re-use, leaving small amounts of TRU for disposal. Carter's ban on
reprocessing created new technical and institutional problems.
Technically, whole fuel assemblies are greater in volume, initially
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hotter, and more hazardous for workers to handle, than TRU waste. The
industry was also loathe to accept the ban and argued that fuel should
be stored retrievably for later re-use. The planners would mute such
debates on technical grounds by classifying spent fuel as "high level
waste."
When loosely organized coalitions of environmentalists and
antinuclear activists began to take political and legal actions in the
1970s, they posed a dilemma for a government that supported the nuclear
industry. To extricate itself, the waste policy planners split the
issue of waste from the future of nuclear power and declared themselves
neutral on the future of nuclear power, placing this topic, and the
antinuclear activists, outside the bounds of discussion.'4
But behind this neutrality is a questionable premise, that once a
technical solution to the waste problem was found, it could be used for
any amount of waste.1" Indeed, nuclear electric power was then
expected to increase rapidly and to produce more waste than military
activity, then expected to decrease in a climate of lessening
international tension.'' But the validity of this premise depended
upon many factors that were unforeseeable in the larger institutional
framework. In any case, such distinctions compartmentalized the system
of generation through disposal and enabled the planners to limit
discussion of major parts.
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Federal government programs for managing wastes involve complex
arrangements. Eight Congressional committees deal with facets of waste;
on the administrative side at least fourteen departments and agencies
have interests.'" Three key ones are expected to interact in a kind
of logical sequence are: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
assemble regulatory standards and guidelines to protect public health
and safety, the NRC to follow with rules and procedures for public
review and licensing of commercial activities and to govern DOE, the
operating agency and in principle the last in line. But EPA's work has
lagged behind schedule because of debates about how to set regulatory
standards, in part because of uncertainties in such areas of knowledge,
as radiobiology and ecology. Meanwhile DOE has tended to forge ahead
with programmatic momentum, reversing the expected sequence, and
creating the possibility that it would not be able to afford to make
costly changes to meet more stringent standards.18
The U.S. Geologic Survey (USGS) became a fourth key agency at the
start of the Carter administration when it questioned long held
assumptions about the suitability of salt deposits for containing
radionuclides. Other agencies with central roles were the Department of
Transportation, on shipping wastes, and the Department of State,
determined to accept spent fuel from abroad to prevent nuclear
proliferation.1
Organizationally, within DOE, waste management programs for military
and commercial waste not only had separate budgets but were further
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fragmented by separate contracts with decentralized national
laboratories. Their records on stored wastes were often incomplete and
their data in different forms, difficult to compare. These labs were
managed by old-timers from the AEC, determined to "prove" the "sacred
theory of salt" entrusted to them by scientists. They were defensive at
criticism by the USGS and accused it of wanting to enlarge its turf in
order to build scientific knowledge and of not appreciating that
engineers need only approximate numbers.2"
In this context, Carter's policy planners focussed on high level
wastes and TRU, considered to be technically the most difficult and
politically essential to protect the nuclear industry and old promises.
They left to Congress the responsibility for unstabilized mill gailings,
highly hazardous now and far in the future. 2' At the request of State
Governors, low level waste would be hendled by the states under new
legislation.22 "Decommissioning" old facilities and reactors, not yet
an urgent matter, would be treated rather superficially.2 3
The Policy Making Process
When ERDA was reorganized late in 1977, DOE was deemed the "lead
agency" on programs for nuclear waste, to overcome the impression that
responsibility was split with the NRC. 2 4 Its first task was to assess
the issue, under the leadership of John Deutch 25 . Early in 1978, the
"Deutch Report" called for the federal government to take responsibility
for all types of waste, to license all long-term disposal facilities,
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and do what was necessary to assure public confidence that all types of
wastes would be disposed of safely.26
This report created a positive climate for policy making.
Environmentalists praised it as a good first step.2l At least three
western States indicated support for hosting the first repository.2 a
Congressmen took new interest in the topic. 29  Such conditions offered
reasons for optimism and opportunities for building a constituency,
based on compromises, for a new approach to this old problem.
However, the Deutch Report revealed a basic conflict that would
divide the planners to the end, labelled "timing versus certainty." 30
DOE urged rapid timing in completing WIPP for TRU waste; it was also
willing to add a small licensed experiment at WIPP for retrievable
storage of spent fuel, to show the public that action was being taken.
It proposed opening several small licensed research and demonstration
projects prior to the first full scale repository. These were called
intermediate scale facilities because successful isolation could not be
demonstrated for thousands of years.
The USGS was leery about any repository in salt and wanted HIPP
halted. OSTP particularly wanted DOE to project a new image by
proceeding slowly step by step with intensive research, investigating
many sites in other media, to provide sound scientific knowledge for
site selection and engineering design. Such programmatic redundancy
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should preclude repeating a time-consuming series of fiascos and produce
at least a few politically acceptable sites.
We posit that this conflict was based on two very different implicit
models of how engineering knowledge is acquired. DOE's approach seems
more like that of practical engineers in the past who obtained initial
understanding of unfamiliar matters by conducting small experiments in
the real world. OSTP's approach was more like that of modern engineers
who claim that their knowledge involves the application of general laws
and principles derived by scientific methods. Moreover, this modern
approach was essential, given the limits in assessing the results of
full-scale experiments.
Early in 1978, President Carter established an Interagency Review
Group (IRG) made up of representatives of fourteen departments and
agencies, chaired by Deutch and directed by a small closeknit steering
group that included OSTP.3 ' The IRG allocated analytical tasks to six
groups, each to work on a part of the policy. OSTP was asked to assess
the status of geologic knowledge in addition to a most important task,
assessing alternative technical strategies.32
Six technical strategies had long been proposed: to put nuclear
waste under the sea, eject it into space, insert it in deep drilled
holes or in mines to melt with the rocks, bury it in massive graves, or
chemically partition it and bury the residue. OSTP chose massive burial
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because time was vital to eliminate the threat to new nuclear power
plants and burial would be "available soonest.""3
For both its tasks, OSTP followed an impersonal procedure used in
situations of great uncertainty in science and that may be described as
a modified Delphi process. 34 It widely circulated drafts of reports
for IRG comments and then revised them until comments abated, and a
consensus could be assumed.
In early Fall, the task groups completed their work and the IRG
issued a draft report that indicated new understanding and significant
consensus on many points. Environmentalists praised it as a welcome
change from tired rhetoric.3 s For instance, DOE agreed to study
various media and look closely at specific sites. It would also now
consult with the States and seek concurrence before it opened any
repository, although this was not required by legislation. Licensing
would be extended to some noncommercial waste facilities, including
WIPP, a decision reached without consulting the Armed Services
Committees, much to its dismay.
Considerable emphasis was placed on adequate public participation, a
point stressed by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which made
a plan for "public input" into the IRG. The plan started with "going
public" in meetings with representatives of special interest groups in
Washington, as had been done for Earthquake Hazard Reduction planning.
Three public hearings were then held across the country during the
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summer. Unfortunately only short notice and incomplete position papers
were available for these and the IRG was roundly criticized."7 The
final phase of the plan was to distribute the draft report, eventually
15,000 copies. The comment period was extended into 1979 to accommodate
demand. Staff then analysed and sorted 3,300 responses into categories,
attempting to tabulate pros and cons on more than 40 separate sections
of the IRG report, and then summarizing these comments and drafting IRG
responses.
The comments raised many new issues. They also often reflected
readers' confusion with language in the report. For instance, CEQ, a
stickler for compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), insisted that IRG decisions not prejudge but preserve policy
options. Therefore these options had to be couched in terms of
procedures for decision making to avoid their being subject to
environmental impact reviews. The wording of the four "interim
strategic planning bases" mainly on the timing of decisions was so
abstract that even IRG members were initially confused about their
differences.3
Many commentators wanted to extend licensing procedure for
commercial waste to military wastes consistent with their physical and
chemical properties. Their questions about the actual threat to
national security raised basic issues about civilian control of the
military that have plagued the nation since its early days.39  The IRG
largely ignored suggestions for alternatives to licensing or for
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decisions made on a case-by-case basis. The IRG stuck with licensing
new facilities for high level waste, which would only be used in the
unlikely event that these would be needed, and for TRU, unnecessary with
WIPP and the ban on reprocessing.
The IRG modified its stance on several issues, notably on opening
small licensed research facilities, in part because some feared these
would grow into permanent repositories. Moreover, "Every HLW repository
will in its early phase be an ISF" and, based on an optimistic schedule
for opening the first, would provide as much information. "Let's junk
the whole concept once and for all.""* This was done. DOE now
conducts experiments without public review.
Especially controversial was a concept of "consultation and
concurrence," what it meant, how it differed from a State veto over site
selection, disallowed under existing laws, and how it would work. This
led the IRG to discussions of federal-state relations and of detailed
procedures that took it far beyond more practical matters at hand.4 1
One remedy for federal-state relations seemed to be a new institution, a
State Planning Council, establishing an "equal partnership" of federal
administrators and selected governors, plus one representative each from
a county, city, and Indian tribe. The council's main task would be to
identify those "decision points" in which all had an equal say.
The most comments and greatest confusion arose in a statement on the
status of geologic knowledge for mined repositories, to be described.
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Even more important was that the array of comments opened up fresh
debates on broad political philosophy and on procedural details thought
to have been settled, apparently testing the patience of many. As one
critic said, the basic error of the President's immediate advisors lay
in their "dogged determination ... to raise and re-raise their points of
view in terms more specific than was needed." 4 2 As patience waned,
the spirit of compromise dissipated, and valuable time elapsed.
The IRG report to the president, weaving comments and IRG responses
into the draft, was finally issued in March, 1979. But the new
conflicts soon split apart the small group that had steered and
energized the IRG. Deutch had become a favorite in Congress for his
lucid testimony and was moving up through the DOE bureaucracy. OSTP
began looking to the President as leader and teacher and the final
arbitrator of disputes. 4 3
Then apparently with little warning, DOE withdrew its offer to
license an experiment with spent fuel at WIPP. Supported by the Armed
Services committees, it would proceed rapidly to open an unlicensed TRU
repository in New Mexico. Another surprise was the accident at Three
Mile Island in March 1979, which shifted public attention from issues of
waste to issues of power plant safety. At that time a Presidential
statement only on nuclear waste seemed ill-advised.
The justifiable delay allowed a small group centered around OSTP to
squabble over the wording of material on issues to be sent to the
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President4 4 One residual issue, the extension of licensing, was sent
to a study committee. Finally, only two issues remained: on continuing
WIPP and the initial one implicitly of "timing versus certainty," or of
how many sites would be closely studied before a first was chosen.
Material was given to the President's staff early in June but did not
reach his desk until late August because of vacations and meetings
abroad.4'
The decision memo gave the President a choice between characterizing
two to three or four to five sites before the first was chosen. He
solved that simply with a mathematical compromise, suggesting three to
four. Time elapsed in clarifying the underlying philosophical
differences between a rapid program of practical action and a more
conservative redundant program of slow and costly research. Then
Carter's new Secretary of Energy backed an unlicensed WIPP; the
President faced a dilemma. If he fought against WIPP as OSTP advised,
he could alienate Senator Frank Church, whose support he needed for a
pending disarmament treaty. Carter took the chance and lost both the
ratification of the treaty and his ban on WIPP. 46
On February 12, 1980, OSTP's work was finally completed when the
President stated the administration's nuclear waste management policy.
Some said that at best the policy echoed the consensus in September
1978, which no longer existed, that it was weak and untimely, or that it
was simply a plan for planning, delaying tangible action.4 7 The
policy statement received little notice in the midst of the Iran
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crisis. Carter did appoint a State Planning Council, but his staff,
pre-occupied in an election year, shelved an OSTP implementation plan
and ignored its advice that an official be appointed in the Executive
Office, at least temporarily, to oversee the waste management
program.4
Problems of Knowledge
From the start, Deutch and others recognized the unprecedented
challenge of the technical task of waste isolation but seemed confident
that adequate research could fill the gaps in knowledge. Their primary
concerns were about geologic knowledge for mined repositories. As a
field of science, geology offered a perspective of time commensurate
with the life of many rationuclides, but it was a retrospective science,
focussing on the past and, like all earth sciences, lacked the theory
necessary for prediction. As one geologist said, "There is no
philosophical or logical basis for predicting the frequency of
geological events or the intensity of geologic processes. Moreover,
geologic processes often destroyed empirical evidence about past
events."*
Building theory was considered especially difficult when the object
of study was a continuous earth that limits controlled experiments. In
contrast, nuclear physics, for instance, has ample particles for
controlled experiments to advance its theory. Moreover, OSTP never
questioned the adequacy of the general laws of physics; implicitly
191
problems lay only in obtaining specific data on how the laws would
operate in particular situations.5"
On the other hand, biological scientists were less than sanguine
about their understanding of the causal chains with many links, from
exposure to phenomena that cannot be directly observed to lethal and
mutagenic affects. Biologists disagreed wisely as new research
indicated that previous exposure standards had been too lax, and their
disagreements fed public anxieties. Moreover, even with reliable
statistics on aggregate affects of exposure to given doses of radiation,
biologists cannot predict individual cases."'
The IRG barely mentioned hazards to workers transporting and
handling wastes, leaving these and other problems prior to closing a
repository to the engineers. For instance, pumps, fans, and spacing of
waste cannisters could be used to handle such contingencies as mine
flooding, excessive heat, gases in the medium, or waste becoming
"critical," e.g. exploding.s2  Long term biological impacts were not
discussed in detail, apparently because a repository was expected to
isolate material for several thousand years; by then biologists would
have a technological fix.
The small group in OSTP that assessed the status of geologic
knowledge for mined repositories, soon simplified its task by dismissing
scenarios of release that seemed least likely, such as that wastes would
be uncovered by meteorites, or that involved "the human problem." This
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latter was the most difficult to characterize, for instance, knowing
whether men would later exhume wastes in the search for minerals.
Instead, the group focussed on the most credible scenario of release, in
the movement of water to the surface. 54 They structured this scenario
with a kind of transport model. Put simply, the rate that the water
would move and the length of its path would determine the travel time,
hopefully long enough to allow radioisotopes to decay to harmless levels.
To characterize this process, knowledge was needed from three
fields, roughly matching three scales of time and space into which the
problem was divided. Geochemistry would address near-term interactions
between the waste form and nearby rock in the repository, rock mechanics
would describe the effect of heat on the site in the thermal period, and
geohydrology would deal with the gradual long-term movement of water up
to the surface. One difficulty in this subdivision was that that
different fields operate at different scales and use different methods
to measure the same properties, such as permeability or stress in
rocks. The results are often inconsistent. Another problem lies in
correlating laboratory results with field measurements.55
Each field also faced particular limitations in predicting even
generally what would happen. Geophysics, the most mature theoretically,
recognized that elements in nature possess a wide variety of changeable
properties; even simple crystals of salt are too complex to be
characterized by a few uniform attributes. The challenge was to model
innumerable combinations of physical and chemical interaction among
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naturally occurring elements and in combination with an array of
man-made radioactive particles. The dangers here were in
oversimplifying and making misleading models, on the one hand, or, on
the other hand, of errors propogating as the models were made more
complex."
The most hazardous stage of a repository might be when the heat
expanded and fractured the surrounding rock along planes of weakness,
possibly uplifting the surface. When the rock cooled, openings could
remain through which water could enter and radionuclides escape. To
learn in advance about weaknesses in a particular rock mass required
drilling boreholes, but that created a dilemma: each new hole made the
data more reliable, but each also progressively weakened the integrity
of the site and its usefulness for containment. Since every rock mass
is unique, neither a study of analogous rocks nor data in generalized
models derived from study of many similar rocks would do. Analogies and
extrapolations from models could miss features of vital interest at a
particular site.
Many radionuclides were expected to be captured by, or chemically
bonded to, elements in the surrounding rocks, but others would dissolve
in water existing within or near all sites and decay as the water flowed
to the surface. But geohydrologists did not understand well the
three-dimensional flow of groundwater at even the best known
aquifers.S7  They could study selective short term retardation of some
elements at sites where waste had been leaching into the ground for up
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to forty years, as at Hanford. But extrapolating from these to another
region and over thousands of years could not be done with confidence.
Given such problems, the best the planners could do was to make
conceptual models of the most important factors and their possible
interactions and to use mathematical techniques such as sensitivity
analysis to evaluate the significance of major variables. 58 There
would also be a need for a risk analysis if only to satisfy EPA
regulations, which require a summary number on the level of risk prior
to review and licensing of proposals.
Meanwhile geologists could study the general attributes of rocks in
various regions, a task multiplied by the need to study six types of
media and also many specific sites. 59  Ultimately the media, site, and
design of the repository, waste form, and packaging were expected to
function together as a system of multiple geologic and man-made barriers
or redundant defenses, which are common in conservative engineering.
Because of unique characteristics of sites and types of rocks, many
design decisions could obviously not be made until a first site finally
was selected.'"
OSTP decided that the site selection process could be simplified by
devising lists of technical criteria by which to characterize media and
general locations and to evaluate specific sites. Such criteria would
provide a basis, if not for an absolute judgement, at least for rational
decision making, comparing and ranking sites, and choosing the best
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among them. OSTP concluded that current knowledge and modelling
capacity was not yet sufficient to permit confidence in the safety of
any particular repository design nor the suitability of any particular
site.6' This somewhat bleak conclusion was softened by the
expectation that time, investment, and study would yield the necessary
knowledge.6
OSTP summarized its conclusions on the status of knowledge in two
paragraphs in the IRG draft report. Responses varied widely and were
divided generally into pessimists and optimists. Some readers voiced
distrust of any statements by scientists, especially after their
exaggerated claims for salt. Others thought that the optimistic tone of
the conclusions was not warranted by the full report nor by other
studies. Specific doubts were expressed about the value of models and
about risk analysis, as on whether uncertainties could be "bounded." A
few felt that knowledge was insufficient even to begin a search for
specific sites. Others argued that knowledge was or would soon be
sufficient; the program should simply move ahead.62
For the report for the President, OSTP completely rewrote its
conclusions, dropping references to risk analysis. It emphasized that
present knowledge was adequate to identify sites for further study and
to assess their suitability against predetermined criteria. Information
would become more complete as a site was excavated and operations
began. Two new provisos were added: work could stop at any time until a
repository was "decommissioned' or closed, but even then some
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uncertainties would remain. Second, the choice of a site would require
not only technical judgment but also a "societal judgment" on the level
of risk and uncertainty.'3 That this judgment would be made through
licensing procedures was clear; less clear was what "society" would know
to make this judgment and how it would express itself.
The Aftermath
Events in the next two years revealed again that neither the defeats
nor the victories were final. Late in 1982, Congress passed the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act, incorporating many IRG concepts. It outlined elaborate
procedures: DOE was to study at least five sites before recommending
three choices for both a first and second high level waste repository,
but under a tight schedule that negated OSTP's intent. 6 4 President
Ronald Reagan dropped the ban on reprocessing (a technology now stymied
by financial and other problems) and allowed the State Planning Council
to lapse.
Programs to deal with other types of waste did not fare well. The
uranium mining industry, which once supplied over 90% of the free
world's market, was in financial straits and tried to shift
responsibility back to the federal government for masses of tailings
abandoned near inactive mines in seven western states.'' With
increased defense activity, military waste has accumulated more rapidly
than the spent fuel from a battered nuclear industry, but consolidation
of leaking military waste faced financial battles.6" The states,
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which had chosen to manage low level wastes, have had difficulties
working together in regional compacts and agreeing on new sites. One
exception was a site offered in Colorado by unemployed uranium miners
accustomed to the hazard."
The choice among three strategies for decommissioning aging or
unusable power reactors, such as that at Three Mile Island, has
vanished, largely because of problems of knowledge. A graduate student
discovered that an unforeseen and long-lived radionuclide could leak
from reactors entombed in concrete, the cheapest option and preferred by
utilities. "Mothballing" a facility to cool before dismantling was
scratched when formal records were found to lack vital information.
Only engineers long at a plant could have such knowledge but would be
long gone when the plant was cool enough for disassembly. The remaining
option, immediate dismantling, is the most hazardous to workers and most
expensive, and obviously puts pressures on utilities to operate plants
beyond the thirty years for which they were designed."8
DOE sped up its work on WIPP on a double track of research and
excavation, running roughshod over local anxieties, exacerbated by IRG
vacillation.6 * The host State, New Mexico, now lives with a dilemma:
it cannot demand NRC review and licensing without becoming eligible to
be the nation's first or only repository for spent fuel.7 *
While the IRG was still deliberating, DOE had identified seven sites
for a first high level waste repository and began reviewing geologic
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data for a second. But technical and political problems proliferated as
more was known of the geology and hydrogeology. Sites in domed salt
have subsequently been dropped because of difficulties in characterizing
irregularities in the subsurface material. Utah blocked exploration by
simply denying permits to DOE to move its equipment over State roads. A
site at Hanford, Washington was preferred because it was on federal land
and already contaminated, even though the poorest geologically. On that
site, experts widely disagreed in interpreting geologic data.
Although many local businessmen welcomed funds for exploration, by 1985
the three remaining candidate states had filed lawsuits to halt DOE site
studies.72
On January 16, 1986, DOE announced that it would seek a second site
from 18 areas in seven eastern states. But on May 28, the President
halted this phase, claiming that the volume of spent fuel accumulating
did not warrant a second repository. Environmentalists, especially,
accused Reagan of bowing to political pressures from Congressmen and
Governors during an election year.73 This diagnosis oversimplifies
what actually happened and is ironic, coming from a group that acquired
power through broad public participation but now relies on
institutionalized laws and procedures. A once apolitical housewife told
a story of a small New England town that is probably not atypical of
other sites.74 The story follows.
Hillsboro, New Hampshire, first learned of the government plan from
televised news. Elected officials then told them to prepare to testify
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at hearings on technical matters of interest to DOE and to refrain from
emotional expressions. A DOE official explained that emotions and
social concerns are difficult to quantify and record in technical
documents and a geologist admitted that the DOE selection process
somehow neglected the well-being of local people. On the other hand,
the community was urged to make personal sacrifices for the public good.
Local scepticism mounted when people remembered being told a decade
before that waste from the Seabrook power plant proposed nearby would
not be a technical problem. But now DOE could not answer many of their
technical questions. Public confidence further waned after the
Challenger disaster and the news that U.S. officials had suppressed
reports of a holocaust at a waste site years before in Russia.
Chernobyl brought reality to the magnitude and subtlety of radioactive
hazards.
Instead of being torn apart by local conflicts and controversies, as
state and federal officials had expected, this community quickly united,
informed itself on technical and political issues and behaved in a
cohesive and socially responsible manner. Apolitical rural residents
joined a spectrum of social and political interest groups to raise
technical questions and express social concerns at DOE hearings; they
also contributed local knowledge.
For instance, one old-timer shared his intimate knowledge of
occasional springs and hidden wells, which might transport radionuclides
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into surface water supplies. A trucker warned of icy patches in winter
and potholes in spring that could cause accidents in transporting
wastes. A housewife speculated that granite containing hot waste might
behave like her pressure cooker, left too long on the back of the stove,
and explode. A six year old boy linked what IRG neutrality had
attempted to decouple and expressed dismay that the stuff would still be
made at Seabrook.
The author herself, no technician, thought that storing the waste
above ground to cool for 50 to 100 years was the best alternative, a
strategy that international experts preferred.7 5  The IRG said that
they rejected storage on the grounds that the generation that benefits
should bear responsibility and costs. The real reasons, of course, were
political.
The combination of questions, concerns, and new understanding from
this and other local areas flowed up to State governors, Congressmen,
and into the President's office.7 ' Congress subsequently slashed
funds for seeking a first site, at a time when DOE was being accused of
mishandling even technical matters, e.g. improperly classifying cores at
candidate sites.77 Congress then scrapped the legislated procedures
and chose to explore only a single site in Nevada. Less than a decade
after work began on the policy, it now seemed undone.
Techniques for evaluating sites and for risk analysis have not fared
well. DOE devised a multi-attribute utility technique for evaluating
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options for the first site, and asked the National Research Council to
do an independent assessment. The NRC approved the method but expressed
concern that the technique "demands scrupulous methodical
implementation" and could be used subjectively to mask the real
uncertainty of a repository's ability to contain radionuclides."8 If
this technique is no better than risk assessments being done on the now
familiar technology of nuclear power plants, there is reason for concern.
Experts have found sophisticated models of risk so complex and
arcane as to confound critical review. Many are based on obscure but
untenably optimistic assumptions, oversimplifying specialized knowledge
or using it inaccurately, or omitting realistic possibilities of
accidents so unprecedented that they cannot be described.'" Yet these
techniques are expected to be the basis for a societal judgment on the
acceptability of risk.
Conclusions
This federal effort floundered, we posit, largely because OSTP had
poorly understood both the physical and social reality. Just as the
AEC's plans unraveled after the unexpected accident in Colorado,
followed by inappropriate organizational responses combined with limited
understanding of local geology, so the IRG's plans began to fall apart
when local people responded to a dreaded hazard and acted together in a
poorly understood social reality.
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The IRG also ignored the larger institutional context in which
nuclear wastes are generated. It bounded out of discussion those
anti-nuclear types most concerned with wastes, and also its potential
allies in Congress and potential supporters in states that might have
willing hosted a repository. Thus it lost opportunities for building a
broad constituency for a robust program.
Opportunities did exist for a multiple but messy approach, for
instance, combining both models for acquiring engineering knowledge,
through small experiments and with scientific research. Could not the
planners have compromised so that DOE's willingness to experiment with
spent fuel at WIPP was combined with a slower process of licensing
reactors, and a policy of energy conservation and long-term surface
storage to slow the generation of wastes and buy time for scientific
investigation? Why not involve a spectrum of local groups, pursuing
local site investigations and monitoring small-scale experiments and
storage? But an approach based on messy compromises and multiple local
incremental programs with broad public involvement would have violated
the expectations of a simple clear cut solution based on predictive
knowledge and firm control by the federal government. Yet that is what
mainstream scientists, engineers, and the public expect. We now turn to
an overview of these three projects.
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CHAPTER VI
INTERPRETATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
These stories have been about federal attempts to prevent
failures, control and monitor hazards, and predict disasters in order
to manage technological risks. But the planners at the top,
scientists, engineers, and bureaucrats, encountered surprising
difficulties and dilemmas, and responded in ways that have not made the
hazards more manageable. Mainstream explanations for the lack of
effective federal action, although partly appropriate, were deemed
insufficient. Instead, our thesis is that the dominant models of
knowledge and institutional arrangements do not fit well with the
reality in which these hazards arise.
This chapter draws on examples from the case studies and is
organized in two parts. The first part looks at how science,
engineering, and bureaucracy, respectively failed to meet mainstream
expectations for handling risks. It then examines a kind of retreat to
probabilistic knowledge and a further retreat to a call for a societal
judgment of the acceptability of risks. After arguing why this retreat
is impractical, the argument pivots to a second part: an exploration of
alternate kinds of knowledge and social arrangements for science and
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engineering and alternate forms of planning for managing technological
risks. The chapter concludes with a critical review of the literature.
Science
A common theme in our stories has been reliance on knowledge from
science, especially the earth sciences, for predicting hazards,
constructing failsafe structures, and managing risks. Traditionally,
science has been expected to provide a kind of deterministic knowledge
of invariant causal relationships (turning more recently to
probabilistic knowledge). This kind of knowledge is represented by
generalized theories and abstract principles; it is acquired by
prescribed methods and with instruments that are expected to be precise
and reliable. Using such knowledge, scientists are expected to make
predictions, so that people can avoid or prepare for disasters, and
engineers are expected to design reliable artifacts to bring nature
under control.
Evidence for such expectations about science lay in the claims of
engineers about knowledge sufficient to build failsafe dams, in the
seismologists' promise of predicting earthquakes, and in the hopes of
policy makers of permanently isolating nuclear waste.
This section describes how these expectations were thwarted, first
when dams and seismic engineers turned to science for help, and then
when they tried to acquire general knowledge of their own. Next it
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discusses the knowledge expected of two types of earth scientists,
seismologists and geologists, and how this knowledge also failed to
meet expectations. It then considers problems with instruments used by
both scientists and engineers. Finally, some responses of scientists
to these problems are considered. We begin with dam engineering.
In FDS, for example, even engineers in the Corps admitted that
scientists supplied inadequate data for the design of dams.
Considerable judgment was required to extrapolate what lay beyond core
samples and to estimate the range and variation of conditions in
foundation and construction materials. Knowledge of past hydrology or
seismicity was often insufficient to forecast what might occur.
Environmental conditions might change over time in unpredictable ways.
More than scientific principles were needed to deal with such
uncertainties, as the FDS panel pointed out; engineers had to use skill
and judgment in designing, especially in synthesizing an array of
non-technical factors with technical ones.
Seismic engineers faced similar difficulties but got little help
from seismology. The scientists' interest in general causes, their
research on past earthquakes, and their basic data, on acceleration,
did not help engineers anticipate the effects of future tremors at
particular sites nor meet their varied data needs. Competent seismic
engineers anticipated earthquakes from faults that had never been known
to rupture. Like competent dam engineers, they had to use judgment in
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practical designs that balanced technical and safety factors with cost,
constructability, and the structures' intended use.
At least three issues thwarted both types of engineers: the data
from science was inevitably incomplete for use in design, knowledge of
the past was insufficient for anticipating the future, which was
essential unknowable in important ways, and scientific principles and
methods were of little use in synthesizing many types of factors to be
considered in design.'
When science failed to provide the reliable knowledge expected,
engineers tried to create their own general knowledge. Both dam and
seismic engineers learned much from practical experiences in the past,
treating earlier projects somewhat as scientists might treat lab
experiments. When one failed, these engineers tried to learn what had
happened. Indeed, engineers are expected to describe the physical
causes of failures and to explain what went wrong in order to improve
their knowledge for future projects.
But the conditions necessary for learning are often inadequate:
the cause of a seismic collapse may be burned in the rubble, the
problem may be hidden in the foundation, as it was at Fontenelle dam,
or the evidence may be destroyed, washed away by the accident, as in
the case of Teton. Technical investigations into that failure revealed
limits in the generalized knowledge of dam engineering.
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Although experts used scientific methods to analyze the unique
conditions of the site, they apparently lacked a general theory with
explanatory or predictive power. They suggested several hypotheses,
such as one on hydraulic fracturing, but they did not fully understand
this process nor had sufficiently tested it. They could not precisely
describe the sequence of events leading up to the failure, but settled
on a very general explanation, "piping." This process cannot be
theoretically described and is but one of several general causes on
varying lists compiled by experts. In fact, these "causes" are not
independent but often occur in combinations unique to particular
failures. 2 Finally, the experts at Teton concluded that the cause
lay in some specific combination of events that they could not
precisely describe and moreover considered irrelevant. Unable to
improve on a theory, they suggested that designers better visualize
generally what might go wrong and add more defenses (which would have
made the dam prohibitively expensive). Here scientific methods and
general knowledge were inadequate even to describe the past. The
remedy, essentially, was human imagination and judgment.
Seismic engineers had carried out research in the lab as well as
in the field in order to build theories and devise formulas for
design. They had incorporated their generalized knowledge in building
codes and standards. But as a leading seismic engineer pointed out,
the knowledge in codes and engineering formulas was little more than "a
pretense of knowledge," often inappropriate for the design or
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inspection of specific projects, but leading engineers and the public
to believe that the structures would be safe.
Turning now to some scientists, the seismologists too were
frustrated in their mainstream expectations. For a time, they had
theories at three different scales, which did not fit well together nor
function adequately, leaving gaps, as the USGS admitted, to be filled
by scientific research. For instance, the global theory of plate
tectonics offerred a general cause for earthquakes at plate boundaries
but did not adequately account for those elsewhere. The concept of
faulting left the final cause of the elastic snap open to competing
hypotheses from various specialized fields. The theory of precursors
has been largely abandoned in the face of contradictory field evidence.
Science advanced its knowledge through controlled laboratory
experiments, but these usually oversimplify field conditions. In
seismology, for example, smooth blocks in the lab did not represent the
jagged irregular nature of faults nor did experiments with them explain
aseismic creep. As an example of how scientists deal with anomalies,
seismologists now suggest that creep is part of a more complex process;
to put it simply, fluids lubricate fine-scale material and allow rocks
under pressure to slide slowly until a far-off binding rock gives way.
The relatively simple process of friction binding two smooth plates
together until it is overcome by stress now requires an elaborate
explanation involving fine-scale local material.3
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Further field studies have revealed new complexities. Additional
plates and local fragments of distant origin complicate tectonic
theory, while qualitatively different processes appear to generate
earthquakes around the world. As is often the case in science, for
every question answered, a dozen more arise. New answers often require
elaborating a theory to account for local phenomena, in violation of
the criteria for good theories, of simplicity and comprehensive
explanatory power. New answers may also require labor-intensive field
investigations that may uncover still more complexities.
Greater difficulties plagued those who hoped to predict the
long-term fate of buried radionuclides. Modest USGS geologists, even
with a perspective of millions of years, denied theirs was a predictive
science, and eschewed uniformitarian assumptions. They could not
explain, for instance, how voids had occurred in ancient salt deposits
and warned that the stability of rocks in the past was no guarantee of
future stability.
These earth scientists perceived some basic difficulties in the
practices of science. First of all, they recognized that because every
site is unique, knowledge about one site could not be used by analogy
to describe another. One also cannot expect a general description
comprised of common characteristics abstracted from many similar sites
to be used in a model from which to deduce an adequate description of
still another site; the new one may have peculiar properties.
217
Critics have argued that geology is an immature science, without
adequate theory and pre-occupied with the past. Compared to fields
like chemistry and physics, it is handicapped by an inability to
perform controlled experiments on phenomena that are all interrelated
parts of one large planet. On the other hand, nuclear physics has
split elements apart and experiments repeatedly on masses of individual
atoms to refine its theory.
But geologists faced difficulties with chemical and physical
experiments in the lab. Selecting and separating elements from
naturally occurring rocks might leave out liquid or gaseous phases that
occur infrequently in the field. Under controlled conditions, these
elements might not behave as they do under varied humidity or
temperature, for instance. Properties identified by analyses could not
simply be added up to represent the qualities of natural rocks. The
heterogeneity, variability, and complex interrelationships among
"parts" of fine-scale phenomena appeared to defy complete description.
This suggests several types of problems of knowledge. One lies in
classification, in seeing one thing as "like " another. A second
arises in leaping from a general description to a description of a
specific thing. A third problem lies in trying to describe a whole
from the knowledge of a few parts, as from samples taken for site
investigation. A fourth type of problem arises when one assumes that a
thing remains the same under other conditions, in a different
particular context, and a fifth is in characterizing a whole as a
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simple aggregate or specific set Of discrete qualities. Several of
these types of problems rest on the false assumption, common in
physical science, that the whole is nothing more than the sum of its
parts.
In summary, the knowledge in generalized models, whether
conceptual ones or physical ones in the lab, seems too simple or gross
to capture particular details and describe heterogeneous properties of
natural phenomena or to characterize complex processes past or future.
On the other hand, analytical methods produce fragmented knowledge that
does not represent essential qualities of a whole in a manner required
for design and prediction.
Turning now to some instruments that scientists and engineers use
as their "eyes and ears" in order to identify aspects of particular
phenomena, we find that they too are often inadequate. For instance,
seismographs are too simple and insensitive to discriminate "noise,"
such as vibrations from nearby traffic, from data deemed meaningful,
such as faint earth tremors. On the other hand, they may be
oversensitive to their environments, as were the uselessly frozen
piezometers at Teton, or surveying equipment that responded to
atmospheric changes near Palmdale with data interpreted as earthquake
precursors.
The choice of a type of instrument and where it is put are
important. For instance, seismographs too close to a quake will not
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distinguish types of waves and may even be damaged. At new locations,
data may be meaningless until men recognize localized patterns, such as
in the groundwater flow around a new dam or in local seismic activity,
or temporal patterns such as the grand cycles of quakes. The data
about a single phenomena will also vary at similar instruments in
different locations, as do signals from a distant quake. Conversely,
different types of instruments in one area, measuring a single property
such as permeability or stress in rocks, will yield different
measurements at a scale of a millimeter, a meter, or a mile.
In such cases, these instruments fall short of the precision and
reliability expected. Their value depends upon human judgments in
choosing, for example, specific combinations of instruments and
locations, in sorting out what is meaningful to humans, and in
identifying patterns.
To review, instead of general theories, universally applicable and
enabling complete descriptions, explanations, and predictions, and
instead of reliable instruments providing clear and consistent data,
there were obvious gaps. For instance, there were gaps between what
was expected from theories or from models in the lab and what was
observed in the field and between general properties characterizing
many field locations and unique ones elsewhere. Moreover, as theories
have changed with new understanding, as in seismology and seismic
engineering, gaps or inconsistencies appear in the knowledge embedded
in models at different periods of time.
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In essence, the knowledge of mainstream science seems too general,
gross, and fragmented to produce descriptions, explanations, and
predictions suitable for handling risks of the type discussed here. By
oversimplifying complexity and overlooking that which is rare, this
kind of knowledge fails to capture the irreducible uncertainty inherent
in combinations of details of particular phenomena that may change over
time in unexpected ways. This raises basic questions about science.
What is needed to fill these gaps? Can limitations such as these be
overcome through further research or are the gaps, in spite of some
scientists' claims, inherent in the very nature of science. These are
questions we will return to. A glimpse at some responses by scientists
to these problems brings us to the social context of science.
Some scientists, this time represented by seismologists and
nuclear physicists, have not been notably humbled by such limitations.
For instance, seismologists did not seem publicly embarrassed when a
new underground test discredited their claims at Geneva or when further
observations forced them to abandon precursory theory. After
geologists discredited their general views on salt, physicists
persisted in claiming that their general laws were adequate; what was
needed was more time and money for research to obtain more adequate
data. Seismologists also called for more money and time to build a big
science like physics and gain the knowledge to fill the gaps.
Money has seemed as critical in building science and overcoming
its limitations as it was for engineers who would build safe dams
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anywhere if clients would pay the price. Seismic engineers outside of
government also long sought research money in competition with the
seismologists. But thirty years after seismology began to get massive
federal support, data from distant seismographs on underground nuclear
tests is still contentious. Even after liberal funding from the EHR
Act, earthquake predictions seem more difficult to make than in 1957.
In sum, more than money is needed to fill the gaps.
The difficulties for scientists and engineers have often been
exacerbated by traps set by the public and by outsiders to specialized
fields, for instance, by people expecting seismologists to hold a
stethoscope to the earth and guarantee a prediction. If scientists'
statements prove invalid or artifacts fail, the public may mistrust all
such statements or may hold individuals liable for damages.
The seismologists faced a surprising dilemma when they learned
that the public might react negatively even before an accurate
prediction. Their response was, predictably, to request more funds for
basic, not socially useful, research. They set up a new institution,
NEPEC, to control what their members said publicly about their
research. They placed new demands on government, that it plan for
responding to a prediction and for controlling public reactions, and
also asked for protection from liability. They defended themselves
from the social world.
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In contrast, although nuclear waste planners had already lost
public credibility, they barely mentioned liability since they did not
anticipate a repository failure for thousands of years. They seemed
confident of adequate funds for research. But they too requested more
time and turned to government for procedures to manage the public
response. For both sets of scientists, the federal bureaucracy was to
fill the gaps.
In conclusion, these scientists in their particular worlds
remained optimistic that with government's help, they would fulfill
their own and public expectations. We now consider how engineers have
fared without generalized knowledge or the data they needed from
science.
Engineering Rules and Procedures
Engineers expect to solve technical problems and create failsafe
structures and systems to control natural and man-made hazards and
increase the benefits of technology. Dams bring water to irrigate new
land as well as to control floods and droughts. Cities can be raised
with confidence in seismic areas. and waste from radioactive materials,
which is harnassed to provide almost unlimited energy, will be disposed
of safely, thanks to the reliable knowledge and procedures of engineers
in charge. Most non-engineers share such beliefs.
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Even though they lacked adequate generalized knowledge, engineers
have depended on implicit rules and standard procedures to create the
expected failsafe structures. Both the rules and procedures rest on
tacit assumptions about the kind of knowledge they have and the
conditions under which they use it. These assumptions are taken for
granted, raising certain expectations of engineering performance. For
various reasons illustrated by the case studies, these engineers, like
the scientists, were often unable to deliver the knowledge expected of
them, leaving gaps between expectation and delivery that can exacerbate
risks.
This section first describes a set of implicit engineering rules
and some of their implications. It then considers common procedures of
engineering, particularly in the organizational context in which most
engineering takes place. Next it describes how some engineers
responded to uncertainties and complexities in their knowledge, based
on particular conceptual models. Last, it seeks to explain the
inadequacy of engineering rules and procedures.
Engineering knowledge tends to be grounded in examples and
advanced on a case-by-case basis according to one implicit rule: do not
question what worked well in the past and elsewhere but use these as
examples. 4 Unquestioning acceptance of earlier artifacts is based on
the assumption that they will not fail, but overlooks how contextual
factors may change, upstream in the case of dams, as the panel
recognized, and also that structures and their foundations deteriorate
224
with time. Oddly, seismic engineers never mentioned the factor of
aging.
One difficulty with this rule is that over time, as engineering
fields themselves have aged, the work of engineers has become
increasingly specialized. Specialists tend to copy examples piecemeal,
so that, like a recipe, a design may be put together of separate
components. For example, Teton designers specified fill and drainage
materials of the sort that performed well independently at other sites,
ignoring how these would function in combination and at that particular
site. As in analytical science, the underlying assumption seems to be
that the parts of a design would add up to an adequate representation
of the whole. This piecemeal approach may be valid for free-standing
mechanical systems with loosely coupled parts. But it seems
inappropriate for more organic earthen dams, for dynamic buildings at
seismic sites, or for high temperature material buried in rocks. The
context for each of these cases is vital: a changing or unstable earth.
If something does fail or does not function as intended or perform
as first expected, a set of unwritten rules comes into play. One is
the remedy prescribed for Teton and also for a nuclear waste
repository, to elaborate a structure by adding on more defenses.
Variations of this remedy are to make something bigger or to somehow
extend the control of a structure or system over its environment, as a
new dam was intended to do in Idaho.
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But to add more defenses or greater internal redundancy is to
ignore the possibility of new problems in some unforeseen combination
of events. For instance, no one imagined that trenches added in the
banks at Teton would allow water to seep through and cause hydraulic
fracturing as a new source of structural weakness. Enlarging a system
may also add new risks, as of dams failing in a series like dominoes.
Indeed, extensive water management systems have transformed the high
probability of small seasonal floods, once locally expected and
avoided, into a low but rising probability of unexpected catastrophes.
The related rule that bigger is better also assumes that a larger
structure will provide more control. This rule is reinforced by
considerations outside the technical domain. One example lay in
bypassing the most solid site for Teton and choosing one higher up that
permitted a larger reservoir to irrigate more land. This rule seems
implicit in the decision to aggregate nuclear waste in a few huge
repositories, not only to offset high overhead costs and limit the
areas to be contaminated but also, no doubt, to avoid political hassles
over many sites. This rule also assumes that there are no natural
limits, as did claims for failsafe dams at almost any site. Both
overlook the larger consequences if failures do occur.
Another implicit rule of engineering, which the public seems to
accept, is that engineering can solve all types of problems. In fact,
as exemplified by the Corps, engineers tend to respond to almost all
demands, accept problems pretty much as given, and seldom refer them to
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others or seek solutions outside their own domain. Even after Teton's
failure, experts did not question whether a dam should have been build
but only how it should have been designed.
Thus floods and droughts in Idaho were interpreted not as normal
climate variations but as an engineering problem. No one seems to have
thought of alternative remedies in the domain of organizations or
economics. For instance, flood damage can be reduced by limiting
farming on flood plains. To compensate farmers for losses in droughts,
a system of local insurance could have been adopted requiring earnings
in good years, in excess of some past average, to be set aside and
distributed in poor years, a remedy costing little to national
taxpayers.
This solution would have violated an implicit assumption, that
technological benefits increase without limits so that no stopping rule
is needed. Why limit agricultural production when another dam would
solve the problem? The IRG's neutrality on the future of nuclear power
implied such reasoning. Why forego its benefits when once an
engineering solution was found to nuclear waste, that solution could be
used for any amount? Again little thought was given to solutions in
other domains, such as stimulating energy conservation or developing
renewable sources.
The use of these rules is justified by a standard procedure,
benefit-cost analysis, which also fuels expectations of increasing
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benefits from technology. But as public challenges to Teton implied,
the knowledge used in these techniques is none too reliable. For
instance, analysts may estimate multiple benefits, such as from fishing
and recreation, that may be difficult to quantify precisely. For more
tangible benefits, such as increased value in agricultural production,
they must rely on data from the past or from other projects, but will
project these over a project's theoretical life of up to 100 years.
Yet no one could anticipate unprecedented events, such as the depressed
agricultural prices in the 1980s. Assuming permanent dams, costs of
repairs and final dismantling could also be ignored. Like physical
instruments in science, the tool of benefit-cost analysis is expected
to be precise and give reliable results; instead the results seem like
artists' creative sketches.
Engineers also rely on their organizations to provide reliable
knowledge. Yet the structure and routine procedures of large
organizations, considered essential for creating huge projects, may
accentuate limits in knowledge. For instance, dam making is commonly
divided into a temporal sequence of steps, first investigating the "is"
of existing conditions and then, given this data as input, deciding on
the "ought," or how a structure should be designed. General plans are
then fleshed out with detailed specifications, both sent down to
control construction under contractual arrangements.
Gaps in knowledge occur between steps in this process. As noted,
initial knowledge of site conditions may be incomplete. A chasm can
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also exist between the knowledge of designers and people at the
construction site, who may not understand the assumptions or intent of
designers. The latter gap is analogous to deriving knowledge from
models or theories in science.
But plans and specifications designed to flow forward in time and
control the actions of those below, constrain the acquisition of more
complete knowledge later, after a site is excavated. New knowledge
cannot flow up the organization and back, in a sense in time, to modify
what the designers knew in the past, so that they can fit the design to
site conditions. Top down organizational controls combined with
sequential engineering procedures keep the best knowledge available
from the design engineers.
On the other hand, when a large organization builds and operates
dams, its engineers are expected to be in charge and have adequate
knowledge throughout the life of a project. But even during design,
this is true only in a general sense. For instance, site investigation
may precede designation of a chief designer and then, as we noted,
design work is parcelled out to specialists, as on outlet or material
specifications, each expected to specify details of that particular
project. The chief engineer, formally in charge, can critically assess
their work only in a general way, somewhat theoretically, leaving a gap
between the completeness expected of his knowledge and what others
individually know. Once design is complete, he moves on to another
project and less competent engineers take over.
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Nor could design engineers know the details of how a structure is
actually build, given the heterogeneity of a site, even if they stayed
on and periodically inspected construction. Engineers working on
seismic aspects of buildings under contract to architects may not even
know about the final design, much less how the structure is build.
Thereafter, large organizations owning and operating projects are prone
to frequent changes of design personnel, so no one engineer supervises
a completed project for long. (Local operators may remain longer, but
their knowledge was ignored). When a structure remains longer than any
one man's life span, no one can ever know all about it. This
fragmentation of individual knowledge of large projects is no doubt a
major reason for treating the knowledge embedded in design documents as
sacred.
The drawings and specifications prepared by design engineers are
expected, like scientific theories, to be complete so that workmen will
know how to carry out all operations and deal with all contingencies.
Instead, as in the Bureau's justification for specifying only general
surface treatment, distant engineers cannot know local conditions as
well as those at the site, who were implicitly expected to use
discretion and judgment. Consistent with the rule that bigger is
better, the Teton crew simply added more grout to big cracks and caves.
Just as large organizations often subdivide complex tasks into
simpler ones, so engineering specifications generally break
construction into routine operations. These are tightly scheduled to
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keep costs close to the expectations raised in earlier benefit-cost
analyses. What does not fit into scheduled routines may be neglected
or ignored, as when workers preparing the surface at Teton fell behind
those laying the core and were forced to fill holes through pipes or to
leave voids.
Another convention is that design engineers must approve and
record changes in design documents before work is permitted to deviate
from specifications. When designers work in offices far from a site,
this procedure can take time; significant redesign causes even more
costly delays. These factors inhibit requests for changes and create a
dilemma for workers: to stick by the rules and ignore anomalies or
break the rules and use discretion. In any case, this procedural
requirement tends to suppress particular knowledge that does not fit
design assumptions, which are themselves required because earlier
knowledge was incomplete.
The conventional procedure of contracting with specialists to
attend to construction details also limits the knowledge available at
the site itself. Legal contracts discourage contractors from attending
to unusual site conditions; they will tend to go by the book or to
cover up deviations in order to protect themselves against breach of
contract and liability, as they did at Teton. Contractual arrangements
also can generate conflicts, as was illustrated by arguments over
interpretations of the Corp's quality control procedures, further
distracting attention from unique conditions. Adversarial relations
231
then replace cooperation in a system already fragmented by engineering
specialization and organizational divisions.
The FDS panel was aware of problems in the organizational setting,
which contributed to Teton's failure. It responded in a way that seems
at first to violate mainstream expectations. It emphasized that dam
building is an art. But that art is implicitly practiced primarily by
design engineers. They require an environment that facilitates the
interchange of ideas and information and guarantees continuity of
thought.' To achieve this, the panel endorsed new management
principles to govern dam safety, but added that the most competent
professionals in the agencies should oversee them. These men would set
an example of technical competence, expected to flow down to correct
improper attitudes and behavior throughout the agencies.
Underlying the talk about art is a conceptual model of engineering
consistent with mainstream expectations: engineers are responsible for
making safe dams and do so with a special kind of knowledge
inaccessible to laymen. This model splits the business of making dams
in two, with engineers possessing the attributes of artistry at the
top. Below are lesser beings who serve engineers in carrying out their
creative functions: managers, workmen, operators, even geologists
investigating a site. He shall later see two variations on this split
model.
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Another model, this time of engineering organization, is implicit
in the panel's expectations that the example of top dam safety officers
would filter down and influence those below, a model of organization
unlike that of the federal bureaucracy. It resembles the flat,
two-tiered structure of academia, where teachers and discussion leaders
provide examples and guide the work of those below in close and rather
informal interactions. That model was also reflected in OSTP's
organization for planning these projects, to be discussed. To the best
of our knowledge neither the model of artistry nor of academic
organization has affected mainstream engineering practice.
Turning now to look at procedures for detecting hazards in older
structures, more problems of knowledge appear. Not only do design
documents not reflect actual site conditions and how a structure was
built, but over time they may overlook matters later realized to be
relevant. Nuclear engineers realized this when they considered
mothballing old power plants; only engineers who had worked many years
at a plant had the detailed knowledge required. In this case, earlier
engineers had insufficient knowledge or imagination to anticipate what
they would need to know in the future. Similarly, new understanding
often reveals that old knowledge embedded in structures, dams or
seismic-proof buildings, once thought to be adequate, no longer is.
Past knowledge itself may be a poor guide to future knowledge. But
with little sense of history, both engineers and the public expect that
whatever is built by engineering rules will be safe.
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Identifying the hazards of older structures is even more
intractable than designing new ones. Weaknesses may be hidden within
or under a structure, giving few or only subtle clues of their
existence. Moreover detecting these by using sophisticated sensing
techniques by installing monitoring instruments, as in older dams, can
be prohibitively expensive.
Seismic engineers were never able to formulate codes for
inspecting the millions of hazardous older buildings in seismic areas.
When dam engineers contemplated the use of general guidelines for
inspecting the nations' largest dams, they encountered familiar
problems. Like theories or designs or general models of media for
nuclear waste, general inspection guidelines would be too gross to
apply to all high hazard dams with their particular histories and
unique qualities.
Some dam engineers saw a dilemma: ideally, only the most competent
professionals should inspect high hazard dams, but too few such
engineers existed to do a timely job. Writing specific guidelines
tailored to each dam would also take time; less qualified inspectors
might follow the rules by rote and miss significant factors. Even if
all civil engineers were offered the jobs, the most competent would
refuse out of a fear of liability and leave the work to fool-hardy
ones. The idea that local people might monitor local dams was ignored.
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In sum, the public generally shares the assumptions that the
knowledge embedded in rules and procedures is adequate and that all
structures designed or inspected by engineers are safe, until events
prove otherwise. When problems do appear, instead of using precise and
reliable knowledge, engineers tend to use rules of thumb, for example,
that bigger and more elaborate things will bring nature under control.
Such control is what the public has come to expect. Such responses
ignore the possibility of limits in nature and tend to amplify the
risks of large disasters. Techniques to justify these rules of thumb
and the benefits of technology, fail to anticipate future changes and
neglect important costs, including the cost of failure.
When engineers draw on their general knowledge for the design of
individual projects, they tend to depend on assumptions derived from
incomplete site investigations or on examples taken from other sites.
Specifications that they expected to be comprehensive and precise
enough to anticipate and effectively treat all contingencies are, like
predictions, too general to fit heterogeneous site conditions.
Moreover, organizational conditions subdivide knowledge for site
investigation, design, construction, and operation, so that no one
knows it all. Even the most complete knowledge available during
construction is subdivided, or deflected in attention to rules, or
suppressed.
Here, as we noted in science, are gaps between what is expected
and what engineers can deliver. Instead of completeness there is
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partial knowledge. Instead of precision are gross rules of thumb or
specifications too gross for the fine scale variations in particular
situations. Instead of internal coherence and consistency is
fragmentation. Instead of comprehensive solutions are narrow
engineering ones that ignore more effective remedies; instead of
reliability solutions are ones that may amplify risks.
How can we account for these flaws and gaps? Do they stem from
engineering hubris? Do they arise from limits in the way engineers see
the world? Or are they inherent in the very nature of engineering
itself? The answer may involve combinations of all three. Hubris may
account for claims of failsafe structures, for the desire to make
things bigger and more extensive and bring nature under control, and
even for the belief in solutions for all problems. Conversely, in some
instances, as in adding more defenses, engineers may simply want to
respond to public demands and assure greater safety. Engineers are
also part of a society that expects protection from even trivial
hazards and fails to recognize a stopping rule.
Some of these flaws and gaps seem grounded in engineers' hopes to
achieve the reliability claimed by predictive science. Engineering
perceptions are often similar to those of science. Both assume, for
instance, that complete descriptions are possible through deductions
from theory and by analysis, and that theoretical knowledge is somehow
superior to particular local knowledge. They share parallel beliefs
that all questions have answers and all problems solutions. Both tend
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to assume that the past is an adequate guide to the future and the
whole nothing more than the sum of the parts. And both pursue
specialized objective knowledge with poor understanding or even a
trained incapacity to understand matters in other domains, particularly
those dealing with the social reality.
The bureaucracies in which most engineers work no doubt influence
their perceptions. When functions, such as design, are parcelled out
to impersonal specialized roles, the human ability to imagine
combinations of factors is lost. Fragmented tasks performed according
to rules lead to making decisions piecemeal. When control and
communication flow down and only limited formal reports confirming
compliance flow up, the more complete knowledge at the bottom, fringes,
and outside of organizations is lost or suppressed.
Big organizations restrict the ability of even the most
imaginative at the top to recognize the weakness of general models,
formulas, and rules, or the limits of nature. In a kind of vicious
circle, the hubris -- or the responsiveness to public demands -- that
has led to larger projects has in turn led to a need to subdivide work
in the simplest, most rational way. Since design appears to be the
most vital function, responsible engineers have preserved it for
themselves, leaving the dirty work to less highly trained people. But
in doing so, they have separated themselves from and lost sight of the
physical reality where projects arise and exist and essential knowledge
is found.
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For such reasons, these kinds of engineering, which require close
continuous attention to local phenomena and a synthesized understanding
of a multitude of technical and social factors, have lost vital
qualities. Men no longer work together, making decisions at all
levels, and sharing responsibility, in the manner that some EHR
planners saw as essential for a safe environment. On the other hand,
if construction workers, for instance, were asked to participate more
fully, they would probably reject the unwanted responsibility, claim
inadequate knowledge, and express a preference for the existing order
of things. Other people might be bewildered by what would seem to be
the antithesis of rationality. So small, increasingly specialized, and
narrowly focussed elites at the top of bureaucracies are forced to
accept responsibility as their exclusive property, but are increasingly
trapped in an almost paralyzing fear of liability. He now move on to
the problem of bureaucracy itself.
Bureaucracy
As scientists are expected to create theories to provide reliable,
predictive knowledge and as engineers are expected to provide reliable
rules and procedures for creating failsafe artifacts, so bureaucracy is
expected to convert both science and engineering into reliable
policies, plans, and practices, in this case to manage technological
risk.
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This section focusses on efforts of OSTP to overcome the
dysfunctions of bureaucracy, which seem to have impeded the federal
government's responsiveness to particular hazards. We first describe
what is general expected of bureaucracy and has made it a most enduring
form of organization, and then illustrate how these expectations were
violated. We then describe a set of OSTP strategies for planning and
management to overcome bureaucratic dysfunctions, some of the
difficulties these encountered, and OSTP's responses. Our analysis
reveals another conceptual model parallel to the earlier model of dam
engineering. Finally, we consider some complementarities and parallels
among bureaucracy, science, and engineering. Now to the ideal of
bureaucracy.
From the classical literature and some later theoretical work on
organizations, one would expect bureaucracy to provide an orderly and
cohesive structure, with internal parts that cooperate and communicate
openly with one another in order to make rational decisions and carry
them out in practice. One would expect government bureaucracy,
especially, to be attentive and responsive to hazards in its
environment, in order to protect the public from harm, and also that
there would be a leader in charge and accountable.
But as OSTP began these three projects, it faced many symptoms of
bureaucratic dysfunctions of the sort that are also acknowledged in the
literature and that led the federal bureaucracy to fail to meet such
expectations. For instance, there was structural fragmentation.
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Responsibility for federal dams was divided among eighteen agencies
operating under a pattern of authority marked by gaps and overlaps. As
many as 100 federal programs relevant to emergencies and disasters were
scattered throughout the bureaucracy.6 Almost a score of departments
or agencies had interests in the management of nuclear waste.
Fragmentation also existed within agencies, as it did in the Bureau of
Reclamation or in ERDA, which treated sources and types of waste in
incompatible ways.
Instead of one leader in charge, even on a single large dam
project, responsibility was dispersed, as discussed above. Two
agencies, NSF and USGS, were mainly in charge of dealing with the
hazards of earthquakes. Leadership on the hazards of nuclear waste was
split three ways in a complex relationship among NRC, ERDA, and EPA,
raising questions about which was in charge.
As is typical of fragmented systems, internal communication was
poor. USGS field workers in Idaho could not talk directly with and
warn the Bureau's local engineer. Officials in major dam agencies
seldom spoke with one another. Agencies refused to report on programs
relevant to mitigating seismic hazards.' Those planning for military
waste were unaware of programs for commercial waste and of USGS
findings.*
Governmental fragmentation engendered inconsistent practices. Dam
agencies differed in their styles of engineering, for instance using
240
either spillways or outlets to handle floods. Various agencies set
different seismic standards for construction. Military waste was
exempt from the licensing procedures applied to similar commercial
waste. Over time ERDA's policy shifted between burial and surface
storage.
Competition rather than cooperation had long marked the
relationship among dam building agencies and those vying for funds for
treating seismic hazards. A desire for secrecy rather than openness
was evident in the reluctance of dam officials to talk about practical
problems or to evaluate their own procedures. The energy agency had
long hidden problems, such as leaks at nuclear waste storage sites,
while ERDA research managers defensively responded to criticism and
referred to themselves as "us versus them." Open hostility marked
relations between USGS and ERDA/DOE. Such competition and
defensiveness, hostility and secrecy, did little to overcome the
bureaucratic dysfunctions of fragmentation and inconsistency, nor did
it foster communication and understanding of potential risks.
OSTP responded to this situation in a number of ways, as we will
document. First it evidently tried to serve as a model of bureaucratic
rationality in its arrangement for these projects and its own operating
style. Consistent with its position at the top of the federal
establishment, it initially displayed an open and democratic style of
leadership. Consistent with its mission, it placed high priority on
scientific and technical matters. A major strategy was to sever
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technical matters from non-technical ones, apparently to free them from
the contamination of bureaucratic dysfunctions and politics.
OSTP's most interesting strategies seem aimed at overcoming or
correcting bureaucratic dysfunctions. Its implicit intent was
apparently to force bureaucracy to speak in one voice, as it is
expected to do. The first strategy, to overcome fragmentation, defuse
competition, and improve communication for planning, was to gather
representatives from all agencies and ask them to work together as
co-equals. To foster a cohesive approach to hazards, a second strategy
was to clearly articulate in public documents the general objectives of
new programs. A third strategy, for management, was to put a leader
clearly in charge of these programs. Evidence for each of these
strategies will be presented in turn. Then we discuss the unexpected
difficulties and surprises that OSTP encountered and its responses.
OSTP's style of operating exemplified what is expected of
bureaucracy. As an agency created by Congress to serve the President,
it responded to problems as given, as engineers tend to do, and
accepted the remedies proposed by Congress or in Presidential memos.
It was also responsive to Carter's policy of "openness," bringing in
outsiders to review its work on dam safety, adopting procedures for
"going public" in EHR, and adding public hearings and policy review for
NW. OSTP demonstrated the openness of its own decision processes by
putting everything in writing, leaving a "paper trail" of memos, notes
on meetings, and annotated drafts in the files. The reasoning and
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responsiveness of the nuclear waste planners was made even more
accessible by weaving public comments and IRG responses into their
final published report.
To structure its work in the orderly manner expected of
bureaucracy, OSTP organized three groups for each project somewhat on
the federal model of checks and balances. Advisory groups performed a
function like judicial review, or like peer review in science and
engineering, overseeing the work of groups of agency representatives.
These functioned somewhat like legislatures and will be discussed
later. OSTP performed the executive function; Philip Smith served as
director of the FDS and EHR projects. However, on the nuclear waste
project, OSTP initially shared leadership with other members of the
steering group, working closely with Deutch or DOE, chairman of the
IRG, but in the end it clearly assumed an informal leadership role.
To make work more manageable, tasks were initially divided and
parcelled out, as is the custom in bureaucracy, so that ICODS's
specialized subcommittees wrote parts of the FDS guidelines, each
member of the EHR working group dealt with a specialized type of issue,
and six task groups were organized to produce parts of the IRG's policy
document.
To handle technical matters, OSTP hired consultants as specialized
staff for each project but reserved for itself the more delicate task
of dealing with the bureaucracy. Staff work began with the analytical
243
approach characteristic of science. The problem of dam safety was
divided into 16 items for agency surveys; the planning group attempted
to collect a comprehensive list of separate issues in EHR; while OSTP
analyzed alternative technical strategies, policy options, and problems
of knowledge in NW. In each case, the planners seemed to expect that
analysis would sufficiently characterize the "is" of the problem and
give sufficient knowledge to a larger group so that it could make sound
decisions in prescribing the "ought" of a solution.
Consistent with its mission, OSTP focussed on scientific matters
and distinguished these from administrative, organizational,
institutional, and political concerns. The split between technical and
administrative matters was clearly demonstrated in FDS by the decision
to create only administrative guidelines, leaving technical matters to
the discretion of engineers at the top, who would supervise less
competent engineers below and modify the rules as engineering knowledge
advanced to prevent them from becoming obsolete under bureaucratic
inertia.
In dealing with earthquakes, seismologists had long set themselves
apart from seismic engineers with their diffuse interests in organizing
for seismic safety. To protect themselves from the threat of a
negative public response, in the mid-1970s the seismologists sharply
distinguished their scientific statements about predictions from
"warnings" for subsequent actions by public officials. Although OSTP
brought together scientists, engineers, and building officials to plan
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administrative and social programs, the USGS made separate plans for
technical research without public review.
NW planners made a finer set of distinctions, setting technical
matters apart at the top, implicitly ranking administrative decision
making second, followed by organizational and institutional matters,
with politics at the bottom. This was evident in the IRG report, which
only summarized the technical discussion of the status of knowledge but
elaborated the options and procedures for decisions, and relegated
organizational and intractable institutional issues to brief concluding
chapters. Technical issues were to be clearly separated from
contentious political ones. Scientific research was to precede
administrative decision making and sites were to be selected on the
basis of explicit technical criteria, developed by DOE and untarnished
by political concerns. Some members of the IRG even feared that a
criteria of regional distribution would undermine technical judgments.
Consistent with the IRG's approach, later legislation spelled out
elaborate decision making procedures, left details of the technical
process to the agencies, and deferred political judgments to the end.
OSTP's major strategy to overcome bureaucratic dysfunctions of
administrative fragmentation, poor communication, and competition was
to create three different representative systems. In each case,
departments and agencies were asked to designate delegates, to work
together on the FDS steering group of ICODS, in EHR, and on the IRG in
NW. Rather than compete for resources, agencies were expected to
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contribute mid-level staff, often formally on loan, to work together on
the planning, as staff did on the ICODS subcommittees, the EHR working
group, and the IRG task groups. To facilitate communication, members
met fairly frequently and informally face-to-face for free and open
discussion.
To achieve consensus in NW, in addition to frequent meetings, OSTP
used a time-consuming and rather impersonal process of re-circulating
drafts of documents to members of various groups, until the number and
diversity of comments abated, giving the appearance of consensus.
Equal voice was given to staff and top officials as it might be in a
seminar in an academic model of organization. In all these groups,
agency officials and staff were expected to behave not like advocates
for the missions of their agencies but like interdisciplinary teams of
professionals dedicated to larger objectives,9 in the expectation
that these teams would eventually find one voice.
OSTP's second strategy to overcome bureaucratic dysfunctions and
assure one voice in the management of these hazards was to produce
general documents expressing bureaucracy's intentions, about
engineering rules, federal plans, or an administrative policy. These
written statements would not deal with substantive technical details,
which were better left to the discretion of engineers and scientists.
Even on administrative matters, they would of necessity be broad and
general in order to apply to many agencies with diverse missions and to
be flexible enough to guide decisions for years to come.
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A final OSTP strategy was to place a leader in charge, who would
manage subsequent programs. Two offices were created in FEMA for these
leaders. Half a dozen additional offices were created for FDS at the
top of departments or agencies. All of the leaders would have no
specific powers. Yet they were exhorted to flesh out specific rules
and regulations appropriate to the work of each agency. The agencies
FDS were also instructed to maintain extensive documentation and
permanent files on every phase of decision making on a project, such as
records of all assumptions, of judgments made on the basis of technical
studies, and of discarded design alternatives.
The lead agency for EHR was placed in FEMA over staff objections
no doubt to avoid favoring either USGS scientists or NSF engineers and
refueling competition, but also to strengthen the new agency. The new
leader's first task was to draw up detailed plans to be implemented by
individual agencies. He was also expected to work with agency
officials and persuade them to adopt consistent seismic standards to
modify programs at all levels, such as those of HUD for rehabilitating
buildings or DOT's on retrofitting bridges. Later FEMA saw its role in
planning to manage a post-quake crisis as spelling out rules on what
agencies should make what decisions and how.
DOE became lead agency for NW before the IRG was set up to change
the impression that responsibility was split between the NRC and ERDA.
However, OSTP wanted a lead person to be designated on an interim basis
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in the President's Office, to oversee DOE and other agencies in
implementing the policy. That person would also work with the State
Planning Council on the process of "consultation and concurrence," to
help the whole federal system achieve one voice.
But OSTP ran into unexpected difficulties and surprises with all
these plans and strategies. In its determination to separate technical
matters from non-technical ones, it must have been shocked by the FDS
panel's talk of artistry to deal with irreducible uncertainty and to
synthesize technical and non-technical considerations. OSTP was
frustrated in its analytical approach when separate EHR issues did not
add up to a tidy whole but left residual governmental and social
issues. NW policy analysts were no doubt upset when a set of simple
criteria generated an array of policy options and forced them to select
four among them somewhat arbitrarily.
More critical was the failure to achieve unity among
representative groups at the top. The surprising resistance to
risk-based techniques in FDS fueled debates that persisted into the
subsequent program in FEMA. Members of the EHR steering group argued
over where the lead agency should be placed, and a larger debate
simmered between those who would have a decentralized program and those
who favored top down command and control. But the real crisis came
when the President, for political reasons, vetoed the keystone of the
plan, abetted by 0MB with bureaucratic interest in fiscal
conservatism. Most horrifying to Frank Press, a leading seismologist,
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must have been OBM's threat to cut funds for his particular kind of
scientific research.
OSTP, bent on avoiding bureaucratic politics on NW, seemed
surprised when new conflicts broke out after public review of the
policy document. The disintegration of consensus within the IRG was
attributed to members' reluctance to express reservations initially in
the interest of an early consensus.'' More likely officials were
later persuaded to fight for positions consistent with their particular
agencies' interests. Deutch no doubt also yielded to political
persuasion within his agency and in Congress, as he rose through the
DOE bureaucracy. After he defected from the IRG, the steering group
fell apart, and staff became unavailable to work with OSTP. Not even
the President could block Congressional funds for WIPP. Thereafter,
the Iran crisis and coming elections probably distracted supporters
from backing OSTP's implementation plan. So politics, bureaucratic,
Congressional, electoral, and international, thwarted OSTP's rational
planning.
OSTP itself often responded to crises in a political manner. In
FDS it insisted on the development and use of risk analysis. Without a
comprehensive EHR plan and facing a time limit for planning, OSTP
abandoned the teamwork approach for an executive style, calling
together high level officials from departments and agencies, but only
once, and requesting them to submit suggestions for adapting their
programs for EHR. After circulating drafts of a composite plan for
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review, OSTP met one-on-one with them in their offices to iron out
problems, using its aura of White House power to persuade them to sign
off. Then faced with the loss of funds for research, it apparently
engaged in backroom politics, undocumented in the files, and yielded to
OMB the lead office's power of budget review, once considered so
essential. Like the rest of bureaucracy, OSTP's main interest was in
the survival of its mission. One can imagine what would have happened
to the Director's status, had he lost support for seismological
research.
OSTP responded to Deutch's defection not by turning to peers, but
to the top, expecting the Chief executive, as ultimate leader and
teacher, to resolve remaining issues reasonably, in its favor. To its
surprise, he resolved the policy choice between selecting a first site
from 2 to 3 or from 4 to 5 options mathematically, suggesting a
compromise of 3 to 4. OSTP was then forced to spell out the
philosophical differences between its slow scientific approach and
DOE's more rapid practical one. OSTP took over, negotiating,
brokering, and arbitrating until an hour before the President announced
the policy.
OSTP maintained that the best way to achieve consensus among
diverse interests on contentious issues was by free and open
communication.12 But ironically it used another kind of political
ploy in NW to achieve consensus, one that could be called "bureaucratic
language games" or "fogging."1 3 The IRG documents were full of
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obfuscating words and phrases, borrowed or invented, and substituted
for simpler straightforward language.
For example, policy options were labelled "interim strategic
planning basis" to avoid their being treated as subject to
environmental policy review, and phrased so abstractly that even IRG
members had confused the differences between options. Spent fuel,
which utilities preferred to consider a resource to be reprocessed
rather than a waste, was subsumed under "High Level Waste" for
technical reasons; a more likely motive was to dampen debates that
arose from the mere mention of "spent fuel." WIPP was called a
"conceptual facility" for experimental disposal of spent fuel to avoid
legal questions about an advanced project that had not met required
licensing procedures. 14 Military waste was often called "DOE Waste,"
a confusing phrase since DOE dealt with all types of waste. Military
waste could not be licensed for "security reasons," although licensing
would not directly harm national security.
This kind of language is not consistent with aims of science,
which coins terms as a kind of shorthand for greater efficiency and
precision; the intention seems more to mask contentious matters, to
avoid or suppress time-consuming debates, and to expedite speaking,
however unclearly, in one voice. The months of haggling among agencies
competing for control of the final words in the policy suggests that
this aim was not achieved.
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OSTP's intent of producing clear and consistent statements of
objectives floundered in the other two programs as well. A difficulty
with this approach, recognized by Tschantz, was that general guidelines
were tantamount to saying nothing, while specific ones could impose
hardships on smaller agencies without the resources to comply. The
result was an ambiguous document, requiring bureaucratic procedures but
also encouraging consensus building and teamwork. Difficulties
stemming from generalities were also apparent in OSTP's plan for EHR.
It ignored the issues so painstakingly assembled and called mainly for
adjustments in federal agency programs; it was so general that Thiel
thought it would be laughed off the Hill.
The strategy of putting a leader in charge did not fare much
better. The leaders of both FDS and EHR burned out and retired.
Moreover almost a decade later all three programs show evidence of
persistent bureaucratic dysfunctions; continued fragmentation, poor
communication, conflicts, secrecy and hiding, and neglect of hazards.
Dam safety became a specialized responsibility of a few at the top,
meeting less frequently and less actively and quibbling on technical
matters or holding back in fear of liability, leaving the future
uncertain after they retire. The most tangible results lower down are
more paperwork, of the sort once blamed for distracting engineers from
essential work, and more written rules, honored more in principle than
practice.
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A fragmented earthquake prediction system is unlikely to take
timely action even if a socially useful prediction is made. The most
practical federal program for EHR is hidden in secrecy, its goal to
protect defense facilities, not civilians. FEMA's plan for command and
control after a crisis is not only inappropriate but may stifle local
initiative. Its new airplane to give information to the press seems
intended to keep the press from scrutinizing military operations
control, rather than aiding the victims.
The fragmented treatment of nuclear wastes continues with little
practical action. Conflicts persist between USGS and DOE, which is
accused of lack of responsiveness, hiding and secrecy. Dialogues with
States have broken down in controversies and lawsuits about the
procedures themselves, while DOE leaders claim no technical problems
and blame electoral politics.
What explains these events? What conceptual model underlay OSTP's
set of strategies and operating style? Apparently, its idea of how to
make bureaucracy effective in managing risk was through an open
consensual democratic planning process at the top. Then management
officials would rationalize bureaucratic performance by requiring
technical experts, free of political influence and ultimately in
control, to use technical procedures, and by establishing rules for
command and control from below. Indeed, it appears that OSTP was
planning not so much for the management of technological risk as for
the management of the bureaucracy.
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Underlying these strategies seems to be a split image of
bureaucracy, like the FDS panel's split image of artistry. A double
standard existed, for different levels, for those at the top and those
below. At the top, fragmentation would be overcome through a
representative system engaged in continuous informal dialogue until
divergent views were synthesized to give the impression of one voice.
That voice would then be embedded in consistent and uniform policies,
plans, or guidelines, giving bureaucracy the stability and continuity
expected of it. These written statements would take on a life of their
own, under a leader or lead agency installed to tend to them, still
working with a group of peers. Since the leaders would have little
authority to carry out policies and plans or enforce guidelines, they
must use powers of persuasion.
What happened below would be different. Lower level officials
would be encouraged to spell out generalities with additional written
rules and to fill the gaps with procedures to fit specialized missions
and to modify routines at all levels. Clear documentation would make
the rules accessible, so that everyone would know how decisions had
been or should be made. In this way, nothing would be left to chance
or politics or low level discretion. For instance, decisions on
individual NW sites could never be made on an informal case-by-case
basis but only after numerous technical studies and bureaucratic
reviews. Thus consistency and rationality would be assured.
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OSTP's operating style was the essence of technical rationality;
its intent was to make things uniform and consistent, orderly and
predictable. Matters would be subdivided and subjected to formal
analysis, based on explicit and often measurable criteria. Decisions
would be technical in the sense of not being open to political
interference. The results would then be incorporated into such clear
and simple procedures that even idiots could be held accountable in
carrying them out.
This model of effective bureaucracy complements and parallels
science and engineering in several ways. Bureaucracy complements
science by stimulating the growth of theoretical knowledge through
support for basic research and by fostering its use in practical
applications. Nuclear science and great dams supported by the federal
bureaucracy have given it prestige around the world. Prediction
research is expected to have a two-fold value, as the USGS pointed
out: to add to human understanding in general and in applications, to
inform and supplement engineering in saving lives. The same double
value was expected of risk analysis, to supply a new way of
understanding hazards and for making decisions on how to abate them.
Moreover, society supports these functions in the expectation that
government could and should protect it from harm.
The hierarchical structure of bureaucracy also complements
science, by facilitating the flow of knowledge like water downhill, as
OSTP expected, and into applications. Research on risk analysis would
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flow into dam engineering and geologic research into engineering for
NW. According to some EHR planners, influential professionals must
help guide the transference of basic knowledge into applications
outside of bureaucracy.
Parallels also exist among science, engineering, and bureaucracy.
As in OSTP's strategy for bureaucracy, science and engineering used
small groups at the top to decide upon theory, judge the validity of
hypothesis, set technical standards, or for peer review. For example,
a few nabobs of American geology rejected Wegoner's theory; a small
group in NEPEC would validate prediction research and in FEMA create
technical standards for dams the only way it could, by a consensus of
individual judgments.
As bureaucracy tried to free technical matters from administrative
and political interference, so scientists and engineers also tried to
stifle purely personal motives, biases, institutional considerations,
or unprofessional behavior. This was the intent of ethical guidelines
in seismology and of professional development programs in FDS.
Scientists, bureaucrats and engineers also seemed to expect that
the use of agreed upon analytical methods, specific criteria, or
legitimate procedures would add up to assure reliable results. For
instance, if seismologists used the methods of science properly and met
quantitative criteria on the magnitude, time window, and probability,
NEPEC could be confident about issuing predictions. If numerous risk
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analyses reached similar conclusions, the results could be expected to
be valid. CEQ seemed to believe that technical accuracy would be
assured if all can agree upon legitimate procedures.6
Furthermore, as scientists expect to predict the future by
deducing testable hypotheses from theories, and as engineers expect to
control uncertainty with artifacts devised from principles, so human
behavior in bureaucracies is expected to follow logically from
policies, plans, and procedures and become predictable. Bureaucracies
have no place for behavior that does not fit the rules any more than
theories have for rare and unusual phenomena. If something goes wrong
and technological accidents happen, bureaucracy turns not only to
science to explain the past but also turns critically on itself to
learn what rules have been broken and what new ones are needed, as it
did after Teton's failure.
In conclusion, as science seeks internally consistent theories
about the natural world and engineers would create comprehensive
designs, so bureaucrats would make coherent generalized policies and
plans for organizations. All can be seen as ways of knowing, of
describing, explaining, and controlling the physical and social world,
or variations on one way of knowing the nature of the world.
Meanwhile, reports on risk analysis as a tool for decision making do
not bode well. But many experts still considered probabilistic
methods, to be discussed in the next section, as a panacea for managing
technological risk.
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Retreat to Probabilistic Knowledge
When science could not deliver thtdeterministic knowledge
expected, in each case bureaucracy fell back to expect more reliable
results from a different kind of knowledge, probabilistic or
statistical knowledge. This retreat was obvious in OSTP's demand for
such knowledge from risk analysis.
This section first describes the way our engineers and some
scientists used simple statistical methods and more complex
techniques. It looks closely at the NW planners' approach to models of
risk in their search for reliable predictive knowledge and then at
their retreat from these. Next it considers what a societal judgment
on acceptable risk might mean in practice. The conclusions suggest a
third split model, this time of society and its knowledge as a whole.
Statistics is a way of describing things mathematically and of
substituting a few quantitative relationships for qualitative
descriptions. Underlying all statistics is the concept of a normal
frequency distribution; if we had all possible data, it would cluster
in a pattern within a limited range around some central measure or
norm. On this assumption, statistics are applied to samples to produce
generalizations about what can normally be expected. But statistics
also make possible estimates about the frequency (if not the range) of
extremes and predictions of their probability. Thus the uncertainty of
knowledge can theoretically be bounded.
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Simple statistics have long been used by engineers as input into
their formulas for design. Dam engineers, for instance, used data on
recent rainfall to estimate the maximum probable flood that a dam might
have to handle once in a thousand years; they usually added a margin of
error of a factor or more. However, as in deterministic science, their
knowledge might be too gross; aggregate regional data neglected heavy
local storms, now recognized as a cause of failure. Or samples might
be too small, as was 20 years of data on the snow above Teton.
Observations for a century or more did not provide knowledge of
earthquakes with cycles of many hundreds of years. Again the past was
an insufficient guide but it is all that anyone could reliably know.
Seismic engineers, in their uncertainty about future earthquakes,
even turned to tables of random numbers, which statisticians have
devised, for input into some of their formulas for design. As an ERDA
offocial remarked, engineers do not need the precise numbers required
in science; approximate, even random, numbers will do, especially with
conservative design.
Statistics are sometimes misused inadvertently, often to support a
position. For example, in the early 1970s dam officials wished to show
that a recent cluster of failures and near failures was unusual; the
average rate of failure of all large dams had decreased from .0027 per
dam per year before 1940 to .0007 thereafter, because of improved
engineering. This data implies that failures will soon end. However,
the method ignored contextual factors, such as the fact that dams are
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aging and newer ones are built on poorer sites with greater economies,
as costs rise. Thus a gap arose between the simplicity of their
analysis and a more complete representation of the situation.
OSTP hoped that risk analysis in conjunction with benefit-cost
analysis would curb dam construction, but seemed unaware of some simple
mathematics. A layman can understand that if a low probability of, for
instance, .0004 (extrapolated from the trend above), were applied to a
billion dollar loss in one year, the "cost" would be only $400,000 the
first year and would decrease thereafter, due to the convention of
discounting future values. This cost would not appreciably offset the
value assigned to benefits from a multimillion dollar project,
especially if analysts massaged the data and parameters.
More sophisticated statistical techniques are used in risk
assessments to calculate the probability of unprecedented failures of a
particular artifact. Such analyses commonly require identification of
all contributing factors as independent variables and the assignment of
probabilities to significant factors. Federal dam officials, who had
willingly used simple statistics, validly criticized risk assessments
for dams: they could not assume the independence of factors in failures
nor even make a comprehensive list of all causal factors, as the case
of Teton suggested. Implicitly they had a model of dams that was more
organic than mechanistic. The expected accuracy of this kind of
analysis collapsed under the limits in their professional understanding
of dam failure.
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Seismic engineers were more enthusiastic about using these
techniques, perhaps because they considered structural elements in
free-standing buildings to be more independent than the layers of fill
in a dam. In principle they could calculate the probability of failure
of each component and what effect strengthening it would have on the
total cost and the probability of failure. But the parts do not add up
so straightforwardly. It is not possible to model accurately the
performance of a complex configuration of parts in dynamic
interrelationships under wide ranges of seismic conditions. Here again
a gap arose between the theoretical possibilities of these techniques
and the grossness of the models in practice.
On one point the seismic engineers were insistent: whenever risk
analysis was used, the public or public officials must have the final
say on the acceptable level of risk. They did not spell out how this
sould work in practice. Less publicly, they simply defined acceptable
risk as an acceptable number of fatalities.1
Risk analysis is seldom used on older structures because internal
conditions are difficult to observe. Loathe to inspect them on a
case-by-case basis due to the risk of liability, engineers and building
inspectors have reverted to statistics in a simpler form, classifying
buildings by material, age, and other factors, and aggregating data to
arrive at probabilities of failures for various types of structures.
The number of structures and the potential losses in some cities and
states is so great that an expensive federal program seemed to be the
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only remedy. Meanwhile local public officials could forego programs to
deal with individual buildings because the problem was too large for
local remedies.
Current models assessing the probabilities that critical
facilities would fail in an earthquake could not yet trace out the
consequences, especially from tertiary effects, such as a fire storm
from the explosion of liquified gas, leaving the magnitude of
catastrophes almost unbounded. Incidentally, the "yet" or an
equivalent modifier often used in discussing these techniques shows
that analysts recognized gaps in the performance of these models but
were optimistic that the gaps would soon be overcome.
Seismologists also had high hopes for statistical knowledge in
especting that earthquake prediction would become as reliable as
weather forecasting. The analogy ignores the fact that seismic
phenomena are not so easy to observe and that seismic events are
scattered and infrequent; at least it implies that many errors were
expected! These scientists also wanted to assign probabilities to all
predictions; then they realized that such numbers on long range
predictions would be little more than guesses until enough successes
provided statistical confidence in their methods.
To advance its cause, the seismic community combined in one
statement the high probability of future earthquakes and the aggregate
consequences as statistics might do, rather than treating matters
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case-by-case. FEMA chose the aggregate approach, ignoring the low
probability that any particular individual or community would be
harmed. Individuals and small groups could not be relied upon for
hazard mitigation; decisions should be made only by those looking down
at the big picture.
Nuclear waste planners were most enthusiastic about risk
assessment. They realized that engineering experience, experiments,
and prototype testing were insufficient to eliminate all
uncertainties. When they could not get the predictive knowledge they
needed from the earth scientists, they turned to mathematical models in
the hope of analyzing the uncertainties and assessing the risks. They
seemed to expect earth scientists to aggregate data about geologic
areas, describe them generally, and characterize how types of sites
would normally behave over thousands of years. These descriptions
could then be used as model for assigning probabilities and predicting
risk.
But even the first step in such analyses was difficult. To
analyze modes of failure required a combination of scientific
reasoning, engineering experience, and intuition. Moreover, the
ability to build the necessary mathematical models was limited.
However, that ability was deemed sufficient to limit or "bound" some
uncertainties, e.g., to estimate reasonable upper limits and test the
significance of many variables. Lab and field research and
conservative engineering could reduce many uncertainties. In spite of
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residual unknowns, OSTP concluded that knowledge would be adequate to
assure isolation for up to a few thousand years.
Attacked for rationalizing a wish to proceed rapidly, OSTP backed
off from these techniques. It admitted that the methods had inherent
limitations and should not be used uncritically, but no other approach
to risk was available. OSTP insisted that its analyses, unlike
previous ones, would not be about idealized repositories, but about
actual sites. These planners seemed oblivious to OSTP's conclusions in
FDS, that risk analyses could not yet be applied to individual dams, a
familiar technology with many examples. This myopia is not surprising,
since OSTP treated dams, earthquakes, and nuclear waste as unique types
of problems and transferred few lessons from one to another.
Typical of its analytical approach, OSTP even classified the kinds
of uncertainties in these analyses. Uncertainties arose from five
types of problems: a lack of data, of experience, and essentially of
imagination to identify all scenarios of release. A fourth problem was
due to the variability in nature and a fifth to an inability to predict
natural processes and "social evolution." The greatest uncertainty
arose about social behavior or "future institutions" but could be
reduced by choosing a site without valuable resources assuming that
humans will always want only the resources valued today.
OSTP then fell back to a new position. In its conclusions on the
status of knowledge, it dropped all references to risk analysis.
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Instead, it emphasized that new information during each step in
creating a repository, from excavation until it was "decommissioned,"
would resolve uncertainties and would "permit" reevaluation of risks.
Yet even after a repository was sealed, some uncertainty would always
remain. It concluded: "Thus, in addition to a technical evaluation, a
social judgment that considers the level of risk and the associated
uncertainty will be necessary. "7
This statement suggests that the planners retreated from
probabilistic knowledge to a social judgment as a way of handling
residual uncertainties that escaped technical characterization. Did
they mean that all members of society should make decisions and share,
as was suggested in EHR? Did they intend that those at the top would
use a kind of artistry to synthesize social judgments with technical
ones, as the FDS panel suggested? Or did they use this phrase only
rhetorically, to mask despair? There is little evidence for the first
two possibilities. These planners ignored, except in principle, strong
public demands for more participation. They did not knowledge artistry
in engineering or anywhere else, but relied on the mainstream model of
decisions based on technical considerations and formal procedures.
How would a social judgment work in practice? We propose a kind
of thought experiment. If a repository site is ever selected, under
what conditions would the public have any say? On the basis of what
knowledge? From what we know of bureaucracy, we may expect that
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the public's role would be tightly circumscribed and its knowledge
would be limited.
Imagine this as a plausible scenario. EPA uses risk analysis not
just as a tool but as a decision rule. It will require a risk analysis
for environmental impact reviews as part of licensing procedures on any
site and will compare the summary number on the level of risk to its
standard for acceptable risk. These analyses will perforce be highly
speculative. But few if any technical people will be able to
critically assess the assumptions and methods hidden behond elaborate
mathematical models and couched in technical terms drawn from many
specialized fields.
Moreover, the analysis will be based on general design assumptions
since the engineered barriers are to be tailored to a particular site.
But DOE will insist that with conservative engineering the repository
performance will meet or exceed EPA's standard by conservative
engineering, and will support this assertion with fogging language that
confuses even insiders. The public and its representatives will do as
they must with seismic risk maps -- accept technical assessments and
expert opinions on faith. Ultimately, various kinds of politics will
be used to force all to sign off and DOE will proceed to construct with
bureaucratic momentum.
But what of OSTP's claim that new information during construction
and repository filling "will permit" the reassessment of risks? Who
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will listen to the construction workers who have direct access to new
data? What will become of information acquired after formal reviews
are completed, especially if it undermines more optimistic assumptions
in the analyses and in the design? The story of Teton suggests that
even if there is evidence of high risks to workers or the public, this
knowledge will be lost or suppressed.
Was the phrase "social judgment" inserted just as another fogging
strategy, to sugarcoat OSTP's despair about the magnitude of technical
uncertainty? Perhaps. The planners certainly believed that "in
principle," licensing procedures would provide some safeguards. But
they failed to visualize how the process might work in practice; they
ignored the combination of institutional factors that allow technicians
and bureaucrats to make important decisions.
Underlying the limited understanding of these planners appears to
be a conceptual model about the social reality, parallel to OSTP's
split model of bureaucracy and that of engineering artistry. Here,
scientists and policy makers are at the top, set apart from all others,
especially from those outside bureaucracy. This is the sort of model
of man and society that FEMA espoused, about knowledge and
responsibility exclusively at the top for making decisions about
technological hazards.
At the top, scientists are also free to do basic research. The
knowledge flows down and is disseminated but only to leading decision
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makers and public officials. Ordinary people below cannot understand
the nature of hazards, will not attend even to their own safety, will
panic if they are not told what to do, and expect Big Government to
protect them. Therefore tthe public should not be informed of hazards,
such as impending earthquakes, until bureaucrats have made elaborate
plans and institutionalized controls.
Even those who had advocated shared responsibility for earthquake
hazards decided later that it was useless to give the public a voice on
acceptable levels of seismic risk, because if only one person died in
an earthquake, people would declaim their earlier decision, and attack
engineers and public officials. Essentially, the experts should keep
their knowledge secret and make their own decisions on risks until
authoritarian programs were in place to control the public reaction.
This is a frightening prospect.
To conclude this first half of our analysis, we have seen how the
variable nature of the physical reality thwarted expectations of using
generalized knowledge and scientific tools for prediction and control.
Engineering rules of thumb and procedures of bureaucratic organizations
exacerbated risks. Rational planning and management strategies fell
afoul of bureaucratic dysfunctions and fell back on politics.
Planners operating on mainstream models of science, engineering,
and bureaucracy were tripped up by new problems and trapped in
dilemmas. Many become confused, as American scientists were in China,
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or frightened, as FEMA was by the California program, or in despair
about inadequate knowledge for isolating nuclear waste. But new
institutional arrangements proposed may only suppress other kinds of
knowledge, social arrangements, and planning useful for dealing with
technological risks. We now turn to examples of alternatives in the
case studies.
Alternative Kinds of Knowledge
In diagnosing the problem as gaps between expectations and what is
delivered by mainstream science, engineering, and bureaucracy, the
question becomes how to fill these gaps. Scientists might shovel in
basic research, but if each question answered raises a dozen more,
theirs is an endless task. Engineers might build bridges, but these
will collapse if gaps widen. Bureaucracy would erect walls to hide the
gaps and order people away. A partial remedy is of course to lower
expectations and recognize that knowledge can never be perfectly
certain or complete and the past is an inadequate guide but all we have.
But more is needed. This section will discuss other kinds of
knowledge, their nature, purposes, and conditions under which they are
acquired. These conditions seem to involve particular kinds of social
arrangements, then discussed. Such social arrangements facilitates a
kind of planning more appropriate to dealing with technological risk.
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Our case studies revealed other kinds of knowledge that may fill
gaps or span chasms. In the messy reality at dams were four kinds of
useful knowledge: the intimate knowledge of familiar phenomena acquired
over time by local people, the feel of skillful workmen in handling
what cannot be observed directly or known with certainty, the
disaggregated knowledge of workers, which was never assembled nor
tapped, and the ability of non-professionals to use imagination and
critical judgment on technical matters.
Competent technical professionals, such as dam and seismic
engineers, also use skill and artistry, imagination and critical
judgment, but the content of their knowledge tends to be abstract and
general. They rely on impersonal instruments and representations on
paper rather than on direct sensory impressions of fine-scale natural
phenomena. Although OSTP recognized that intuition and judgment are
required for risk analysis, scientists often downplay the skill and
judgment gained by experience, such as seismographers use to
distinguish meaningful patterns from noise.
All sorts of people were seen to possess these kinds of
knowledge. For instance, senior engineers at nuclear power plants
could have intimate knowledge of vital matters not documented in
records. Experienced building inspectors who liked their work were
said to be able to sense infractions before they saw them. Both knew
more than could be put into words. So did ordinary people in various
contexts, such as the New Hampshire farmer with intimate knowledge of
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occasional springs acquired over time, or the housewise speculating on
an analogy between a pressure cooker and a nuclear waste repository, or
Chinese villagers about the behavior of their wells and animals.
The characteristics of such knowledge are often the antithesis of
what is expected of mainstream science. Global generality is replaced
by local particularity, and "rationality" by feelings and intuition.
The knowledge of mainstream science is itself enriched when
specialization is supplemented by aggregation, analysis by synthesis,
and when speculation and criticism replace claims of certainty.
But how can such reliable knowledge be acquired? One way is
through close direct observation of particular phenomena characteristic
of empirical methods of science. NW planners, for instance, recognized
that a remedy for incomplete general descriptions was the direct
inspection of particular conditions at unique sites. But such
knowledge would be incomplete and lack predictive value, and be
conditional on further investigation.
The most reliable kind of knowledge seems to come from discovering
patterns in some combinations of specific factors, often at different
scales or from different sources. A good example was the recognition
by seismic engineers that the frequencies of earth tremors amplify
normal vibrations in structural members to become a major cause of
failure. At a larger scale is the example of the Chinese, who
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recognized that converging patterns of anomalies indicated a coming
quake.
A value of statistical methods is their ability to show patterns
among sets of variables; another value is that the knowledge gained
admits to limited certainty. But statistics, like controlled
experiments, remove variables from contexts, as scientists and
engineers do in taking sample cores from sites, often changing the
nature of phenomena, as exposure to atmosphere does to some
elements." Statisticians also tend to ignore what can not be
quantified, so that the results may be less reliable than what is
implied by stated levels of confidence. In contrast, the grouter,
through repeated fine-scale interactions, appreciates the qualitative
nature at phenomena.
The ability to combine information from multiple sources and
discover patterns was essential in early science. One example was
Mallet, who assembled ordinary people's "felt reports" and observations
of structural damage to discover circles of decreasing seismic
intensity. Reid also combined data from many field surveys to discover
a pattern of discontinuities over time. Both men were open to
surprises and serendipity and the back talk of local phenomena and
people.
The earth scientist Terry Sieh used this kind of approach. He had
to be intimately acquainted with the particular local reality in order
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to know where to dig. Like the Chinese who used knowledge old and new,
indigenous and foreign, and from folklore and science, Sieh combined
knowledge from geology and modern seismology and methods and
instruments old and new, as in a shovel and a modern Geiger counter.
He was not afraid to dirty his hands in direct interaction with the
earth. Like the Chinese, he did not seem interested in building theory
but he discovered a pattern, left by the past, useful for anticipating
future quakes and protecting lives.
The cognitive processes of Sieh and the early empiricists seem
reflected in social processes at a larger scale. For instance, to
arrive at the magnitude of a distant quake requires more than
skillfully interpreting objective data from instruments. In some
cases, seismologists must interact informally, communicating with
contemporaries and comparing data from different locations but also
drawing upon the knowledge of predecessors, the field geologists who
studied and mapped the terrain through which the tremors travelled.
Thus the Richter scale of magnitude can reflect a collective judgment,
combining knowledge old and new, from particular points and of the
larger context, arrived at through social interactions deep within the
institutions of that community of scientists.
Informal relationships across the boundaries between disciplines
are also valuable, as the FDS planners realized in recommending the
formation of interdisciplinary teams, using curiosity, in dam site
investigations. This approach encourages questions and attention to
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odd details, and precludes their being ignored or facily explained by a
single discipline.
Indeed, in the earth sciences neither geophysics nor any one
theory, past or present, seems adequate to explain the diversity of
field phenomena. As the Chinese recognized, predcting unusual events
in the earth requires a social process even more than a theory, so
their approach was to aggregate all kinds of knowledge in order to
discover local patterns through a massive empiricism that transcended
disciplinary and institutional boundaries.
Engineers have also acquired knowledge empirically through direct
interactions with the physical world and informal social arrangements.
One example is John B. Jervis, who build Croton-on-Hudson, the first
large dam for the public purpose of supplying water to New York City.
He knew and loved the landscape. He worked with his men and like Sieh
was not afraid to dirty his hands, gaining an intimate knowledge and a
feel for the site. He also learned lessons from failure.
Engineers have filled gaps in knowledge by learning from
multitudes of past failures, both of dams and buildings in
earthquakes. One of the greatest bridge engineers, John A. Roebling,
learned from understanding why earlier crude suspension bridges
failed. On the other hand, recent engineers have responded to failures
by simply adopting higher standards without critical judgment, as the
Corps did for spillway design. Some nuclear waste engineers would have
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depended on experience in simple salt mining, overlooking how
unprecedented combinations of factors could lead to failures. But they
could also acquire some knowledge about radionuclides in soils from
past failures in leakages at storage sites. Unfortunately, the IRG
lost the opportunity to experiment with spent fuel. It also failed to
treat low level waste sites as opportunities for small-scale
experiments.
The history of seismic engineering offers an example of how
engineering knowledge advances. Both physical proximity to failures in
California and social proximity or informal social arrangements in
academic organizations in that state were helpful. Initially small
groups of faculty and students collaborated in an easy exchange of
ideas at a few universities in California and could study failures
nearby. They even learned from errors in well-engineered buildings, as
when the falling of new light fixtures revealed the importance of the
duration of tremors. They also learned to be leary of new materials
and structural innovations, while the best among them recognized the
need for good judgment.
Bureaucracy was especially uncomfortable with knowledge that could
not be formalized or put on forms, as New Hampshire people learned
about their social concerns and as USGS field workers mentioned before
Congress. Dam officials made this apparent when they protested that
anyone who had knowledge that a dam might fail should speak up; it is
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unlikely that they would accept speculation, feelings, or judgments not
backed by technical data.
Our cases provided one example of how bureaucracy could obtain
local knowledge, from the bottom up, in the final guidelines for
national dam inspections. These guidelines were multileveled,
generalized at the top, as were OSTP's plans. But instead of imposing
stricter controls on those below, they gave states discretion to spell
out more specific guidelines, not consistently for all dams but for
each particular one. At the lowest level, relatively inexperienced
people, much like forest rangers, would use discretion in making visual
inspections. As in the Chinese example, people with special training
would intervene only if something significant were suspected. Thus
judgment was required at the lowest level and responsibility flowed up,
synthesizing and re-embodying the artistry that mainstream engineering
dismembered.
When adequate knowledge cannot be gained through the usual
procedures, joint inquiry requires those with formal expertise to place
a certain trust in the knowledge of those without extensive training in
theoretical matters. On the contrary, NEPEC distrusted even trained
field workers who came to a consensus on patterns of anomalies and
would make a short-term prediction. Seismologists dismissed the
insights of Denver citizens and implied that they themselves had
discovered "by chance" the role of fluids in generating tremors. This
distrust is ironic, since openness and trust are essential in building
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science, where no hypothesis can ever be completely confirmed and where
specialists themselves must suspend disbelief in the judgments of
others outside their own fields.
Formal education and training may not be essential for acquiring
or using knowledge to handle risks. As early empiricists and engineers
demonstrated and the Chinese recognized, equally important is a
combination of human faculties, simple instruments, and a feel for the
patterns of phenomena in the field. Forest rangers at old dams and
even hydrologists at new ones use little more to recognize warning
signs or groundwater patterns.
These Chinese scientists demonstrated a simple method of training
when they intervened minimally on a case-by-case basis with new
recruits, responding to requests to confirm the existence of anomalies,
criticizing only to correct errors, but sustaining efforts with
commendations. Amateurs thus refined their skills in observation and
became experts in particular kinds of local knowledge. In this
country, only two examples were found of amateurs contributing to local
inquiry, a teacher tending instruments at Parkfield under elaborate
contractual arrangements with the USGS and a Connecticut housewife
closely supervised in monitoring seismic sounds. Yet seismology could
benefit vastly from volunteers who might, for instance, help field
geologists dig holes to replicate Sieh's work. But involving laymen in
scientific research would require inventing new social and
institutional arrangements, the topic that follows.
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Alternative Social Arrangements
New models of organizing science and engineering are needed to
facilitate acquiring knowledge for anticipating natural hazards, for
building reliable artifacts, and for taking precautions against
disasters. Such models must accommodate the fact that humans live in a
diverse and ever changing reality. Even members of small local groups
live in different worlds and bring fresh perspectives and different
cognitive skills to the group that facilitate problem solving.
This view of reality differs from that underlying bureaucracy or
expected under a model of economically rational man. Shared concerns
and some trust and openness can be expected to replace competition,
secrecy and suspicion. It is the model behind the EHR planners' view
that success in dealing with hazards depends on decisions -- the
ability to understand and willingness to act -- by individuals and
groups at all levels, continuously sharing responsibility for a safe
environment.
This pluralism was exemplified in California's preparations for
earthquakes. Even schoolchildren could learn about their effects and
what to do. Other people, the elderly, for instance, might not
understand or be able to act and would need help. After a disaster,
some people might be looters but many more could be expected to aid
their neighbors.
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When hazards do not immediately threaten, what kind of social
relations in formal organizations facilitate the acquisition of useful
knowledge and its application in constructing reliable artifacts? Our
stories suggest clues in the organization and operation of two agencies
linked to the federal government, the USGS in science and the Tennessee
Valley Authority in dam engineering.
USGS, a pioneer in science in the federal government, has avoided
the bureaucratic practice of top-down policy making, of imposing
programs on others below or outside, or of constructing huge projects
to control nature. Instead, for over a century, it has concentrated on
describing natural phenomena, responsive to the needs of other agencies
and cooperating with the States. With the recent exception of
seismology, the USGS appears less interested in building theory than in
studying phenomena in the field, assembling detailed descriptions of
local conditions to meet practical needs of engineers and others inside
and outside government. It therefore felt that it was more qualified
to do geologic research for nuclear waste than ERDA, which had received
large sums "just to kick around a few rocks."
Internally, USGS's style of operating has been somewhat unique and
less bureaucratic than that of other agencies. For instance, it
frequently organized researchers in small teams, as in the field near
Teton, and also rotated senior researchers into administration
positions, helping them to understand the relationship between
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acquiring knowledge and applying it. Thus responsiveness, cooperation,
and internal flexibility marked its social arrangements.
USGS acquired knowledge useful for warning of natural hazards or
engineering problems and it has also been willing to take a critical
stance. For instance, it warned the AEC about the burial site in
Idaho, discredited ERDA's assumptions on salt, and battled DOE about
the geology and hydrology of proposed sites, as on the one at Hanford.
In other words, it supplied critical judgment on programs within
bureaucracy itself.
The TVA has been an example of social arrangements that facilitate
sound engineering. Although also linked to the federal bureaucracy,
like the USGS, it maintained independence, for example, by locating its
main offices outside of Washington in the center of its water
management system. For the TVA in a single river basin, like the early
seismic engineers, physical proximity in a small and fairly
concentrated area facilitated communications and awareness of potential
hazards.
Like the USGS, the TVA also has had a unique operating style. For
instance, rather than contracting with outsiders for new construction,
the TVA hired and trained local people who knew the valley intimately
and cared about its future. Its flat and two-tiered organization was
what the FDS panel had in mind and no doubt contributed to informal
two-way communication among designers, constructors, and managers.
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They could readily meet face-to-face to discuss construction and
operating problems and share understandings of how to deal with them.
The temporal continuity of the organization also facilitated
intimate knowledge and communication. Operators and inspectors would
be able to talk with designers and construction people, no doubt
learning things to supplement written documents about how a structure
was actually built. Constructing a sequence of dams in a similar
geologic setting and working with them over time facilitates peer
review and makes possible a kind of learning curve for design.
Another feature of TVA is the visibility of aging artifacts. Old
dams dominate the landscape and enhance the imageability of failures
and thereby stimulate actions. Local control and revenues also have
given TVA financial independence and may explain why it was the first
of the agencies in FEMA to invest in enlarging spillways. It was also
first to adopt emergency plans, conservative ones that might
inconvenience people in needless evacuations but were preferable to no
plans at all.
A notable social characteristic of TVA, in contrast to
bureaucracy, are overlapping, combined, or multiple roles. People who
live in the valley and work for the TVA act as creators, beneficiaries,
and potential victims of TVA dams. Even top officials who do not live
directly below a dam may personally know many people who do. Multiple
roles transform the chain of responsibility into a closely woven fabric
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from which knowledge about risks is more likely to emerge and be acted
upon. Similar conditions existed in older California communities where
residents were the first to impose limits on growth. Since then others
have become aware of the mixed blessing of their landscape and the
hazards of nearby faults, and are voluntarily taking precautions in
workplaces and homes. Sharing awareness of hazards and responsibility
for risks in a small area may also have contributed to TVA's
recognizing a stopping rule on the construction of new dams (turning
however to nuclear power).
In summary, a combination of organizational factors: a flat
structure, spatial limits, continuity in time, and local control,
contribute to a collective understanding and a shared sense of
responsibility for engineering safety. Internal flexibility and
responsiveness to the requirements of outsiders, in a larger social
contest, appear to be valuable characteristics of organizations doing
science. Vital too for obtaining usable knowledge and useful criticism
is placing people on teams, involving them in multiple roles, and
encouraging social interactions among them as co-equal partners. Such
social arrangements seem to stimulate caring about the quality of
knowledge and work to prevent the creation of new hazards.
Planning
In dealing with existing hazards and planning or preparing for
disasters that cannot be predicted, what sort of actions are useful and
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how can they be organizedThe following pages describe planners and
AA
planning markedly different from OSTP's, drawing on examples in the
California EHR program.
Although OSTP created flat organizations for free discussion from
diverse perspectives to prepare written plans, it restricted the
membership on these and imposed time constraints. An alternate model
of planning to produce a document was glimpsed in the time-consuming
"messy process" of preparing seismic safety elements for a few
California communities. The public, local officials, and staff, after
conflicts and compromises, produced plans that even elected officials
accepted as legitimate. We do not know who organized these processes,
but we suspect that the plans were effective because the many people
who participated would act as watchdogs on implementation.
We do know who were the entrepreneurs for effective planning
within the federal bureaucracy, especially in the second "conspiracy"
in FEMA. Both EHR conspiracies were led by mid-level people, who were
in a better position to understand the whole organization than those at
either the top or the bottom. Thiel also had the task of transforming
general policies or plans into specific programs at the cutting edge of
OSTP's double image of bureaucracy. This position no doubt enabled him
to recognize the myth of a layer cake model of the federal system, as
dintinct from the marble cake model of management, e.g. that management
must pull together resources from different levels for appropriate
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actions. Local communities can do some things better than the federal
government.
In both conspiracies, small groups of concerned individuals
communicated informally across institutional boundaries. They were
often critical of one another's ideas. They collaborated inside
bureaucracy, as in the USGS-NSF gentlemen's agreement, but sought
opportunities to collect support from outsiders. This operating style
was anathema to the institutional separation of powers, to a formal
structure for planning such as OSTP had imposed, and indeed to the
rational order expected of bureaucracy. Apparently for such reasons,
the NW planners neglected to work with friends in Congress and with
local communities interested in hosting waste sites and lost
opportunities to aggregate support for their policy.
These EHR planners soon achieved consensus on a limited problem,
the need for a small local experiment, as early engineers might have
done. Instead of splitting technical from non-technical matters, they
combined scientific data (later deemed unreliable) on a possible Los
Angeles quake with the opportunity of a local prediction plan and with
intimate knowledge of how state legislators behave and of where bits of
federal money could be found. They transformed antagonists into
supporters by political persuasion, games, and ploys, enriching their
knowledge and other resources. This synthesis of strategies,
constituencies, and resources was, as Thiel had been told, the
antithesis of the analytical approach of science.
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In contrast, the NW planners focussed on the most contentious
issue, and excluded a concerned and vocal mass of people by their
"neutrality" on nuclear power. They persisted in a conflict between
small practical experiments and obtaining knowledge from science,
rather than seeking ways to combine both in a more robust approach. In
EHR the conflict between building science and taking practical action
has also persisted, as it has to some extent in dam engineering.
Temporal continuity was vital to the EHR effort, and was reflected
in the planners' refusal to accept setbacks as permanent. They
converted defeats to successes, for example when they got the President
to endorse a prototype program, and later when the Seismic Safety
Council fired the disastrous SCEPP director, cut ties with FEMA, and
reorganized for more local autonomy. SSC even benefitted from the
governor's competing program, so that planning for one region merged
with statewide action.
At the local level, SCEPP did not produce general written plans
nor detailed formal procedures but incrementally built informal
support. It wrote agreements with local jurisdictions on a
case-by-case basis, designed to be flexible. It did not try to create
a leader nor a center nor a big organization for implementation; even
the Governor and Hollywood stars were mere symbols to provoke
widespread interest in the cause.
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Yet this program was becoming institutionalized at the bottom, as
SCEPP got into the "doingness" of changing the way people were thinking
and acting in response to the threat. Many preparations required
modest knowledge or simple practical actions, as when, for example,
individual homeowners learned how to shut off gas lines, stockpiled
food and water, secured household objects to walls, or bolted homes to
sills. Neighborhood groups were organizing to share resources should a
major quake occur. Other actions required semiskilled amateurs to
learn to work together as teams, for instance for shortwave radio
communication. A few preparations required highly skilled people to
cooperate in the use of special technology, such as helicopters for
rescue missions.
The model of professionalism underlying SCEPP, unlike that for dam
engineering, involved complex social interactions. The professional
staff not only worked as an interdisciplinary team, but collaborated
closely in a kind of co-inquiry with myriads of individuals and local
groups in the messy social environment, receptive to back talk and
criticism. Like old time professionals, they did not rely on grand
theory but on a kind of charisma to gain support for a cause.
This example illustrates how planning can work in a diversified
social reality, through many people sharing responsibility, acquiring
and using different kinds of knowledge, and being willing to act in a
variety of ways over sustained periods of time. The California EHR
program is more than a random collection of spontaneous individual
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actions. It has become a kind of social movement. The movement is
consistently redesigned by and energized by caring "professionals," in
a traditional and almost obsolete sense of that term. This ends our
interpretation of the case studies. We now conclude this dissertation
with a review of the literature discussed in the first chapter.
The Literature Revisited
He can now compare our position to perspectives taken in the
literature. We have tried to demonstrate how planning for the
management of technological risk in these cases failed because it
relied on generalized models of knowledge, incorporated in scientific
theories, rules and procedures of engineering, and general plans and
policies of bureaucracy. Management failed because of reliance on
institutional actions inappropriate to the physical and social reality
from which natural hazards and technological risks arise. Both
planning and management failed ultimately because the planners at the
top were too far from and out of touch with this reality.
We have seen how generalized models of knowledge and institutions
interacted. Both subdivided functions and tasks in organizations and
among specialized fields of science and engineering, as OSTP itself did
in treating each project as distinct. This process of rationalization,
decomposition, and specialization also marked bureaucratic decision
making, splitting broad decisions on policy and plans apart from
actions, and interposing research, precise criteria, and chains of
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formal procedures on tiers of bureaucrats, thereby preventing
appropriate and timely practical action. While small elites claimed
reliable knowledge, that of all others was ignored or suppressed and
their actions subjected to command and control. This was our diagnosis
of OSTP's failure.
The search for a remedy was informed by Perrow's characterization
of "normal accidents" in man-made systems or artifacts, which arise
from unforeseeable combinations of rather normal variations in events
or processes. But his diagnosis, particularly the mechanistic model of
man-made systems, such as dams and other artifacts set into the earth,
seems too simple. He also failed to see how a combination of
inadequate knowledge and organizational glitches may have precipitated
the failure of Teton.
In spite of the faulty diagnosis, we would extend Perrow's model
of unforeseeable combinations of factors to natural disasters, such as
earthquakes. Faults snap and tremors may occur elsewhere because of
unique combinations of events at particular places, including the
movement of magma deep in the earth, atmospheric changes and/or
configurations of planets high above, interacting with fine-scale
elements in hidden rocks. Rather than the regularities expected, such
subtle couplings necessitate a more organic model of nature, as well as
of artifacts. Such rare combinations of events or unique processes
defy knowledge by analysis, statistical methods, or characterization by
any one field of science, at a single scale, or under any one theory.
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In relation to the literature reviewed in Chapter I, our diagnosis
is not inconsistent with that of the radical theorists, who state that
science and technology have become the dominant ideology, embedded in
major institutions. Nor can we disagree with moderate mainstreamers
who see conflict about technological risks undermining the authority of
government and threatening economic growth. Certainly multiple
defenses increase the costs of engineering projects much as liability
insurance increases costs for professional services. But it makes
sense to question the authoritarianism of bureaucracy and the hubris of
professionals who claim exclusive expertise.
The alternatives are not stronger controls as a remedy nor is
stalemate the only alternative outcome, as mainstreamers suggest. Some
of Perrow's remedies are better: to simplify some systems and to stop
others altogether. We would add the remedy of slowing down the process
of building artifacts, both individual ones and collectively, while
searching for small non-technical solutions at the local level. The
results might be slower technological change but increased
opportunities for learning.
In terms of institutions, our prescription is for change, not
globally as the radical reformers suggest, but by building on a
fundamental institution in our society, political democracy. The
prescription of conservative reformers, of new institutions, is
appropriate, but not at the top to elaborate an already overblown
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bureaucracy, but at the bottom -- many small-scale local ones to detect
and warn of hazards and take precautions or remedial actions.
Our prescriptions are consistent with those political scientists
who would involve the public more in decisions on technological risk,
or as Smith said in FDS, give them a more active role. But their
language on the conditions for participation implies an underlying
mainstream model: the public should be "given" "real choices" through
procedures with "unbiased" management that distribute expertise and
give equal weight to social and technical matters.
In contrast, because moral views underlie all others, as Wildavsky
points out, unbiased management is hard to find. Distributed expertise
belies the expertise of ordinary people on particular matters, which
may be more valid than the experts' generalized knowledge. As we have
seen, social and technical matters are deeply interwoven, and their
relative weights can hardly be quantified. Real choices may not
exist. But most of all, both Nelkin and Smith make participation seem
like a gift, not a right, and one that must be circumscribed by formal
procedures to avoid a confusing babel of voices, conflicts, and social
disorder.
Our prescription picks up on the radical approach of dialogues,
open to participation and criticism by all. But not necessarily on an
ideological level; global arguments are difficult to settle. Disputes
can more readily be resolved by attending directly to case-by-case
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specifics. Local dialogues are needed, directed at whatever hazards
community groups choose, such as those from a local dam, old buildings,
or toxic or hazardous wastes.
Dialogues should be open to all in the chain or network of
responsibility, including those with technical expertise. Ordinary
people need help in understanding technical terms, in grasping the laws
of probability and appreciating formal reasoning on matters of chance,
as social psychologists have pointed out, but they must also trust
their direct observations and knowledge. The technicians' role is not
to educate people to the insignificant nature of "real risks" they
face, but to act as co-equals, making accessible technical aspects of
problems, as we have tried to do, and also respecting others' insights
and judgments. By collaborating, all may achieve a fuller
understanding, make incremental decisions, and find one voice, as OSTP
would have done, but in a tentative manner on locally focussed issues.
Nor is verbal dialogue enough. Intimate knowledge and a feel for
phenomena require direct interactions with the physical world in order
to detect errors, to correct them, and to take precautionary actions.
As Wildavsky says, risks as well as reality are socially
constructed. Risks are constructed not only conceptually in the things
people recognize as risky, but in the sense of physical artifacts and
of decisions, as when people freely choose to live below dams or in
seismic areas, if they have a choice. In contrast to Nildavsky's
simple general theory of types, we found a complex and pluralistic
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society, for instance, entrepreneurs within bureaucratic hierarchies
and lowly construction workers who were knowledgeable and critical
about technical matters. Such exceptions to stereotypes open up
opportunities for innovative social arrangements in dealing with risks.
If, as Wildavsky says, our technological world contains more risks
than anyone can be aware of, and if natural disasters and man made
failures arise in subtle and often unforeseen ways, there are plenty of
hidden hazards for people to choose from. But many local groups and
individuals also exist to attend to them. The majority of people may
continue to hold mainstream views, but pluralism creates opportunities
for many other individuals and groups to address and work to reduce
particular hazards they dread.
To cope with uncertainty, or in this case to cope with
unprecedented hazards, Weick would advise organizing in new ways. We
would prescribe small flat organizations as substitutes for large
formal hierarchies. Even in these, those at the top and bottom could
cooperate with mid-level people and focus on small practical actions
instead of on diffuse worries. The aim of organizing is not to create
elaborate written plans but to devise original sketch maps showing
qualities hitherto edited out. Instead of recipes, these could be
guides to local experiments and ongoing social processes in which all
have opportunities to express their voices and take appropriate actions.
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From the perspective of technical rationality, approaching
technological risks in this way may be like stepping through a looking
glass; everything appears upside down, inside out, or reversed. But
instead of treating the two perspectives as distinct and opposed, we
need to combine both images, and indeed many perspectives.
He conclude with some speculations raised earlier about science.
Is reduction of technological risks a matter of more and better
research? Or, in spite of what scientists claim, is there something
inherent in science itself that precludes knowledge for limiting these
risks? Some combination of positive and negative answers seem valid.
"In principle," science supplies useful general knowledge that is often
reliable to describe and predict normal events. But such knowledge too
often is "faulty" in practice, when specific data are poorly understood
and when particular phenomena are elusive and subject to change. More
research and better theory based on past observations can be of little
help.
New kinds of knowledge are needed, open to understandings based on
direct observations and also open to intuitions, hunches, and
feelings. These may not always be expressible in words but may
nevertheless be as rational as public "dread" may be. In addition,
there is the need to combine and balance knowledge old and new,
indigenous and foreign, from folklore and science, in particular
cases. This requires artistry and new forms of social and engineering
arrangements.
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Social rationality enriches understanding for decisions on natural
and man-made hazards, but if solutions cannot be found, it at least
facilitates a diversity of coping actions. It also offers the comfort
of social bonding to compensate for the irreducible uncertainty and
technological risks, and the ultimate dread of individual mortality,
the only real certainty. Social rationality offers the hope that
society, transcending individuals, will survive.
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NOTES
1. Degenkolb, "Earthquake Engineering," 117-129.
2. Alan DeMarr interview.
3. Wesson and Filson, "USGS Program."
4. Frank Perkins interview.
5. Panel, 27.
6. Issues Draft, 16.
7. "Staff Notes #9 for the Earthquake Hazard Reduction Group (WG),
October 12, 1977."
8. Greenwood's "Notes on Meeting November 2, 1977," of DOE and USGS
called by OMB on Nuclear Waste Management. For instance, news of
USGS concerns about salt had not "filtered up" to waste managers
in DOE.
9. Karl Steinbrugge in interview in Berkeley, Calif., November 24,
1972, said he made this expectation clear to the Working Group.
10. Comment in "Proposed Outline for Issues Paper," May 29, 1978,
pointed out that three criteria, the redundancy of the
alternatives, timing (now or later), and greater or lesser
conservatism would create an unwieldly set of eight alternative
strategies.
11. Greenwood, "Nuclear Waste Management," 23.
12. Ibid, 21.
13. Martin Rein suggested the germ "fogging."
14. IRG Report, 70.
15. Greenwood, Ibid. 2.
16. Hays, Program and Plans, Glossary.
17. IRG Report, 42.
18. Luth mentions one compound of interest commonly found in salt that
is transformed into a liquid and evaporates in the presence of
atmospheric humidity; another compound, anhydrite, greatly
increases in volume in the presence of moisture.
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